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THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL OPINION, 
PART II:  BACK TO THE FUTURE FROM THE ROBERTS COURT TO 
LEARNED HAND – SEGMENTATION, AUDIENCE, AND THE 
OPPORTUNITY OF JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR 
Jeffrey A. Van Detta* 
I. INTRODUCTION
This is a continuation of the work I undertook in an article that appeared in Vo-
lume 12 of this publication.  There I made a close and exacting examination of 
representative opinions written by Judge Learned Hand during the midst of his 
fifteen--year Federal District Court tenure.  That examination germinated from the 
attention recently garnered by the decline in influence of the opinions of American 
courts, including the Supreme Court of the United States, in the estimation of 
courts around the world.1
I posited a number of influences on this trend.  Among them was a surprising2
lack of trial court experience among the members of the Roberts Court, as well as a 
seemingly concomitant lack of appreciation for the process of writing opinions at 
the Federal District Court level, which I posited was a gap in knowledge and expe-
rience that leads to less effective appellate opinion writing.  By looking to the 
strengths and opportunities of Learned Hand’s work as a U.S. District Judge, I be-
lieved we would achieve greater insight into improving the cognitive impact of all 
American judicial opinion writing by looking “back to the future” from the pers-
pective of the decade and a half of trial court opinion writing experience by the 
jurist who went on to become America’s most famous 20th century federal appel-
late judge.  
 ________________________  
 * Professor of Law, John Marshall Law School-Atlanta, Georgia.   Professor Van Detta served as law 
clerk to Judge Roger J. Miner, U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals, 1987-1988.  I wish to thank our Library 
Director, Professor Michael Lynch, and our Research Librarian and Head of Public Services, the incomparable 
Mary Wilson, for their extraordinary assistance throughout Parts I and II of this article.  I also wish to thank The 
Barry Law Review’s Editor-in-Chief, Kevin Dilg, for suggesting that there might be two articles in my material, 
and the student editorial staff, for their tireless efforts and excellent work. 
 1.  Adam Liptak,  American Exception: U.S. Court Is Now Guiding Fewer Nations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 
2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com; American judicial opinions once “were ‘studied with as much 
attention in New Delhi or Strasbourg as they are in Washington, D.C.’”  Id. Now, according to authorities as 
diverse as Chief Justice Aharon Barak of Israel and Justice Michael Kirby of Australia, “America is in danger . . . 
of becoming something of a legal backwater . . . .” Michael Kirby, Think Globally,  4 GREEN BAG 2d 287, 291 
(2001); see also Aharon Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy ,
116 HARV. L. REV. 16 (2002). 
 2. But see LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE SUPREME COURT 32 (2006) (observ-
ing that “[t]oday’s Court is different from the past ones in that, during the period between 1994 until 2005, eight of 
the nine justices had prior experience as a judge, mostly at the federal circuit court level, or as a state appellate 
court justices. . . . In contrast, when Earl Warren was named Chief Justice in 1953, only Justices Minton and Black 
had prior experience on the bench . . . .”)
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In short, by understanding the challenges of trial court opinion writing and re-
lating those to the writings of opinions by the courts that review them, we would 
achieve a more holistic vision of what contributed to the formerly high reputation 
of American court opinions, and what may have changed on the road to their de-
cline and fall in international reputation. 
My stated objectives in that previous undertaking also apply to the present en-
deavor: 
But how does Hand stand up as a writer of trial court opinions? Is 
a great appellate writer also a great writer of findings of facts, con-
clusions of law, and judgments? By what standards would we 
judge Hand as a judicial writer, based on his legacy of published 
trial court opinions (which number over 1,000)?  Would good trial-
court writing skills produce better appellate opinions?  Would giv-
ing more weight to trial-court experience in judicial selection 
processes improve the insight and quality of appellate opinions? 
To solve the riddle of the decline and fall of the American judicial 
opinion, I have written two articles – this is Part I of II —and I 
start here not with an exegesis of the politics or opinions of the 
Roberts Court.  Rather, in both articles I seek to go back to the fu-
ture, by looking to Learned Hand’s trial court writing and what it 
can teach us, in order to evaluate the current state of American 
judicial writing.  A critical component of this undertaking is the 
adoption of a methodology well suited for the analytic task.  Thus, 
these articles undertake to answer each of those questions, using 
the principles and techniques of superior legal writing developed 
by Armstrong and Terrell in their seminal work: THINKING 
LIKE A WRITER.3   
The tools I used in Part I, and continue to employ in Part II, are those which 
Terrell and Armstrong have adapted from cognitive psychology and tailored to the 
arts of legal writing and editing.4 Part I examined Hand’s District Court opinions 
 ________________________  
 3. Jeffrey A. Van Detta, The Decline And Fall Of The American Judicial Opinion, Part I:  Back To The 
Future From The Roberts Court To Learned Hand--Context And Congruence, 12 Barry L. Rev. 53 (2009) (citing 
STEPHEN V. ARMSTRONG & TIMOTHY P. TERRELL, THINKING LIKE A WRITER: A LAWYER’S GUIDE TO EFFECTIVE 
WRITING AND EDITING (1992) [hereinafter ARMSTRONG & TERRELL 1st]; STEPHEN V. ARMSTRONG & TIMOTHY P.
TERRELL, THINKING LIKE A WRITER: A LAWYER’S GUIDE TO EFFECTIVE WRITING AND EDITING (2d ed., Practis-
ing Law Institute 2003) [hereinafter ARMSTRONG & TERRELL 2d].   
 4. Using Terrell’s and Armstrong’s framework for evaluating the cognitive virtues and vices of judicial 
opinion wring makes much more sense than some of the recent efforts by professors at national law schools to set 
up citation frequency as a proxy for the quality of written opinions.  See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi and J. Mitu Gulati, 
Choosing The Next Supreme Court Justice:  An Empirical Ranking Of Judge Performance , 78 SO. CAL. L. REV.
23, 48-49 (2004).  Such approaches do not survive even the lightest scrutiny by those familiar with how federal 
courts really work.  The  fatal flaw of using citation counts as a proxy for quality is evident  to anyone taking a 
moment to consider the many reasons that particular court cases happen to be cited – their status as Circuit 
precedent, their vintage as an overview or most recent statement of the law of the Circuit, and the mere fact that 
more senior judges on appellate panels tend to end up with the presiding duties and many more opinions to write—
2
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from the context and the congruence principles, two of the four foundational prin-
ciples articulated in Terrell and Armstrong’s work.  I observed that the results evi-
denced a mixed bag, moments of strength and superior coherence intermixed with 
more stretches of a somewhat banal, work-a-day approach, lacking in the merits of 
establishing context and achieving congruence. 
What bringing to bear the segmentation and the audience principles will reveal 
about Hand as a trial-court opinion writer is the subject of the present article.  Here, 
I will make holistic observations about Hand’s trial-court writing, and will consider 
the complete picture painted from the perspective of all four foundational prin-
ciples. 
I will also discuss how the recent confirmation of the first U.S. Supreme Court 
Justice in our lifetimes with extensive experience on the U.S. District Court creates 
a unique opportunity for the Supreme Court to apply the lessons from Learned 
Hand’s strengths and opportunities in trial-court opinion writing to reclaim lost 
leadership among the world’s high courts.
II. “THINKING LIKE A WRITER”: THE PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUES OF 
EFFECTIVE LEGAL PROSE—SEGMENTATION AND AUDIENCE
In Part I, I explained the crucial analogy between legal thought and legal writ-
ing upon which Terrell and Armstrong construct a highly effective taxonomy and 
analytic template for excellence in legal writing and editing.  Terrell and 
Armstrong note that just as legal principles are the overarching guides from which 
legal rules spring, so too are the “background principles” of effective legal writing 
that, “establish the framework within which all [written] rules (and what we will 
call ‘techniques’) apply.”5  The principles of effective writing, “speak to fundamen-
tal purposes” and guide legal writers in, “assess[ing] the relative importance of 
specific rules (and techniques), to choose among them when they conflict, and to 
draw them together toward the single end of clear, persuasive prose.”6  These prin-
ciples are the product of applied cognitive psychology.7
that have nothing whatsoever to do with the “quality” of the written opinion.  In fact, the author from long hours of 
personal experience as a federal appellate judge’s clerk can testify emphatically that federal courts do not base 
their search for and use of authorities on how “well written” they are, nor do they have a rich palette of degrees of 
writing excellence from which to choose.   
 5. ARMSTRONG & TERRELL 1st, supra note 3 at 1-2 to 1-3 (citing RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS 
SERIOUSLY (1976)).  
 6. ARMSTRONG & TERRELL 1st, supra note 3, at 1-3.  Having lived with both texts for a number of years, 
including as a senior lecturer for LAWriters, www.lawriters.org, Professor Terrell’s platform for instructing judges 
and practicing lawyers on this conceptualization of effective legal writing, I borrow freely from both works, rather 
than treating either as urtext, and consider them as, together, providing the overall approach used in my analysis 
below. 
 7. Raffaele Caterina, Comparative Law and the Cognitive Revolution, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1501 (2004).  
Professor Caterina observes that:  
[T]he development of cognitive science brings on stage human nature. Models of vision and 
object recognition, generation and comprehension of language, reasoning and other cogni-
tive processes elaborated by cognitive science are universal models. The linking of the cog-
nitive processes to deep mechanisms characteristic of our species brings with itself the re-
construction of human nature. 
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As explained in Part I, Terrell and Armstrong have distilled effective legal 
writing into four principles that apply at the level of the entire document (which 
they call macro-organization). First, the context principle: readers absorb informa-
tion best if they understand its significance as soon as they receive it. Second, the 
congruence principle: the organization of the information should match the logic of 
the analysis. Third, the segmentation principle: readers absorb information best if it 
is presented to them in relatively short pieces that do not exhaust the reader’s span 
of attention.  Fourth, the audience principle:  readers are much more attentive and 
receptive if the writer approaches the material from the readers’, rather than the 
writer’s, perspective. An effective writer not only applies these principles, but does 
so with an informed perspective from having determined the identities, knowledge 
bases, and needs of each audience of the document.  
The context and congruence principles were explained, explored, and applied 
in Part I.   Here in part II, we explain the content, and consequences, of the seg-
mentation and audience principles.
A. The Segmentation Principle 
The segmentation principle is based on a fundamental observation from cogni-
tive psychology.  That observation is that, “[r]eaders absorb information best if 
they can absorb it in pieces.”8  The genesis of the segmentation principle however 
should not be misunderstood as a patronizing view of modern readers’ abilities, nor 
founded on a defeatist attitude toward the products of our current system of educa-
tion.  As Terrell and Armstrong observe: 
[P]roperly applied, this principle is more than a sop to your read-
ers’ impatience.  It should walk hand in hand with an earlier prin-
ciple:  Make the structure explicit. . . .  If you break your prose into 
chunks, the divisions should help to make the document’s structure 
Id. at  1501; accord Adam J. Hirsch, Cognitive Jurisprudence, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331 (2003); Alan M. Lerner, 
Using Our Brains:  What Cognitive Science and Social Psychology Teach Us about Teaching Law Students to 
Make Ethical, Professionally Responsible, Choices, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 643 (2004).  A significant application 
of cognitive theory has delved into the heart of judicial decision-making itself: 
Based on a connectionist cognitive architecture, coherence-based reasoning shows that the 
decision-making process progresses bidirectionally: premises and facts both determine con-
clusions and are affected by them in return. A natural result of this cognitive process is a 
skewing of the premises and facts toward inflated support for the chosen decision. . . . [This 
theory of cognition may be applied] to four important aspects of the trial. . . . [C]urrent doc-
trine in these areas is based on misconceptions about human cognition, which lead to syste-
matic legal errors. By identifying the cognitive phenomena that lie at the root of these fail-
ings, the research makes it possible to devise interventions and introduce procedures that re-
duce the risk of trial error. 
Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making , 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
511, 511 (2004).  Similarly, by identifying the cognitive phenomena that lie at the root of reader incomprehension, 
Terrell and Armstrong’s work make it possible to devise interventions – the principles of effective writing – and to 
introduce procedures (the techniques for implementing the principles) that reduce reader incomprehension. 
 8. ARMSTRONG & TERRELL 2d, supra note 3, at 33; see ARMSTRONG & TERRELL 1st, supra note 3, at 5-
21 to 5-23. 
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visible.  And, if you set out to make the structure explicit, a step 
that requires you to make it clear to yourself, you will find it much 
easier to “chunk” the writing.9
In practice, this principle applies throughout a document.  First, on a macro-
organizational level, large blocks of undifferentiated text are quite daunting to 
readers and generally operate as a metaphorical “keep out sign”.  On a more so-
phisticated level they are writer’s equivalent of the greeting to Hell imagined by 
Dante:  “ABANDON ALL HOPE, YOU WHO ENTER HERE[!]”10  The writer, 
however, is not condemned to this outcome.  Rather, the writer can take the reader 
by the hand, as Virgil took Dante, and use segmenting (i.e., “chunking”) of blocks 
of information to make the information mentally digestible.  This is accomplished 
by breaking up larger blocks of text using subheadings, shorter paragraphs, and 
“white space” on the page.11
Within the mid-level (or “intermediate”) structure of a document, even short-
ened paragraphs can be made more comprehensible to readers by employing seg-
menting devices such as numerical lists or bullet point presentations.12  At the mi-
cro-level, segmenting requires crafting sentences to either be shorter, or to be bro-
ken into mentally digestible segments, separated by an effective use of punctua-
tion.13
 ________________________  
 9. ARMSTRONG & TERRELL 2d, supra note 3, at 16, 114; see ARMSTRONG & TERRELL 1st, supra note 3, 
at 5-21 to 5-23. 
 10. DANTE ALIGHIERI, THE INFERNO OF DANTE 25 (Robert Pinsky trans., Farrar, Straus & Giroux 1994) 
(emphasis added). 
 11. ARMSTRONG & TERRELL 2d, supra note 3, at 16, 33-34, 114.  The concept of white space is the idea of 
using the absence of text itself as a communicative and organizing tool.  As a case in point, Armstrong and Terrell 
quote the following observation from a writing manual published by a federal agency whose regulatory ambit 
includes the most vexing of reader unfriendly documents—financial disclosure statements: 
The white space signals a break for the reader while lightening the overall look of the doc-
ument.  White space especially strikes readers of disclosure documents because these docu-
ments usually feature dense blocks of impenetrable text.  Increased white space invites read-
ing and emphasizes important points. 
Id. at 117 (citing U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, PLAIN ENGLISH MANUAL: HOW TO CREATE CLEAR SEC
DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS 50 (1998), available at http://www.sec.gov/pdf/handbook.pdf). 
 12. Id. at 114, 118–121. 
 13. Id. at 16, 33–34, 114.  This is in sharp contrast to the trite admonition, “write short sentences.” Id. at 
117.  Two of the greatest American stylists of political language—Abraham Lincoln and Rev. Dr. Martin Luther 
King, Jr.—showed great adeptness at using very long, yet very readable, sentences to convey complex ideas.  For 
example, the famous closing sentence of Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address is justly celebrated for its clarity, memora-
bility, and communicative power.  Yet it also weighs in at a hefty eighty-four words.  The words are punctuated so 
carefully and naturally that to subtract even one would destroy the sentence’s effectiveness.  See, e.g., GARRY 
WILLS, LINCOLN AT GETTYSBURG: THE WORDS THAT REMADE AMERICA 60-61, 171-75 (Simon & Schuster 
1992); see also, e.g.,  RONALD C. WHITE, JR., LINCOLN’S GREATEST SPEECH: THE SECOND INAUGURAL 18, 153, 
154 (2002) (noting that in emphasizing that the scourge of war was divine retribution for the “offence” of slavery, 
“[i]n a complex sentence of eighty-six words, he worked with imagery that brought the long dark night of slavery 
under an intense light that allowed his audience both to see and to understand the dimensions of this American 
‘offence.’”) (original emphasis); id. at 19 (where the famous last sentence of the Second Inaugural, “With malice 
toward none; with charity for all” demonstrates a powerful combination of complex ideas that is incredibly for-
ward-moving and easy to read despite being seventy-six words in length). An even more impressive example is the 
over 300-word sentence in Dr. King’s Letter from a Birmingham Jail, where he lists the grievances of the African-
American community in a sentence that flows like a mighty river to a waterfall, with an ever-rising surge of syn-
5
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B. The Audience Principle 
Although discussed last, the fourth principle is one that imbues and guides the 
implementation of the other three principles.  “Readers pay more attention if you 
approach your material from their perspective, not yours,” Terrell and Armstrong 
observe.14  The challenge, they say, is ab initio, from the get-go, to “mak[e] busy, 
impatient readers pay attention throughout the document—not grudgingly, not just 
out of a sense of duty, but because you have shown that they will be richly re-
warded.”15  To use modern business parlance, the first persuasion that must be 
achieved in any legal writing is to persuade the reader that working through all of 
your text “adds value” to him or her.  Thus, Terrell and Armstrong liken the writ-
er’s preparation for a writing project to “preparing to negotiate” to “kno[w] as 
much as possible about” the reader’s “business environment and background and, 
most importantly, about” the reader’s “real needs, as distinct from his explicit de-
mands.”16 Thus, they advise determining whether you are writing for “more than 
one audience”——to whom will this writing be important or useful?—to under-
stand what each audience really wants, (besides “a thorough, reliable legal analy-
sis”) and determining what each audience already knows about your subject to 
avoid “being condescending or wasting time.”17  Among other techniques for im-
plementing the audience principle, the writer needs to determine “which conven-
tions of style and organization will seem natural” to each audience “and which will 
seem alien[,]”18 as well as to  “analyze the practical constraints”—i.e., “[h]ow 
much time do you have, and how much effort is the project worth[.]”19  Taking the 
reader-centric approach advocated in this principle will prevent the writer from 
“becom[ing] a sopilist, creating an audience to suit his needs rather than adapting 
himself to his audience.”20
tactical power producing an incredible rhetorical effect that leaves the reader feeling the depth of outrage created 
by racist societal institutions.  See MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., Letter from a Birmingham Jail, in WHY WE CAN’T
WAIT 64, 69-70 (2000).  
 14. ARMSTRONG & TERRELL 2d, supra note 3, at 17 (emphasis added). 
 15. Id. at 126.   
 16. ARMSTRONG & TERRELL 1st, supra note 3, at 2-1. 
 17. Id. at 2-2, 2-4. 
18. Id. at 2-3.  The result, say Armstrong and Terrell, is the “more you can show your readers that you 
understand how they think and speak, the more receptive they will be.”  ARMSTRONG & TERRELL 2d, supra note 3, 
at 129.   Thus, the writer should keep three reader questions in mind:   
[1] “Will you help me?  Or will leave . . . [the mental heavy-lifting to me by] just hand[ing] 
me some information and then leave me to figure out how I should use it?”; [2] “Will you 
use my time efficiently?  Or . . . waste it by [repeating] what I already know[,] . . . or by . . . 
[forcing] me to wade through pages of tedious detail before I . . . [come upon] anything [in 
your document that] I care about?”;  and [3] “Are we even from the same planet?”   
Id. at 135–36.  Thus, writers are admonished to, “[a]t the start, show (quickly) that you will give your readers 
practical help without wasting their time” because “[i]n those few seconds, you often win or lose your struggle to 
capture the reader’s attention and establish your credibility.” Id. at 130.  This short window of opportunity with 
readers is dramatized by J.K. Rowling in the opening of a Harry Potter novel.  See J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER 
AND THE HALF-BLOOD PRINCE 1-2 (2005) (describing narrating the internalized, cognitive reaction of a busy 
politician attempting to wade through a subordinate’s memorandum, until the politician “gave it up as a bad job”). 
 19. ARMSTRONG & TERRELL 1st, supra note 3, at 2-10. 
 20. Id.
6
Barry Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 2
https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol13/iss1/2
Fall 2009 Decline & Fall: Part II 35
III. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE LEARNED HAND: HIS APPROACH TO           
THE TRIAL COURT WRITING TASK—SEGMENTATION AND AUDIENCE
A. Making the Digestible Indigestible:  The Segmentation Principle in Dis-
trict Judge Hand’s Opinions
Many of the observations made already about the context and congruence prin-
ciples also apply to the way in which Hand approached the segmentation principle.  
Some of his writing, as in the Masses, does an effective job of presenting informa-
tion to the reader in segments, or “chunks,” that allow the reader to absorb it most 
effectively.  In other opinions critiqued above, Hand has not assisted his readers as 
much as he might by scrupulous attention to the cognitive implications of this prin-
ciple. 
The cardinal tenet of segmentation is that readers absorb information best if it 
is presented to them in relatively short pieces that do not exhaust the reader’s span 
of attention.  In practice, this principle applies throughout a document on a macro-
organizational level, large blocks of undifferentiated text are quite daunting to 
readers; in many opinions, Hand does not seem to notice this, and he, like many 
judges of the era, did not take advantage of ways to re-package of blocks of infor-
mation to make them mentally digestible —e.g., by using subheadings, shorter 
paragraphs, and white space on the page.  As previously noted, even paragraphs 
can be made more comprehensible to readers by employing these techniques; 
Hand’s paragraphs work better from a segmentation perspective —although pri-
marily not by intelligent design, but rather by his realization of the segmentation 
principle at the micro-level, where he more often crafted sentences either to be 
shorter, or to be broken into mentally digestible segments, separated by effective 
use of punctuation. 
Indeed, Learned Hand’s greatest strength as a judicial writer was his ability to 
construct strong, clear, and oftentimes, even songful sentences—a—as noted pre-
viously, Hand was a balladeer in his heart of hearts, and the rhythm of ballad often 
seems to permeate his best sentences.  If one reads these sentences aloud, for ex-
ample, the listener’s ear is attuned not only to the segmentation through grammati-
cal units, but also to a beat running through them not unlike the effect of “the four-
teener”21 epitomized in George Chapman’s celebrated Elizabethan translations of 
Homer: 
And therefore since my mother-queene (fam’d for her silver feet) 
Told me two fates about my death in my direction meet —
The one, that, if I here remaine t’assist our victorie 
 ________________________  
 21. “A Fourteener, in poetry, is a line consisting of 14 syllables, usually having 7 iambic feet, often used in 
16th century English verse.”  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fourteener_(poetry) (last visited March 21, 2008). 
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My safe returne shall never live, my fame shall never die: 
If my returne obtaine successe, much of my fame decayes 
But death shall linger his approach and I live many dayes.22
Both intellectually and aesthetically, then, segmentation was for Hand primari-
ly a function of his sentences.  These were like unto the bricks from which he as-
sembled his District Court opinions from the ground up. Thus, unlike some judges 
who appear to start from the “big idea” and work their way down to the sentence-
level, Hand’s writing gives the appearance of a master mason at work on the wall 
of a cathedral, his ultimate objective—deciding a case—clear in his mind’s eye, but 
his conception of the task emanating from the bricks—the individual quanta of 
ideas—that lay before him in his carefully crafted sentences.  To paraphrase Emily 
Dickinson, Hand’s “wars were laid away” in sentences.23
1. Segmentation in Aid of Fairness:  In re Denny
In re Denny24  presents a case of contemporary resonance, in which Hand uses 
cognitive segmentation in aid of a fair outcome.  Born in Russia, having resided in 
the British Empire, and having petitioned to become a naturalized English citizen, 
Denny sought United States citizenship, but his lawyer erred in guiding his applica-
tion and created a technical ground for denying his application.25  His filings stated 
he was foreswearing loyalty to the Russian Czar, when in fact he needed to do that 
with respect to his most recent sovereign, King George V of England.26  Rather 
than subject Denny to deportation and other harsh consequences (as he might well 
be subjected to in our immigration environment of today), Hand sought to do equi-
ty.  In doing so, he recognized that his opinion was of significance “for future 
guidance in this circuit.”27  Hand’s organization of the opinion is a bit problematic 
from both the context and congruence perspectives. He begins the opinion by stat-
ing cases with which he disagrees, and their citations, but without explanation as to 
what issue they are relevant, what they hold, or why he is rejecting them (other 
than to say “none of these are authoritative” and to suggest they run counter to his 
“quite positive belief” that Denny “is entitled to” the benefit of his doubt).28   De-
spite this inauspicious opening, Hand crafts the most important section of the opi-
 ________________________  
 22. GEORGE CHAPMAN, CHAPMAN’S HOMER: THE ILIAD, Bk. 9, lines 396-401, at 191 (Allardyce Nicoll 
ed. 1998)  (This is the famous passage where Achilles explains the choice confronting him of living a short yet 
glorious life—or living a long yet undistinguished one, as most men do.).   
 23. EMILY DICKINSON, My Wars Are Laid Away In Books, Poem No. 1579 (1882) from THE POEMS OF
EMILY DICKINSON: READING EDITION 581 (R.W. Franklin, editor 1998). 
 24. In re Denny, 240 F. 845 (S.D.N.Y. 1917). 
 25. Id. at 845. 
 26. Id.
 27. Id. at 846. 
 28. Id.
8
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nion, the two well-constructed paragraphs setting forth the “reasons” which Hand 
determined it was “proper for [him] to give” in support of the ruling.29
The segmentation skills displayed by Hand in these two paragraphs operate at 
both the paragraph and sentence level.  Grammatical cores contain the most impor-
tant information and are clearly constructed; he observes the OI/NI sequencing; 
and he skillfully uses dependent and parenthetical clauses to make effective transi-
tions, to set up points of emphasis, and to provide a rhythm, variety, and vitality 
that makes his writing in these two critical passages of the opinion both lively and 
memorable.  To roughly paraphrase Cervantes, the proof of the segmenting is in 
the reading:30
The question is whether, when in his declaration and petition an 
applicant has honestly mistaken the name of the sovereign whose 
allegiance he means to abjure, he may, upon final hearing, abjure 
the proper sovereign, and, if necessary, correct the declaration and 
petition.  At the outset I may observe that, unless there be some 
particular jurisdictional reason, every reasonable motive should al-
low the relief, which would be allowed at the present day in every 
other form of legal proceeding, so far as I know.  No one wants 
gratuitously to impose upon naturalization proceedings that tech-
nical spirit which easily follows a literal application of so detailed 
a statute, and which results in vexatious disappointment, and in 
needless irritation, to a defenseless class of persons necessarily left 
to the guidance of officials, except in so far as the courts may miti-
gate the rigors of their interpretation.  The decisions in question 
have, therefore, all depended upon the supposed jurisdictional na-
ture of the requirement.  
The section controlling the case is section 4, which provides the 
preliminaries upon which the citizen may apply for admission.  
The first formality is the ‘declaration of intention’ to become a cit-
izen and to renounce his allegiance ‘to any foreign prince, poten-
tate, state, or sovereignty, and particularly, by name, to the prince, 
potentate, state, or sovereignty of which the alien may be at the 
time a citizen or subject.’  This must be at least two years before 
his admission, and must be followed by a petition, three months 
before his admission, which must repeat the earlier expression of 
his intention in the same words. Under our notions of national feal-
ty, accepted in part by other nations, a subject may voluntarily and 
with the consent of his new sovereign change his allegiance.  His 
own consent is to be manifested by his oath of abjuration and his 
 ________________________  
 29. Id. at 846–47. 
 30. MIGUEL DE CERVANTES SAAVEDRA, DON QUIXOTE, Pt. I, Book IV, Ch. 10. (Edith  Grossman, tr., 
2003)(“the proof of the pudding is in the eating”). 
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oath of allegiance. Hence the critical fact for the change in alle-
giance is the oath; that is the definitive act by which the change 
takes place, and perhaps even an innocent mistake in that is fatal.  
At least that question may be reserved. However, the applicant’s
prior declarations, either in the ‘declaration of intention’ or in the 
‘petition,’ are both mere preliminaries, designed to assure the new 
sovereign of the persistency of the applicant’s purpose, and per-
haps in a measure as well to identify him by his existing alle-
giance.31
The sentences sing, as does Chapman’s Homer, and they build a strong analy-
sis within an opinion that is otherwise rather undistinguished in its structure, de-
spite the importance of its topic.  
2. The Ada 
In an admiralty case captioned The Ada, 32 Hand handles the prose well at the 
sentence level, which may be why Hand is so often quoted,33 and why Robert Jack-
son advised the bar to “quote Learned;” but the macro-structure may have impelled 
Jackson to admonish the bar to “follow Gus.”34
The Ada is a classic work product of a very busy judge.  Hand’s opinion does 
not even open with the obligatory lengthy, small-font factual recitation.  We simply 
learn that this is a “[s]uit by the Universal Transportation Company, Incorporated, 
against the steamship Ada and the Rederiaktiebolaget Amie” and that the case is “in
admiralty” and “[o]n exceptions to the commissioner’s report.”35  We are not given 
context.  For example, what is the nature of the claim?  Tort?  Contract?  Special 
rules of admiralty law?  And what is a commissioner?  What is the commissioner’s
role in the decision of the case?  These, and numerous other matters, are not ex-
plained to the reader.  We are given no roadmap—only a declaration, clear and 
 ________________________  
 31. Denny, 240 F. at 846-847. 
 32. The Ada, 239 F. 363 (2d Cir. 1916), rev’d on other grounds, 250 F. 194 (2d Cir.1918). 
 33. Richard A. Posner, The Learned Hand Biography And The Question Of Judicial Greatness, 104 YALE 
L.J. 511, 536 (1994).  Posner starts from the thesis that “[t]he counting of citations to the work of a [judge] is 
therefore a possible method of evaluating the quality of the [judge’s] output, and of comparing the output of dif-
ferent [judges].” Id. at 534-35.  (Employing an empirical analysis of citations by other courts of the Second Cir-
cuit opinions of Hand as well as other Second Circuit Judges who served 1925-1961, Posner finds that Hand leads 
by a wide margin in total citations (nearly 2,300) but also, more significantly, that contemporary judges continued 
to cite Hand in the last period studied by Posner, 1988-1992.  Posner notes that he considers this to be “a measure 
of the durability of a judge’s opinions” and notes that “here Hand’s lead is the greatest.” Id.
 34. See, e.g., Pierre Riou, Note, General Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations: All That Glitters Is Not 
Gold Issue Mining, 14 REV. LITIG. 741, 765 n. 137 (1994) (quoting Dictionary of American Biography 269 (James 
A. Garraty, ed. Supp. 5 1977) ); Adam J. White, Justice Jackson’s Draft Opinions In The Steel Seizure Cases, 69 
ALB. L. REV. 1107, 1110 n. 18 (2006) (quoting Robert H. Jackson, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Why 
Learned and Augustus Hand Became Great, Address before the New York County Lawyers’ Association (Dec. 
13, 1951) (“[I]f I were to write a prescription for becoming the perfect district judge, it would be always to quote 
Learned and always to follow Gus.”), available at
http://www.roberthjackson .org/documents /Why%20Learned%C20and%C20Augustus%C20Hand%C20Became%
G! reat.pdf. 
 35. Ada, 239 F. at 363–64. 
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unmistakable, that if we are not a party to this case, Hand is of no mind to helping 
us fathom it. “The commissioner’s report gives the general facts in the case with 
enough detail to justify the omission of any preliminary statement, and I may there-
fore proceed at once to the specific matters in dispute as shown by the excep-
tions.”36
Hand, however, does not make that report part of the opinion, neither as an at-
tachment nor as an appendix.  Thus, Hand is in effect telling us that he is in control 
of what he wants us to know and he has no intention of making it easy for us to 
know what he knows.  On the macro-structural level, the opinion’s structure does 
not mirror the overall logic of the analysis—the only structure he appears to pro-
vide is around default organizations, and even there, he is not consistent.  For ex-
ample, Hand declares that the organizing structure he has chosen is another docu-
ment to which we are not privy—the “exceptions” that have been filed to the com-
missioner’s report, although we are not told by whom (i.e., one or both parties) 
those exceptions are filed.37  Even if the exceptions themselves suggested some 
logical structure, it would be easier to navigate this opinion.  But they do not ap-
pear to, and making matters even more challenging for the reader, he really is not 
using the exceptions as the organizing structure!  Instead, he immediately quotes 
eight issues—not exceptions to the Commissioner’s findings or conclusions—
which appear to be listed in issues that were delegated to the Commissioner to ad-
dress, rather than organized around the logic of the exceptions.38  And even this 
opening listing is a false roadmap; the opinion does not contain a correlative set of 
headings or subheadings that match the organization of the eight questions he lists.  
In fact, Hand uses a few “lead sentence fragments” that tersely have as their refe-
rent some of the eight issues he listed as “the exceptions.”39
For example, his lead sentence fragment, to which the West editors assigned 
Headnote 1, “The Outward Voyage,” corresponds to the first “exception” he listed 
up front: “First.  What was the primary damage from the loss of the outward 
voyage from New York to Genoa, about May 1, 1916?”40  He includes in this dis-
cussion, however, an evaluation of profits, which was separately listed as the 
second issue up front; he provides the reader no separate indication that he is doing 
so.41  The discussion of lost profits consumes several pages in which Hand dis-
cusses numerous sub-arguments, uncontextualized documentary and testimonial 
evidence, and calculation issues that fall upon the reader like a surprise rain shower 
encountered without an umbrella.42  Only after several pages of reciting this “bu-
shel of facts”43 does Hand provide any container that gives us a clue as to their 
legal relevance:  “All this evidence should, in my judgment, have some effect upon 
whether the Ada could have booked more freight than she did, but for the with-
 ________________________  
 36. Id. at 363. 
 37. Id. at 363–64. 
 38. Id.
 39. Id. at 364. 
 40. Compare id. at 364 with id. at 363. 
 41. Compare id. at 364–65 with id. at 363–64. 
 42. Id. at 364–67. 
 43. See GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 65 (1994). 
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drawal.”44  He discusses arguments, counterarguments, and additional sub-issues 
for another page and a half.45
We then are greeted with lead sentence fragments, “The Future Return Voyage 
From Genoa,”46 “The Loss on the Zealandia” (which appears more confusing as it 
is designated by the West editor as Headnote 2, although it appears to correspond 
with Hand’s third issue)47;”The Sarnia and the General Damages” and “The Net 
Freight Inward,” which appear to correspond to the Fourth and Fifth issues stated 
by Hand up front but which have no numbering indicating that;48 “Incidental 
Items,” “The Payments Of Hire Under Charter,” and “Interest” (once again, made 
more confusing for the reader trying to deduce the macro-structure as it is desig-
nated by the West editor as Headnote 3, although it corresponds to the Eighth is-
sue),  which appear to correspond to the Sixth through Eighth issues listed up 
front.49  Thus, while a reader can labor to figure out what Hand is doing—and what 
Hand is doing is logical—it takes several re-readings and cross-referencing across 
the opinion to do so, and considerable retention of information (the “Eight issues”)
in short-term memory to do so.50  The reader has carried the burden of the mental 
heavy lifting with little help. 
To truly understand what this case is about, one must go to the Second Cir-
cuit’s opinion on the appeal from Judge Hand’s decision—in which the appeals 
court reversed.51  The Second Circuit sets out at least a comprehensible narrative of 
how the case arose, what the claims and arguments were of the parties, and the 
context for Judge Hand’s decision.  The appeals court did not address any of the 
 ________________________  
 44. Ada, 239 F. at 366. 
 45. Id. at 367–68. 
 46. Id. at 367. 
 47. Compare id. at 368 with id. at 363. 
 48. Compare id. at 369 with id. at 364.  The “Net Freight Forward” becomes quite confusing because Hand 
appears to begin going through a detailed list of accounting credits and disbursements, some of which he identifies 
by number (e.g., “item 10”), others of which he identifies by a phrase or a sentence (“The Journal of Commerce 
item is disallowed” or “The coal at Bermuda would have cost $1500.  I follow the commissioner” or “I disallow 
Stapleton’s and allow Hennessey’s charges”).  Id. at 369–71.  It is almost as if this portion of the opinion is the 
judge scanning down through a list, scanning the commissioner’s report, and reacting out loud with his words 
transcribed by the stenographer, although the opinion does not so state.  Hand even initiates out of nowhere a 
discussion of the effect of some mysterious “interlocutory,” collateral proceeding, introduced out of the blue with 
the opening phrase, “As to Judge Sith’s order, it was irrelevant to the question”, and Hand tells us little more than 
that “[i]t would be extremely unjust to throw out $9,000 from the account on any such procedural point as the 
supposed impropriety of cross-examining one’s own witness.  After some experience in trials, I think I can say that 
I have never seen a case where the objection made [sic] for justice, unless a willing witness was being led.” Id. at 
371. 
 49. Compare id. at 371–72 with id. at 364. 
 50. See Terrell and Armstrong’s discussion of the ineffectiveness of a writing that expects readers to carry 
excessive amounts of information in “suspension” in order to understand the significance of information provided 
by the writer later in the document.  ARMSTRONG & TERRELL, supra note 3, at 3-2.  Judge John Minor Wisdom 
once waded through Hand’s opinion to encapsulate it in this concise way:   “Judge Hand found that the owner had 
wrongfully withdrawn the vessel and was liable to the charterer for the loss sustained by it as charterer, although 
the damages for breach of the sale provisions were not recoverable in admiralty.”  Jack Neilson, Inc. v. Tug Peggy, 
428 F.2d 54, 59 (5th Cir. 1970). 
 51. The Ada, 250 F. 194 (2d Cir. 1918). 
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questions taken up by Hand, since it was found that the matters Hand decided were 
outside of the District Court’s admiralty jurisdiction.52
Then why do I contend this opinion is at all memorable, given its macro-
organizational problems and its subsequent reversal, albeit on procedural grounds 
that Hand did not pass upon?  Although it dealt not with a citable subject matter 
jurisdictional issue and instead dealt with the fine points in dispute between the 
parties, the opinion enjoys twenty-two citations in Westlaw (in cases, treatises, and 
briefs), the most recent of which occurred in 1997 by a federal appeals court and in 
2006 by a federal district court.53  Why?  Because, I maintain, the strength of 
Hand’s ability to express ideas clearly, concisely, and memorably in his sentences 
and paragraphs.   
For example, in Navieros Inter-Americanos, S.A. v. M/V Vasilia Exp.,54 the 
First Circuit cited to a concise, pithy, and memorable statement of the rule Hand 
articulated in terms of damages due for breach of a time charter: 
The breach of the Navieros time charter occurred when the vessel 
was diverted to the use of Comet, after performance of the Navie-
ros contract commenced but before Navieros’s cargo was loaded.  
Without noting the distinction, defendants assert that the measure 
of damages should be that which is used in cases where the owner 
breached the charter party by repudiating it before performance 
began.  The general rule for recovery in that situation was stated 
long ago by Judge Learned Hand: “the withdrawal of the ship 
entitled [the charterer] prima facie to damages measured by the 
difference between the hire reserved in the charter and the hire 
necessary to secure such another bottom.”55
While it may well be Hand’s reputation that otherwise impelled the court to se-
ize upon one of his cases for citation and quotation, I think that it is equally true 
that the expression of key ideas in this case with Hand’s careful attention to seg-
mentation and syntax make them attractive even beyond the fading memory of his 
admiralty work.  The opinion is replete with sentences, and paragraphs that bear 
 ________________________  
 52. Id. at 194 (“We shall dispose of the case on grounds which relieve us from the duty of considering the 
merits at all. . . . Evidently the whole controversy could have been disposed of in an action at law, but the jurisdic-
tion of a court of admiralty is confined to maritime subjects. It cannot, having obtained jurisdiction, dispose of 
nonmaritime subjects, for the purpose of doing complete justice, after the manner of courts of equity, nor can it 
distribute funds in its possession, as do courts of equity and bankruptcy, among all creditors, preferred and gener-
al.”). Id. at 194.  Interestingly, although the decision was unanimous, each judge of the three-judge panel wrote 
separately. Id. at 194 (Opinion of Ward, J.) , 197-198 (Opinion of Rogers, J.), 198 (Opinion of Hough, J.) 
 53. Navieros Inter-Americanos, S.A. v. M/V Vasilia Exp,120 F.3d 304 (1st Cir. 1997); Onhtrup v. Gal-
lagher, 2006 WL 2792790, *6 (D.N.J. Sep 27, 2006) (NO. CIV.A.03 4891 TJB).  International commercial arbi-
trators have also relied on Hand’s Ada opinion.  See, e.g., In The Matter Of An Arbitration Between Federal Com-
merce And Navigation Company Limited, Charterer, And Overseas Bulk Transport Corp., Owner Of S. S. Dryad., 
Arbitration At New York, N.Y., 1973 A.M.C. 2065, 2068 (Arbit. May 08, 1972) 
 54. Navieros, 120 F.3d 304 (1st Cir. 1997). 
 55. Id. at 317 (quoting The Ada, 239 F. 363, 364 (S.D.N.Y.1916), rev’d on other grounds, 250 F. 194 (2d 
Cir.1918)) (emphasis supplied). 
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their length by appropriate punctuation and syntax—take for example his assess-
ment of a witness’s testimony on lost profits: 
There is no evidence of the inward freights, except F. Frankel’s es-
timate that it would result in a gross return of $15,000, equal to the 
first voyage.  The witness supposed that $7,500 of freight was due 
at New York, though the account subsequently disclosed nearly 
$11,000.  It seems, therefore, that the libelants had already col-
lected at Genoa and Leghorn $7,500, and that the gross freight on 
that voyage was $18,500.  I can scarcely make such an inference, 
however, without more basis, considering the power of the libe-
lants to produce the exact facts.  Assuming that the inward voyage 
netted $11,000, have we any ground for accepting F. Frankel’s es-
timate that the next would have done so?  Taken merely as an es-
timate, it seems to me clear that we have not.  The witness made 
no attempt to show that he knew the values or conditions at Genoa. 
Yet the testimony, which might have been justified by adequate in-
formation, was not objected to, so far as I can find, and the libe-
lants had good reason to suppose that it would not be challenged.  
Whether they could have supported it no one can tell, but they 
should have been advised that the respondents would insist that it 
was insufficient.  That the ship would have earned some freight 
was practically certain. The amount would in any case necessarily 
have been an estimate, and there was at least some basis for sup-
posing that the earlier voyage was an indication of what it would 
have been.  When Frankel made that estimate, he testified to an 
opinion which, being possibly competent, should stand while un-
challenged.  I allow $11,000 for the inward voyage.56
Similarly, Hand uses a strong segmentation technique of using complex sen-
tences appropriately balanced by placement of subordinate clauses and punctuation 
to make the following finding that is based more so on an absence of credible evi-
dence rather than its presence: 
As I have already indicated, it presses my credulity hard, especial-
ly in view of Herrmann’s and Nichols’ testimony, to suppose that, 
in such dearth of shipping as existed, the mere withdrawal of the 
Ada without any fault of the charterers should so have affected 
their power to fill the Zealandia; but the proof stands uncontra-
dicted, with the exception of the witnesses just mentioned, that the 
cancellations were because of the withdrawal. Moreover, there 
would apparently have been no trouble on the face of it in calling 
those shippers who canceled to see whether any effort was made to 
 ________________________  
 56. Ada, 239 F. at 367-368. 
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secure them for the Zealandia, and why they refused. Upon such a 
record, whatever I may suspect, I do not feel at liberty to disregard 
proof which the commissioner has accepted.  I shall therefore as-
sume that the Zealandia was not filled because of the Ada’s with-
drawal.57
Hand’s greatest strength as a trial court writer may have been his ability to 
build from the bottom up, rather than from the top down.  At the building-block 
level of lawyerly communication—the sentence and the paragraph—he was a mas-
ter of the segmentation principle in action.  Given his excellent undergraduate edu-
cation by luminaries including George Santayana, that comes as no surprise.58
B. For Whom are You Writing?  The Problem of Audience in District 
Judge Hand’s Opinions
1.  A Tale of Two Hands:  “Razzle-Dazzle” and “The Importance of Being 
Earnest”
The Audience Principle,59 discussed in Section II.D, supra, is implicated 
throughout our examination of principles relating to context, congruence, organiz-
ing patterns, and segmentation.  The choices the judicial writer makes in these 
areas are important components in the sum total of his or her approach to the au-
dience.  To that list we add syntax as well. 
Syntax—word choice—can often be a determinative factor in assessing the ac-
cessibility and cognitive effectiveness of prose.60  While syntax may not change the 
ultimate meaning of a phrase, a sentence, or an opinion, it can change the efficacy 
of communicating the message – and in some cases, the message itself.61   
Syntax can be inviting and inclusive.  Or it can be opaque and exclusive.  A 
reader’s cognitive reaction to syntactically difficult judicial writing might well be 
described in Franz Kafka’s parable:
[O]f a “man from the country” who seeks the Law.  A doorkeeper 
stands at the entrance to the Law and bars admittance. The man sits 
down and waits for days, weeks, months, and years.  He examines 
 ________________________  
 57. Id. at 368. 
 58. GUNTHER, supra note 43, at 33-35. 
 59. ARMSTRONG & TERRELL 2d , supra note 3, at 128. (“Readers pay more attention if you approach your 
material from their perspective, not yours.”  In addition, the Audience Principle commands us to explicitly deter-
mine who our audience is, whether we have multiple audiences, and what varying content and degree of meta -
information those audiences bring to the reading of our work.) ARMSTRONG & TERRELL 1st, supra note 3, at 2-1–
2-8. 
 60. See, e.g., Edward J. Eberle, Comparative Law, 13 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 93, 100 (2007) (“Law 
and literature teaches us the power and complexity of language in shaping legal data. Words, their syntax, gram-
mar, style and the like convey the particular context in which words sit, and form meaning.”). 
 61. See, e.g., Parker B. Potter, Jr., Antipodal Invective: A Field Guide To Kangaroos In American Cour-
trooms, 39 AKRON L. REV. 73 (2006) (a fascinating study of how courts and litigants have affected their messages 
by including the phrase “kangaroo court” in the syntax). 
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the doorkeeper with his eyes and cross-examines him with his 
questions.  As the man grows old and death draws near, he asks 
one final question of the doorkeeper: why, during this long period 
of time, no one else has come to seek admittance to the Law.  The 
doorkeeper roars into the man’s nearly deaf ear that the gate to the 
Law “was made only for you.  I am now going to shut it.” 62
Syntax serves as an implicit invitation, or exclusion, of the audience whom the 
writer wishes to engage.  In a revealing remark made towards the end of his judi-
cial career, Learned Hand observed that, “I confess when I look at my service it 
seems to have been for the most part trivial.  It amounted to a good deal to the 
people at the moment.”63  Hand’s district court opinions reveal that, in the main, he 
seemed to be writing for lawyers representing the immediate parties to the case and 
for himself—occasionally with an eye, too, for an appeals court, but certainly not 
always. 
a.  “Razzle-Dazzle”
Hand did not seem to be especially dedicated to an inclusive approach to writ-
ing.  Like the English attorneys who could not bear to give up their beloved French 
law even when the language was deader than a doornail, Hand demonstrated an 
unusual proclivity, at times, to restrict full understanding of his opinions to a 
smaller circle – a circle who, like himself, would have known the things that a clas-
sically educated young man at Harvard in the 1890s would have learned from pro-
fessors such as the fabled Santayana.64  In fact, Hand’s greatest weakness in terms 
of audience was that he sometimes wrote in a cryptic, almost exclusionary sort of 
way—for the “guild.”  Second Circuit Judge Roger Miner, among the finest of our 
judicial writers, once referred to the writing of judges who like to sound important 
and make things look harder than they really are — or, as the English would say, 
are prone to making rather heavy weather of it — as “razzle-dazzle.”  At times, that 
phrase describes Hand’s judicial writing as well.
Hand’s clubby, collegiate mindset is perhaps best exemplified by one of his 
more curious writing idiosyncrasies.  This being his fondness for the relatively 
obscure Latin phrase, vade mecum, which roughly means a handbook or a “bible”
for some area of specialty.  In an early personal jurisdiction case, that in some ways 
was a stepping-stone to International Shoe,65 Hand offers us vade mecum in the 
 ________________________  
 62. George Dargo, Reclaiming Franz Kafka, Doctor of Jurisprudence, 45 BRANDEIS L. J. 495, 501 (2007). 
 63. Fifty Years of Federal Judicial Service, 264 F.2d 5, 27 (2d Cir. 1959)(special session to commemorate 
50 years of service by Hand) (separately paginated section). 
 64. See GUNTHER, supra note 43, at 33-35 (quoting hand as stating that the study of philosophy was his 
“‘first love’”, and his reverence for George Santayana, a member of Harvard’s faculty during Hand’s student years 
and one of his teachers, most often remembered today for his aphorism about those not remembering history being 
condemned to repeat it). 
 65. See Jeffery A. Van Detta & Shiv K. Kapoor, Extraterritorial Personal Jurisdiction For The Twenty-
First Century: A Case Study Reconceptualizing The Typical Long-Arm Statute To Codify And Refine International 
Shoe After Its First Sixty Years, 3 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 339 (2007). 
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denouement to his opinion.  In that case, describing what would later come to be 
called the lack of a non-resident defendant’s forum contacts for purposes of per-
sonal jurisdiction analysis, there occurs a passage that a few courts have quoted 
(adding to the already small number of times any federal judge since 1796 has used 
vade mecum in a published judicial opinion): 
None of this, and not all of it, seems to us a good reason for draw-
ing the defendant into a suit away from its home state.  In the end 
there is nothing more to be said than that all the defendant’s local 
activities, taken together, do not make it reasonable to impose such 
a burden upon it.  It is fairer that the plaintiffs should go to Boston 
than that the defendant should come here. Certainly such a stan-
dard is no less vague than any that the courts have hitherto set up; 
one may look from one end of the decisions to the other and find 
no vade mecum.66
“Vade mecum,” a 21st century reader might ask, “what does that phrase 
mean?”
Vade mecum67 appears again in numerous Hand opinions and dissents in the 
Court of Appeals.68  One might expect some judges to feel the need to write more 
learned-sounding prose in an appeals court capacity.  Yet vade mecum also ap-
peared in at least one of Hand’s district court opinions.69   
Among legal phrases, even in 1930, this was not one typically encountered.  In 
fact, a search of the Federal Reporter series through 2007 reveals that the phrase 
has been used in twenty-three federal judicial opinions from 1796 until its last ap-
pearance in 1999, eight of which (35%) Hand authored as noted above.70  That kind 
of syntax seems to be quite uninviting, even among the most narrowly conceived 
audience of judicial opinions; and it excludes many readers whose educations did 
not include a substantial amount of Latin instruction.  While the education of many 
who became lawyers included some Latin, given the paucity of the use of vade 
mecum in the federal courts suggests that is not one of the helpful Latin legal 
 ________________________  
 66. Hutchinson, 45 F.2d at 142. 
 67. A vade mecum is a useful reference, such as a handbook, OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 1027 
(1980). 
 68. New York Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 68 F.2d 19, 20 (2d Cir. 1933); Catalin 
Corporation of America v. Catalazuli Mfg. Co., 79 F.2d 593, 595 (2d Cir. 1935); Kuhner v. Irving Trust Co., 85 
F.2d 35, 38 (2d Cir. 1936); Pink v. U.S., 105 F.2d 183, 188 (2d Cir. 1939) (Hand, J., dissenting); U.S. v. 
Goldstein, 120 F.2d 485, 491 (2d Cir.  1941); U.S. v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950).   
 69. Van Heusen Products v. Earl & Wilson, 300 F. 922, 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (“The prospect of getting 
objective tests for invention is tempting, but it is a mirage. How is it possible to say a priori what combination of 
elements needs an original twist of the mind, and what is within the compass of the ordinary clod? Is it not clear 
that the quality of a man’s inventiveness must be tested by reconstituting the situation as it was in the light of the 
preceding history of the art? There is no vade mecum for such inquiries.”).  
 70. Compare Roberts v. Cay’s Ex’rs, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 260, 261 (1796) (in which the phrase is part of the 
title of a treatise listed in a string citation), with Longhi v. Animal & Plant Health Inspection Service, 165 F.3d 
1057, 1060 (6th Cir. 1999) (in which Judge Nelson writes, “This prohibition is found in Subchapter A of Title 9 of 
the Code of Federal Regulations, the Agriculture Department’s vade mecum of regulatory provisions relating to 
animal welfare.”).    
17
: Decline & Fall: Part II
Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2009
46 Barry Law Review Vol. 13 
phrases that many 19th and early 20th century lawyers and judges incorporated into 
their syntax.  Further, considering how many attorneys of the day clerked their way 
into bar admission with a minimum of formal education.  The use of such a Latin 
phrase could leave out many of the audience even in the legal profession.  Indeed, 
when the Military Court of Appeals employed it in a 1954 opinion, the court felt 
the need to define it immediately:  “This Court has, from the first, emphasized that 
the Manual for Courts-Martial constitutes the military lawyers’ vade mecum, his 
very Bible.”71
b. The Importance of Being Earnest 
Perhaps Hand’s greatest strength in terms of audience was his impressive and 
consistent earnestness in judicial writing.  Hand understood, as we have seen, the 
terrors and tribulations of being a litigant.72  Hand also held a modest assessment of 
his own corpus of judicial work that was focused on the parties before him:  that “I
confess when I look at my service it seems to have been for the most part trivial.  It 
amounted to a good deal to the people at the moment.”73  Thus, in any of the opi-
nions known to the author, Hand always treated the rendering of the opinion with 
the seriousness of purpose and sense of occasion for the litigants befitting the judi-
cial role and the deconstructive suffering endured by all litigants as a result of the 
process, no matter how “due,” itself.74  While that may seem obvious to some, ex-
pected, de rigeur, it is not so simple. 
Complexities abound from judges who become too literary, and use the opi-
nion as an opportunity to impress in a manner usually reserved for creative writing 
classes.  Judge John Brown, for example, whose maritime and admiralty opinions 
are deservedly celebrated for their clarity, did have a distracting habit of injecting 
“humor” into his opinions.  His clerks reminisce fondly about it: 
Judge Brown’s legal opinions are equally legendary.  Judge Brown 
very much believed that the law and its language need not be dull 
and lifeless.  Legal writing was his passion and ultimately, his leg-
 ________________________  
 71. U.S. v. Drain, 1954 WL 2443 (CMA), 16 C.M.R. 220, 4 USCMA 646, 648 (Ct. Mil. App. 1954).  
Certainly, of course, Hand might have explained his reference this way—that he did not do so is telling for his 
view of the audience.  One might compare the way that even the antiquarian Cardozo dealt with terms or phrases 
on which he sought to build his metaphors; thus, while he felt no need to help the reader with the unusual word, 
“punctilio” in Meinhard v. Salmon, he sometimes took more solicitude for the reader, as when he sought to build a 
metaphor on a modern medical device,  the sphygmograph. See, e.g., People v. Zachowitz, 172 N.E. 466, 467 
(N.Y. 1930) (“The sphygmograph records with graphic certainty the fluctuations of the pulse. There is no instru-
ment yet invented that records with equal certainty the fluctuations of the mind.”).  Cardozo’s use of the word does 
not appear, however, entirely accurate.  See, e.g., Jennifer Leonard Nevins, Measuring The Mind: A Comparison 
Of Personality Testing To Polygraph Testing In The Hiring Process, 109 Penn. St. L. Rev.  857, 864 n.56 (2005) 
(describing the device as one of three used in polygraphing, “to record changes in blood pressure”). 
 72. See generally GUNTHER, supra note 43.  
 73. Fifty Years of Federal Judicial Service, 264 F.2d 5, 27 (2d Cir. 1959)(special session to commemorate 
50 years of service by Hand) (separately paginated section). 
 74. See, e.g., ANITA MILLER, UNCOLLECTING CHEEVER: THE FAMILY OF JOHN CHEEVER VS. ACADEMY 
CHICAGO PUBLISHERS (1999) (describing bankrupting effects--emotionally and financially--of protracted litigation 
between author’s widow and small publishing house). 
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acy. As a result, he and his clerks made every effort to make his 
opinions entertaining as well as illuminating.  In fact, when I be-
gan clerking for the Judge, I was told that the funnier the draft (in 
appropriate cases, of course) the more likely he was to accept it 
without changes.  That proved to be pretty good advice. As a re-
sult, “Pac-Man” starred in one of our opinions, and even Dickens 
was employed as the voice of garbage to describe its landfill desti-
nation as the “far, far better rest I go to than I have ever known.”75
Yet, the humorous school of judging takes little account of the sacrifice of 
emotion, time, expense, resources, and orientation within the context of normal life 
that attends all litigation, even that involving “soulless corporations,” for individual 
corporate agents have responsibility for the litigation and are typically among the 
witnesses; these sufferings Hand always seemed to be keenly aware of.  Imagine 
then, what Hand’s reaction might have been to the following anecdote about Judge 
Brown: 
Judge Brown’s creativity in making his point through humor is 
shown in Croft & Scully Co. v. M/V Skulptor Vuchetich.  The issue 
in the case was whether the $500 package limitation set forth by 
the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) applied to a 20-foot 
steel container that held 1,755 cases of a soft drink called Dela-
ware Punch.  In the context of a container that capsized during 
loading operations at Houston, Judge Brown declined to apply the 
[COGSA package monetary limitation.]  He noted that “Pepsi Cola 
Hits the Spot-On the Pavement”; “during the Refreshing Pause be-
tween the arrival of the container and the arrival of the Skulptor”;
“42,120 cans of soft drinks crashed to the ground, never a thirst to 
quench”; “[i]n the Crush. . . . [t]he stevedore . . . was in no mood 
to have a Coke and a smile”; “the winds of judicial change 
Schwepped away the $500 shelter”; and the appellee’s argument 
held “no water, carbonated or otherwise.”76
The litigants—and lawyers —in this case spent considerable time, resources, 
and efforts arguing these points.  To make their dispute the subject of corny humor 
 ________________________  
 75. Collyn A. Peddie, Lessons From The Master-The Legacy Of Judge John R. Brown, 25 HOUS. J. INT’L
L. 247, 250 (2003) (footnotes omitted) (Pettie attempted to rationalize Brown’s thinking by asserting that “[t]here 
was a method to the Judge’s apparent madness. Judge Brown instinctively knew that humor-perhaps more than 
any other language tool—has the ability to make an idea memorable and concrete and to explain a complex con-
cept in terms that people can understand.”). Id. at 250.  While that may be true, there are other, countervailing 
considerations in writing a judicial opinion—lessons of the Audience Principle.  See, e.g., Patterson v. People of 
State of Colorado ex rel. Attorney General of State of Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 465 (Brewer, J., dissenting) (taking 
Justice Holmes to task gently for treating as “frivolous . . . a distinct claim that [appellant] was denied that which 
he asserted to be a right guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.”). 
 76. Gus A. Schill, Jr., John R. Brown (1910-1993): The Judge Who Charted The Course, 25 HOUS. J. INT’L
L. 241, 243-244 (2003) (discussing Croft & Scully Co. v. M/V Skulptor Vuchetich, 664 F.2d 1277 (5th Cir. 1982) 
(footnotes omitted)). 
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that would not pass muster in even the remotest of Catskill Resorts77 would seem to 
trivialize the gravity of the dispute to the parties, let alone the legal system.  This is 
something Hand would never do.78
The Audience Principle is even more poorly served by judicial opinions that 
actually poke fun at parties.  A most egregious example, now included in law-
school casebooks on contracts,79 is the New York Appellate Division’s opinion in 
Stambovsky v. Ackley.80  Justice Rubin’s majority opinion is a rollicking exercise in 
finding as many ways to work in words and phrases relating to the supernatural as 
possible; however, the jokes not only are demeaning to the parties (however skep-
tical one is of the world of the supernatural) but also interfere in communicating to 
a broader audience the nature of the case and the issues that required an appellate 
opinion to resolve them.  In fact, it is only in the dissenting opinion of Justice 
Smith, who plays it straight, that we clearly learn what the case is about: 
Plaintiff seeks to rescind his contract to purchase defendant Ack-
ley’s residential property and recover his down payment. Plaintiff 
alleges that Ackley and her real estate broker, defendant Ellis Real-
ty, made material misrepresentations of the property in that they 
failed to disclose that Ackley believed that the house was haunted 
by poltergeists.  Moreover, Ackley shared this belief with her 
community and the general public through articles published in 
Reader’s Digest (1977) and the local newspaper (1982).  In No-
vember 1989, approximately two months after the parties entered 
into the contract of sale but subsequent to the scheduled October 2, 
 ________________________  
 77. For those unfamiliar with the genre of “borscht-belt” humor, this cultural phenomenon is nicely sur-
veyed at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Borscht_Belt (last visited March 26, 2008). 
 78. Hand might well have shared the sentiments of W.S. Gilbert, the 19th century barrister best recalled as 
the pungent librettist for Sir Arthur Sullivan in their string of hit operettas.  See generally ANDREW GOODMAN, 
GILBERT AND SULLIVAN AT LAW 9-10, 15 (1983).   Into the mouth of Ko-Ko, the “Lord High Executioner 
of Titipu,” Gilbert placed his famous song “I’ve got a little list.”   Included among those whom Ko-Ko considered 
as executable to satisfy the Mikado’s one-execution-per-month decree are “society offenders who might well be 
underground/and who never would be missed” — such as “that Nisi Prius nuisance, who just now is rather rife, 
The Judicial humorist.”  W.S. Gilbert, The Mikado, Act I, lines 240-242, 262-263, in THE COMPLETE ANNOTATED 
GILBERT & SULLIVAN 571, 573 (Ian Bradley, ed. 1996).  Ian Bradley notes that the phenomenon that Gilbert was 
skewering may have been lost on non-lawyers producing The Mikado in the latter 20th Century.  See id. at 572, nn. 
263, 264.  One wonders what Gilbert might have made of Justice Peter Smith’s 71-page ruling in The Da Vinci 
Code copyright lawsuit he decided — in which he embedded, among his findings, his own “Code” which he 
challenges readers to decipher .  Sarah Lyall, A Puzzle Embedded In “Code” Ruling, N.Y.TIMES, Apr. 27, 2006, at 
B1, B8 (noting that the judge wrote that deciphering his “code” was “[t]he key to solving the conundrum posed by 
this judgment”).  The reporter charitably characterized the opinion as “an opportunity for Justice Smith to indulge 
in a flight of judicial and cryptographic fancy.” Id. at B1 (noting that the “Code” covered over 13 pages of the 
opinion, and even included the typeface as one of the “clues”).  Of course, neither Gilbert nor the author intend to 
make light of real iudecide, a phenomenon unimaginable in Victorian England but all-too-familiar to American 
federal judges from the 1970s onward.  See, e.g., Remembering A Judge Who Died For His Work, N.Y. Times, 
May 3, 1992, at section 1, p. 50 (New York edition); Rick Lyman, Focus on Safety for Judges Outside the Cour-
troom, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 2005, at A18.  
 79. E.g., BRIAN BLUM & AMY BUSHAW, CONTRACTS: CASES, DISCUSSION, AND PROBLEMS 333 (1st ed. 
2003). 
 80. 169 A.D.2d 254 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dep’t 1991). 
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1989 closing, the house was included in a five-house walking tour 
and again described in the local newspaper as being haunted. 
Prior to closing, plaintiff learned of this reputation and unsuccess-
fully sought to rescind the $650,000 contract of sale and obtain re-
turn of his $32,500 down payment without resort to litigation.  The 
plaintiff then commenced this action for that relief and alleged that 
he would not have entered into the contract had he been so advised 
and that as a result of the alleged poltergeist activity, the market 
value and resaleability of the property was greatly diminished.  De-
fendant Ackley has counterclaimed for specific performance.81
It is rare that the dissent has to take on the tasks of setting forth the basic facts 
and claims in the case.  But Justice Rubin’s opinion left Judge Smith little choice.  
Justice Rubin opens the opinion with the first in a string of bad puns, “The majority 
opinion goes on to observe that ‘no divination is required to conclude that it is de-
fendant’s promotional efforts in publicizing her close encounters with these spirits 
which fostered the home’s reputation in the community.”82  But Justice Rubin was 
just getting his comedy-club audience warmed up, as we see him “top” himself in 
the next passage: 
While I agree with Supreme Court that the real estate broker, as 
agent for the seller, is under no duty to disclose to a potential buyer 
the phantasmal reputation of the premises and that, in his pursuit of 
a legal remedy for fraudulent misrepresentation against the seller, 
plaintiff hasn’t a ghost of a chance, I am nevertheless moved by 
the spirit of equity to allow the buyer to seek rescission of the con-
tract of sale and recovery of his down payment.83
But Justice Rubin was not done.  As if we were reading the work of a judicial 
Jim Carey, having lost control of a skit and now far over the top and out of any 
reasonable bounds of decorum, we are treated to the climatic passage of the opi-
nion, “Pity me not but lend thy serious hearing to what I shall unfold.”84
From the perspective of a person in the position of plaintiff herein, 
a very practical problem arises with respect to the discovery of a 
paranormal phenomenon: “Who you gonna’ call?” as the title 
song to the movie “Ghostbusters” asks. Applying the strict rule of 
caveat emptor to a contract involving a house possessed by pol-
tergeists conjures up visions of a psychic or medium routinely ac-
companying the structural engineer and Terminix man on an in-
 ________________________  
81. Id. at 261. 
 82. Id. at 256. 
 83. Id. at 256 (emphases added). 
 84. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET THE FIRST ACT, sc. 5. 
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spection of every home subject to a contract of sale.  It portends
that the prudent attorney will establish an escrow account lest the 
subject of the transaction come back to haunt him and his client-or 
pray that his malpractice insurance coverage extends to superna-
tural disasters. In the interest of avoiding such untenable conse-
quences, the notion that a haunting is a condition which can and 
should be ascertained upon reasonable inspection of the premises 
is a hobgoblin which should be exorcised from the body of legal 
precedent and laid quietly to rest.85
In their teaching notes on this case, Professors Brian Blum and Amy Bushaw 
of the Lewis & Clark School of Law posit troubling questions about this opinion, 
striking at the heart of the Audience Principle: 
We don’t mean to spoil the fun, but think that it is worth raising 
the issue of whether it is appropriate, and not a lapse of proper 
judicial conduct, for a judge to write an amusing or facetious opi-
nion.  Although the facts may be funny to an outsider, the parties 
have spent considerable money and time, and have no doubt in-
curred some emotional cost, in litigating the case.  Their percep-
tion of the system of justice may be diminished by an opinion that 
is not serious and judicious, even if the case itself seems silly.  
(There are more appropriate sanctions for frivolous or vexatious 
litigation.)86
Two of these points especially merit further development and emphasis.  First, 
the diminution of the judicial system from such writing is not just in the eyes of the 
parties, it has toxicity for the judiciary (abasing general rules of decorum and sensi-
tivity in adjudication), for the legal profession (where professionalism and decorum 
are already seriously at-risk), for the general public (to see courts having a laugh at 
the expense of non-lawyers and non-insiders) -and for law students (who read such 
cases in forming their own values, perceptions, and standards at a very critical time 
in their professional lives).  Second, the suggestion that frivolous and vexatious 
claims (which this was not, given that the majority reinstated the rescission claim) 
can be better handled through established means is one that was lost on this court.  
Another opinion in which a judge—a federal trial judge, no less—loses sight of the 
line between decorum and toxicity, between appropriate sanctions and inappro-
priate humiliation, is Bradshaw v. Unity Marine Corp., Inc.87
The Bradshaw court was ruling on a defense summary judgment, but found the 
briefs and authorities submitted by both parties to be inadequate and inaccurate.  
Rather than simply holding a hearing on the motion and scolding the attorneys in 
 ________________________  
 85. Stambovsky, 169 A.D.2d. at 257 (emphases added). 
 86. BRIAN A. BLUM & AMY C. BUSHAW, TEACHER’S MANUAL FOR CONTRACTS: CASES, DISCUSSION, &
PROBLEMS  156-157 (1st ed. Aspen 2003). 
 87. Bradshaw v. Unity Marine Corp., Inc., 147 F.Supp.2d 668 (S.D. Tex. 2001). 
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open court, the court elected to subject counsel to the modern equivalent of the 
pillory—forever etching his humiliation of them into the pages of the Federal Sup-
plement Second Series: 
Before proceeding further, the Court notes that this case involves 
two extremely likable lawyers, who have together delivered some 
of the most amateurish pleadings ever to cross the hallowed cau-
seway into Galveston, an effort which leads the Court to surmise 
but one plausible explanation.  Both attorneys have obviously en-
tered into a secret pact-complete with hats, handshakes and cryptic 
words-to draft their pleadings entirely in crayon on the back sides 
of gravy-stained paper place mats, in the hope that the Court would 
be so charmed by their child-like efforts that their utter dearth of 
legal authorities in their briefing would go unnoticed.  Whatever 
actually occurred, the Court is now faced with the daunting task of 
deciphering their submissions.  With Big Chief tablet readied, 
thick black pencil in hand, and a devil-may-care laugh in the face 
of death, life on the razor’s edge sense of exhilaration, the Court 
begins.88
The court, however, was not satisfied with that lashing.  The court continues in 
the same mocking tone as it begins to evaluate specific arguments: 
Defendant begins the descent into Alice’s Wonderland by submit-
ting a Motion that relies upon only one legal authority.  The Mo-
tion cites a Fifth Circuit case which stands for the whopping prop-
osition that a federal court sitting in Texas applies the Texas sta-
tutes of limitations to certain state and federal law claims.  See 
Gonzales v. Wyatt, 157 F.3d 1016, 1021 n. 1 (5th Cir.1998). That 
is all well and good-the Court is quite fond of the Erie doctrine; 
indeed there is talk of little else around both the Canal and this 
Court’s water cooler.  Defendant, however, does not even cite to 
Erie, but to a mere successor case, and further fails to even begin 
to analyze why the Court should approach the shores of Erie. Fi-
nally, Defendant does not even provide a cite to its desired Texas 
limitation statute.  A more bumbling approach is difficult to con-
ceive-but wait folks, There’s More!89
It continues such hyperbolic sarcasm throughout the opinion: 
Plaintiff responds to this deft, yet minimalist analytical wizardry 
with an equally gossamer wisp of an argument, although Plaintiff 
 ________________________  
 88. Id. at 670. 
 89. Id.
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does at least cite the federal limitations provision applicable to ma-
ritime tort claims.  See 46 U.S.C. § 763a. Naturally, Plaintiff also 
neglects to provide any analysis whatsoever of why his claim ver-
sus Defendant Phillips is a maritime action.  Instead, Plaintiff 
“cites” to a single case from the Fourth Circuit. Plaintiff’s citation, 
however, points to a nonexistent Volume “1886” of the Federal 
Reporter Third Edition and neglects to provide a pinpoint citation 
for what, after being located, turned out to be a forty-page deci-
sion.  Ultimately, to the Court’s dismay after reviewing the opi-
nion, it stands simply for the bombshell proposition that torts 
committed on navigable waters (in this case an alleged defamation 
committed by the controversial G. Gordon Liddy aboard a cruise 
ship at sea) require the application of general maritime rather than 
state tort law.  See Wells v. Liddy, 186 F.3d 505, 524 (4th 
Cir.1999) (What the ...)?!  The Court cannot even begin to com-
prehend why this case was selected for reference. It is almost as if 
Plaintiff’s counsel chose the opinion by throwing long range darts 
at the Federal Reporter (remarkably enough hitting a nonexistent 
volume!).90
The insults are too numerous to catalog easily; they even penetrate into the 
lowest of the vernacular in the court’s Wells v. Liddy parenthetical, which (if we 
are trying to imagine the audience) should appeal to cynical teens, perhaps.  The 
shrillness of tone reaches a pitch at which the reader begins to feel sympathy, if not 
empathy, for these lawyers, no matter how poor their lawyering, since the public 
judicial response is so far over the top.  For example, at one point, the district court 
writes:  
Despite the continued shortcomings of Plaintiff’s supplemental 
submission, the Court commends Plaintiff for his vastly improved 
choice of crayon-Brick Red is much easier on the eyes than Golde-
nrod, and stands out much better amidst the mustard splotched 
about Plaintiff’s briefing. But at the end of the day, even if you put 
a calico dress on it and call it Florence, a pig is still a pig.91   
The court then dismissively transitions back into a legal analysis with the barb, 
“Now, alas, the Court must return to grownup land.”92  The ad hominem attack on 
the attorneys continues unabated right into the concluding paragraphs of the opi-
nion, in which the court not only casts more aspersions on the lawyer’s abilities, 
but allows the venom to spill over into disrespect for the parties and the cause of 
action: 
 ________________________  
 90. Id. at 670–71. 
 91. Id. at 671. 
 92. Id.
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After this remarkably long walk on a short legal pier, having re-
ceived no useful guidance whatever from either party, the Court 
has endeavored, primarily based upon its affection for both coun-
sel, but also out of its own sense of morbid curiosity, to resolve 
what it perceived to be the legal issue presented.  Despite the waste 
of perfectly good crayon seen in both parties’ briefing (and the in-
explicable odor of wet dog emanating from such) the Court be-
lieves it has satisfactorily resolved this matter. 
. . .
[I]t is well known around these parts that Unity Marine’s lawyer is 
equally likable and has been writing crisply in ink since the second 
grade.  Some old-timers even spin yarns of an ability to type. The 
Court cannot speak to the veracity of such loose talk, but out of 
caution, the Court suggests that Plaintiff’s lovable counsel had best 
upgrade to a nice shiny No. 2 pencil or at least sharpen what’s left 
of the stubs of his crayons for what remains of this heart-stopping, 
spine-tingling action.93
Despite exhausting nearly every contumely a court might think of, this court 
went so far as to finish off the opinion with a final, demeaning footnote, admonish-
ing that, “[i]n either case, the Court cautions Plaintiff’s counsel not to run with a 
sharpened writing utensil in hand–he could put his eye out.”94
We of course do not know how vexing the pleadings were with which the 
judge dealt.  Perhaps they were worthy of the level of scorn and contempt heaped 
upon them.  But the Audience Principle tells us that the manner of the heaping was 
utterly inappropriate.  The judge could have played it straight in the opinion; he 
might have noted the amateurish nature of the pleadings, and might even have 
made an appendix of highlights of some of the more embarrassing lowlights.  
However, in losing the restraint of language and tone that decorum demands, the 
court, instead, abdicated its judicial role with a public audience of bench, bar, and 
public—it committed a judicial sin at least as mortal as, if not more so, than the 
incompetence with which it charges the lawyers.  As Professor Steven Lubet has 
observed of this opinion: 
Let’s resist th[e] urge [to delight in misfortune well-earned], at 
least for the time being, while we think a bit about the use and mi-
suse of judicial opinions.  In that regard, [the judge’s] stylings turn 
out to be a symptom, or perhaps an exemplar, of a more general 
problem for both the judiciary and the legal profession. 
 ________________________  
 93. Bradshaw, 147 F.Supp.2d at 671. 
 94. Id. at 671 n.4. 
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Federal judges exercise enormous power over lawyers and their 
clients.  Armed with life tenure and broad discretion, a judge can 
do great damage to an attorney’s reputation and career, while the 
lawyer has almost no recourse.  So when [the judge] decided to 
torment the hapless counsel in the Bradshaw case—who are identi-
fied by name in the published opinion—he was taking aim at 
people who could not defend themselves.  Under prevailing law, 
they cannot even get their case transferred to a new judge. They 
just have to grin and bear it, in the hope that ‘His Honor’ doesn’t
decide to go after them again.95
Even more significant, however, to our discussion of Learned Hand and the 
Audience Principle is the impact of a judicial opinion like this on the injured plain-
tiff: 
Furthermore, there are severe costs when courts use published opi-
nions for the purpose of humiliation, even when couched in hu-
morous terms.  First, we ought to worry about the impact on the 
parties.  Bradshaw is a Jones Act case, involving serious personal 
injuries to a seaman. Judge Kent’s decision dismissed an important 
defendant from the case, causing a definite setback to the plaintiff.  
Imagine how the injured Mr. Bradshaw would feel upon reading 
[the opinion] . . .  
Put aside the fact that Mr. Bradshaw was injured when climbing 
from a tugboat to the pier, which Judge Kent chose to use as part 
of a joke.  Until seeing this excerpt, Mr. Bradshaw might once 
have believed that federal judges decided cases out of an obliga-
tion to justice, not out of affection for counsel, and certainly not 
out of morbid curiosity (another bad joke).  He would surely be 
 ________________________  
95. Steven Lubet, Bullying from the Bench, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 11, 12 (2001) (footnote omitted). This 
judge’s excess eventually proved  not confined merely to his writings. See, e.g., James C. McKinley, Jr., Judge
Sentenced To Prison For Lying About Harassment, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2009, at A15 (discussing Samuel Kent’s
guilty plea to obstruction of justice charges in the wake of his confession that falsely denied in forcing  unwanted 
sexual contact on two of the district court’s personnel).  The victims of the judge’s excesses were quoted as fol-
lows: 
Both women made statements before the sentencing, The Houston Chronicle reported. Ms. 
McBroom expressed anger that Judge Kent had tried to portray her complaints as those of a 
spurned lover. 
“Being molested and groped by a drunken giant is not my idea of an affair,” she said in 
court. 
Ms. Wilkinson called Judge Kent “the biggest bully of them all.”
Id. Recently, it was reported that  “Dick DeGuerin, a lawyer for Judge Kent, said the judge suffered from depres-
sion, alcoholism, diabetes and bipolar disease. Rather than resign before he serves his time in prison, Judge Kent, 
appointed to the lifetime post by President George Bush in 1990, has asked to be allowed to claim that he is di s-
abled so he can continue to collect his salary of $169,300 a year.”  Id.
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confused, or more likely appalled, by the court’s trivializing refer-
ence to the odor of a wet dog.  And remember, the plaintiff lost. 
Although you would not know it from reading the opinion, the 
case was about Mr. Bradshaw, not about the judge’s relationship to 
the lawyers.  Will Bradshaw be able to read Kent’s opinion and 
feel that he received a fair hearing?96
What would Judge Hand say to such opinion?  As Richard Posner reports, 
Hand didn’t suffer fools gladly and wasn’t afraid to, “[s]wivel his chair 180 de-
grees, thus presenting his back to the lawyer, and at times he would toss briefs over 
the bench in disgust.”97 One can easily see Judge Hand turning his back on such 
judicial writing and tossing the opinions back over the bench to their authors. 
2.  Audience and Judicial Motivation 
Speaking metaphorically, if syntax is but a key to estimating the audience in-
tended for a judicial opinion, it may also be a surrogate for judicial attitudes and 
motivations otherwise disclosed.  The subject of audience in judicial opinions has 
recently been tackled by Professor Lawrence Baum.98  Professor Baum’s approach 
to the subject might be fairly deemed a motivational perspective—he examines a 
range of communications, both judicial and extra-judicial, to decipher motivations 
for their decisions beyond merely “making good law” or even “making good poli-
cy.”99
Baum hypothesizes that judges are also driven by the very human desire for 
popular approval and public respect, and, as a result, these extra-legal factors both 
shape their decision-making and define the audiences for whom they write.100  A 
strong motivator—both conscious and unconscious, for most judges is the percep-
tion of them as “elite” groups in American society, “whose values are more similar 
to those of the mass public than they are different,”101 but when those views “differ, 
however, judges’ links with their personal audiences will draw them toward the 
 ________________________  
 96. Id. at 12–13; see David McGowan, Judicial Writing and the Ethics of the Judicial Office, 14 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 509, 568, 574 (2001).  It is interesting to contrast this judge’s contempt for the status of the injured 
merchant mariner with the solicitude for injured sailors shown by District Judge Edmund Waddell, Jr., whose 
admiralty opinion in The Mina, 241 F. 530 (E.D. Va. 1917), was contrasted with one of Hand’s, supra notes 208-
09 and accompanying text.   
 97. Richard Posner, The Learned Hand Biography and the Question of Judicial Greatness, 104 YALE L.J. 
511, 521 (1994). 
 98. LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1st ed. 
Princeton U. Press 2006). 
 99. Id. at 158–59. 
100. Id. at 148. Baum observes that “an audience-based perspective can supply some of the missing motiva-
tional bases” for models of judicial behavior and assist in harmonizing disparate models. 
 101. Id. at 5 (stating that although his study has focused on “higher courts,” especially the U.S. Supreme 
Court, his “interest extends to lower courts” and that “a perspective based on judges’ relationships with their 
audiences is one means to study lower courts in the same terms as higher courts.”).  The phenomenon of lawyering 
targeted at elites begins even in the fundamentals of legal education, as Professor Lucille Jewel has recently 
brought to light.  See Lucille A. Jewel, Bourdieu and American Legal Education:  How Law Schools Reproduce 
Social Stratification and Class Hierarchy, 56 BUFFALO L. REV. 1157 (2008). 
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views of elites.”102  Baum makes other, extensive empirical observations about how 
judges’ perceptions of audiences drive their decision-making.  I do not propose to 
test those hypotheses here against Hand’s District Court work—the environment in 
which he did that work is remote and the contextualizing personal and societal 
sources require more research than resources at hand permit.   However, recogniz-
ing that Terrell and Armstrong’s approach to cognitive communication is on a pa-
rallax with this recent work on audience-versus-outcomes in the field of political 
science, I turn to a more explicit discussion of audience in Hand’s opinions than 
the article has explored until this point.  The key to understanding Hand’s style 
goes beyond idiosyncrasies he may have indulged.  A broader assessment of his 
work suggests that Hand was keenly aware of writing for the parties as au-
diences;103 and that he was often writing for other judges in the District, as well as 
for lawyers whose practices were centered there.104  Of more significance, howev-
er, is Richard Posner’s observation that, “no careful reader, making due allow-
ance for differences in linguistic conventions between the nineteenth cen-
tury and today, will fail to note the personal, direct, and conversational tone 
of” Learned Hand’s judicial opinions.105
The following is an eclectic, yet representative selection of cases that reveal is-
sues of audience arising inferentially from Hand’s District Court opinions; and for 
the reader who wishes to enrich this with Baum’s exploration of decision-making 
models, the following are worthy of case study. 
a. Isn’t this Important Enough to Lay Out Logically?  In re Kerner
Fraud—whether done by commission or omission—is an all-too-familiar phe-
nomenon to bankruptcy practitioners.106  Hand dealt with such a problem in In re 
Kerner,107 as he worked to develop the bankruptcy law of the Southern District of 
New York (an obviously bustling place for bankruptcies).108  The question in the 
 ________________________  
 102. BAUM, supra note 98, at 163. 
 103. See Learned Hand, The Deficiencies of Trials To Reach The Heart Of The Matter, 3 ASS’N OF THE BAR 
OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK LECTURES ON LEGAL TOPICS 87 (1926). 
 104. See In re Denny, 240 F. 845, 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).  
 105. Richard A. Posner, Judges’ Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?), 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1421, 1429 
(1995). 
 106. See, e.g., DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA
(Princeton U. Press 2001). 
 107. 245 F. 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1917). 
 108. See DAVID A. SKEEL, supra note 106, at 40–43 (discussing the history of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 
and its early development); see also F. REGIS NOEL, A HISTORY OF THE BANKRUPTCY LAW 157-162 (William S. 
Hein & Co., Inc. 2003) (1919); CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 128-43 (Harvard 
U. Press 1935); PETER J. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA: INSOLVENCY, IMPRISONMENT FOR 
DEBT, AND BANKRUPTCY 1607-1900 (State Historical Society of Wisconsin 1974); Charles Jordan Tabb, A Histo-
ry of the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 23-26 (1995); David A. Skeel, Jr., 
The Genius of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 15 BANKR. DEV. J. 319 (1999).  Bankruptcy cases were a very signifi-
cant part of Hand’s work from the beginning of his District Court service, yet he was new to the subject.  
GUNTHER, supra note 43, at 137.  Bankruptcy “cases produced more than half of his written opinions during his 
first year on the bench.” Id.  In a letter to his mother, Hand described the stress that such cases caused him: 
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case was whether a debtor could obtain a discharge of debts when he omitted in a 
mid-winter financial statement information about inventory he had purchased for 
the spring season.  The debtor’s excuse (at least according to the Reporter of Deci-
sions) was that “it was customary in the trade to omit from the financial statement 
such assets and liabilities.”  The issue here seems fairly significant—in general, 
establishing the standard of disclosure in bankruptcy cases; and in particular, estab-
lishing whether business practices alleged to be common are relevant to, let alone 
modify, the disclosure standards that Congress intended to establish through the 
Bankruptcy Act.  Obviously, this would be a ruling of critical importance to indi-
viduals, businesses, and lawyers. 
One might think that the importance of this issue would have moved Hand to 
have written a well-organized opinion, explaining the background of the issue and 
its significance to a broad audience.  However, Hand did not take that approach—
the opinion is cryptic, and the importance of the issue is not revealed until the very 
end of what might be fairly described as a somewhat cursory opinion.  Indeed, 
Hand’s opening leaves the reader feeling as if we have walked into a conversation 
already well under way during our absence: 
This case falls directly under my ruling in Re Maaget, 245 Fed. 
804, and I shall follow it, unless it appears that it has been over-
ruled in Re Rosenthal, 231 Fed. 449, 145 C.C.A. 443.  The opinion 
in that case does not pass upon the point, and I have no means of 
determining whether it was raised on the appeal.  In any event the 
opinion below does not diverge from In re Maaget, but quotes it 
with approval, and the case has the distinguishing point that the 
bankrupt, who could not read or write, may well have supposed the 
statement to have been true.  I cannot find that any court has de-
cided that, where a bankrupt deliberately chooses to omit a liability 
for the purchase price of goods still on hand, he has made a true fi-
nancial statement.  Scienter is, of course, a necessary element in 
the charge, and it would be a defense to show that the bankrupt, 
however erroneously, supposed that the liability did not in fact ex-
ist.109
There is a lot going on here—a juggling of case precedents the reader has no 
particular reason to know, facts of those cases contrasted with facts of this case, 
and the judge’s thinking out loud about the effect of one precedent upon another.  It 
should hardly be the lead in.  In fact, the lead in should have been crafted around 
what Hand left for the end of the opinion —crafted with the syntactical excellence 
It is not that the bankruptcy cases are more difficult to decide than others . . . only there are 
so many of them, and I get mixed up; and besides that, I am constantly interrupted by people 
who come in asking usually for what they ought not to have. 
Id.
 109. In re Kerner, 245 F. at 807. 
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characteristic of Hand’s sequencing skills at the paragraph and sentence level, and 
leaving therefore an indelible impression: 
[W]hile the bankrupt’s error touching the existence of the liability 
would make the statement honest and excuse a mere mistake, his 
error as to his obligation to make a true statement is irrelevant.  His 
duty is to speak the truth, so far as he knows it, and no mistake as 
to the scope of that duty affects the legal consequences of his 
omission.  Like any other duty, the law imposes it upon him at his 
risk.  The test is honesty in the statement, not in the belief that an 
honest statement is necessary. It would be as intolerable as it is 
anomalous to allow men to make financial statements which they 
know to be false, on the plea that they supposed the recipient was 
not entitled to honest ones.110
Interestingly, Hand invites the parties to appeal; “[i]t would be satisfactory if a 
ruling upon the point could be obtained from the Circuit Court of Appeals.”111  The 
debtor’s attorney took him up on this; and the Second Circuit reversed Hand’s de-
cision.112  Perhaps “the point” deserved a more cognitively well-crafted opinion.  
As it was, there was a dissent,113 but Hand’s view on this important issue of devel-
oping clear standards of veracity in bankruptcy did not command either of the re-
maining two judges on the panel. 
It is a bit odd that Hand put little into crafting an opinion that he invited the 
parties to appeal.  The Circuit Court of Appeals is a potential audience to virtually 
every district court opinion; Hand, who frequently sat by designation on the Ap-
peals Court from 1917 onwards, certainly had that constituency in mind among his 
audience.  Beyond the immediate parties, a future panel of appeals court judges is 
one of the significant audiences for an opinion of a district judge.  While some of 
Hand’s opinions were not written in a way that would seem to take that audience 
into account,114 others were written to engage that audience—who showed their 
cognitive connectedness not only by affirming Hand’s ruling, but by adopting his 
opinion as the opinion of the appeals court.  A Westlaw search reveals four opi-
 ________________________  
 110. Id. at 807–08. 
 111. Id.
 112. In re Kerner, 250 F. 993, 995 (2d Cir. 1918).  The Reporter helped to make clear the issue and its             
context better than Hand had in the district court: 
Under Bankruptcy Act, § 14b, as amended by Act Feb. 5, 1903, c. 487, § 4, and Act June 
25, 1910, c. 412, § 6 (Comp.St.1916, § 9598), prohibiting a discharge where the applicant 
has obtained credit on a materially false statement in writing, a financial statement, made by 
the bankrupt as a basis for credit which omitted from the assets certain merchandise and 
from the liabilities the amount due thereon, held not so materially false as to warrant denial 
of discharge and furnish ground for objection to a composition offer. 
Id. at 993. 
 113. Id. at 995 (Hough, dissenting) (“[D]issents, on the ground that the financial statement in question was 
‘materially false’; i.e., substantially untrue, and made so with intent to deceive.”). 
 114. E.g., United States. v. Fong On, 240 F. 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1916); In re Lampitos, 232 F. 382 (S.D.N.Y.        
1916). 
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nions in which the Second Circuit rendered an affirmance by incorporating Hand’s
district court opinion as its own:  F.I.A.T. v. A. Elliot Ranney Co.;115 Owens v. Brei-
tung;116 The Walter Green;117 and May v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.118  None of 
these occurred during the 1916-1917 period under examination.  Perhaps that sug-
gests that he was still learning how the principles of cognitively effective commu-
nication play out in actual application; the evidence principles in application, and 
only after a decade of seasoning (and increasingly frequent-stints on appellate pa-
nels by designation119) was he fully in tune with the judicial craft to the degree that 
his opinions reflected the style and presentation of the appellate judge. 
b. Writing for The Parties, Not Posterity: Contrasting Coronet Phosphate and
Pressed Steel 
In an admiralty opinion that implicates the Congruence Principle and the use of 
default organizations as well as the Audience Principle, Coronet Phosphate Co. v. 
United States Shipping Co,120 neither Hand nor the Reporter of Decisions graces us 
with a faculty summary.  In fact, were it not for the Headnotes inserted by a West 
Publishing Company Editor, we would have no idea what the opinion is about.  
That is because Hand begins with a discussion of a pleading we have not seen, 
which is itself a response to another pleading we have not seen:  
The first defense is contained in the forty-eighth article of the an-
swer.  It alleges . . .”121
The rest of the opinion is organized in this same mechanical fashion, based on 
the order of articles in the answer: 
The second defense is set up in the forty-ninth article of the an-
swer.  It alleges . . . 
. . .
The third defense is contained in the fiftieth article of the answer.  
It alleges  . . . 
. . .
The fourth defense, in the fifty-first article, asserts that . . . 
 ________________________  
 115. 249 F. 973, 973 (2d Cir. 1918). 
 116. 270 F. 190 (2d Cir. 1920). 
 117. 266 F. 269, 271 (2d Cir. 1920). 
 118. 297 F. 997, 998 (2d Cir. 1923). 
 119. GUNTHER, supra note 43, at 56. 
 120. 260 F. 846 (S.D.N.Y. 1917). 
 121. Id. at 846. 
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. . . 
The fifth defense is contained in the fifty-second article of the an-
swer, and arises under the clause . . .122
. . . and so on.  The organization of the answer, therefore, becomes the organi-
zation of the opinion.  This default organization works conveniently enough for the 
parties’ lawyers; out of their numerous case files, they could pull the required 
pleadings and lay them down alongside Hand’s opinion to, in effect (and with 
apologies to Mitch Miller), sing along with Learned.  As a result, Hand provides no 
meta-information about the case, about the relative legal importance of the argu-
ments, or about how they might relate to the overall disposition of the case.  He 
simply, and efficiently for the lawyers in the case, ticks off the various exceptions 
to the answer.  He closes the opinion, in effect, to an outside audience as if he were 
a school board in executive session.  There are, however, matters of real interest to 
other parties.  For example, World War I was raging on land and sea.  Although the 
United States had not yet entered the war, United States businesses and foreign 
businesses with United States presence were being greatly affected by the slings 
and arrows of belligerence among the European powers.  Thus, the defenses to 
contract performance associated with doctrines such as impossibility of perfor-
mance and with contract clauses such as force majeur came into play.  The case 
raises issues such as the proper pleading (in the pre-Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure (“FRCP”) days of stricter pleading rules) of such defenses: 
[T]he charter party under which the carriage was to be made con-
tained the usual provision against restraints of rulers, princes, and 
people.  It then goes on to allege that, in consequence of the Great 
War, ‘restraints, restrictions, and limitations have been placed on 
shipping, both under neutral and belligerent governments’ among 
them being Great Britain and her allies, on shipments destined to 
Sweden and Holland, and that by reason of these restraints, limita-
tions, and restrictions respondent was prevented and restrained 
from performing the charters mentioned in the libel and furnishing 
the tonnage. 
This allegation is certainly bad as it stands.  I do not mean to pass 
upon the question whether the British Orders in Council excused 
the respondent from the voyage; but I do mean to say that in plead-
ing foreign ordinances having the force of law the pleader is bound 
to allege more than his conclusion of the effects of the ordinance.  
He is bound to set out its substance, so that the court may judge 
whether it has the effect which he ascribes.  Without passing, 
therefore, upon the question as to whether shipments to Sweden 
 ________________________  
 122. Id. at 847–49. 
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and Holland were excused by the Orders in Council, or any other 
ordinances promulgated by any of the powers, the exception is sus-
tained.123
But the significance of the legal matters ruled upon is buried under the default 
organization, which operates as a kind of code that, absent considerable reader ef-
fort, can be readily unlocked only by the parties’ counsel. 
That is not to say, however, that Hand was unconscious in this case of an au-
dience beyond counsel of record.  We find mid-way through the opinion that there 
are two other sets of exceptions that he is ruling on, “[t]he other exceptions, except 
the last two, touch the interrogatories”124—but here, Hand sets aside the mechani-
cal run-through to give a commentary on the function of interrogatories in admiral-
ty cases and the limits of (pre-FRCP) discovery: 
Interrogatories in the admiralty serve two purposes, to amplify the 
pleadings of the party interrogated, and to procure evidence in 
support of the libel or defense of the party interrogating.  They 
should not, however, be used merely to fish into the evidence 
which the party interrogated may produce in support of his own al-
legations.  This limitation upon discovery has remained even in the 
most modern rules of procedure. A party is of course entitled to 
know whether his opponent admits the truth of his own allegations, 
and how far, so as to avoid unnecessary preparation for trial.  He is 
not entitled to know what evidence his adversary will produce to 
prove the adversary’s allegations, and what evidence he must him-
self produce to overcome the case so made.  The result will, of 
course, be, as it has been in the past, that he must go to trial some-
what in the dark as to what he must meet.  The pleadings are in-
tended to advise him of that, and interrogatories are proper to re-
duce those allegations to very specific form.  They should be en-
couraged for that purpose, but so far as they call upon the pleader 
to go further, and give, not only the details of his allegations, but 
the evidence by which he means to prove them, they are liable to 
abuse.  If there develop on the trial a case of genuine surprise, the 
court, especially where there is no jury, has ample power to protect 
the party surprised.125
This digression is clearly aimed at a larger audience, beyond counsel of record.  
Hand appears to be speaking to the admiralty bar in New York, if not more broad-
ly.  Having recognized the broader audience, even for matters in this opinion, one 
 ________________________  
 123. Coronate Phosphate Co., 260 F. at 847 (citations omitted). 
 124. Id. at 849. 
 125. Id.
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might have thought that Hand would structure the opinion to be more accessible to 
that audience. 
While Hand hid the ball in discussing the important discovery issue in Coronet 
Phosphate for an audience of fireside intimacy, he certainly showed a greater ap-
preciation for a broader audience in Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Union Pacific Rail 
Co.,126 where Hand tackled a subject that is the bane of many trial judges’ exis-
tence—discovery disputes. 
Part of the challenge presented by the bill of discovery was that this was an 
equitable process being sought in an action-at-law for breach of contract.  At the 
time, the equity and law jurisdictions of the Federal District Court had not yet been 
merged.  This was not to occur until 1935.  Hand addressed the problem in an ear-
lier opinion in this litigation.127  In this subsequent opinion, the Reporter of deci-
sions provides an extensive prologue setting forth the details of the pleadings in 
what boiled down to a breach of patent licensure agreement.128  This set the stage 
for Hand to discuss, for the benefit of practitioners throughout the country, the 
changes from the “old course of equity” and “the abolition of pleas” to new rules 
(at that time) “that discovery shall be by interrogatories, to which specific objec-
tions may be taken, . . . and that pleadings shall contain no evidence, but the ‘ulti-
mate facts.’”129  Then, as if turning to address a gathering of federal court civil 
practitioners at an American Bar Association annual meeting, Hand details that 
“the proper practice in a bill of discovery is now as follows,” and proceeds to lay 
out the steps, and then demonstrate, as a case study, how they apply to the discov-
ery dispute between these parties.130  While Hand helps us out a bit more here than 
in Coronet Phosphate as to the content of the interrogatories being challenged and 
their relationship to the lawsuit, it seems to matter less:  Hand is holding a master 
class in the “new” federal court discovery.  This becomes clear as Hand describes 
not only how the discovery he’s allowing will proceed here, but also, how he will 
not allow discovery to proceed: 
If the defendant can be brought to acknowledge the possession of 
any documents which appear to be pertinent to the issues, it will be 
required to produce them, but not until it does.  Any other rule 
would enable the plaintiff to fish among all the documents which 
the defendant may have for the purpose of picking out those on 
which it chooses to sue.  Such a course is wholly unauthorized, not 
only under the old practice (Langdell, Secs. 204, 205), but equally 
under rule 58, which requires a party to produce only those docu-
 ________________________  
 126. 241 F. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1917). 
 127. Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Union Pac. Rail Co., 240 F. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (justifying exercise of 
court’s equitable jurisdiction over bill of discovery petition in a breach-of-contract action at law). 
 128. Pressed Steel Car Co., 241 F. at 964–66.   
 129. Id. at 966. 
 130. Id. at 966–67. 
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ments which contain evidence material to the case or defense of his 
adversary.131
If any doubt could be entertained to how much more broadly Hand acknowl-
edges his audience here, that doubt would be dispelled by the use of this opinion as 
a platform to preach greater party cooperation in the use of discovery to save the 
“maximum of expense in time and labor”:
The plaintiff will have leave to frame and keep reframing interro-
gatories till it has extracted from the defendant all the information 
which it possesses.  Much the most convenient way would be for 
the parties to agree upon a master and allow the plaintiff an oral 
examination.  This, however, I cannot compel; but the same result 
may probably be obtained, though it must be confessed with the 
maximum of expense in time and labor, by allowing interrogato-
ries to be renewed as often as justice requires. If that does not 
serve, the plaintiff must rely upon such rights as he will have at the 
trial under Revised Statutes, Sec. 724 (Comp. St. 1916, Sec. 
1469).132
c. Deferring To The Special Master:  Page Machine Co. v. Dow, Jones & Co.
Another question on the Audience Principle is at what point does the audience 
come to the litigation?  Should a judge reprise the facts, at least in summary form, 
if the opinion is to be published?  Or should the judge simply leave it to the reader 
 ________________________  
 131. Id. at 967. 
 132. Id. at 967.  As Professor Peter Subrin has described pre-FRCP discovery: 
In 1935, Edson Sunderland started drafting what became Rules 26 to 37 of the Federal 
Rules.  Up to that time, extremely limited discovery took place in both law and equity cases 
in the federal courts. For law cases, the sole discovery (except the motion for a bill of parti-
culars, which was considered a pleading device, and an equitable bill for discovery in sup-
port of a law case, a cumbersome and infrequently used device) was provided for in two 
federal statutes dealing with depositions. 
Peter N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background Of The 1938 Federal Discovery Rules ,
39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 698 (1998) (footnotes omitted).  Professor Subrin then elaborates on the bill of discovery and 
its treatment in Pressed Steel:
One could use an equitable bill of discovery in aid of a legal action, but “there was a conflict 
of opinion as to whether a party could obtain discovery only of evidence that was relevant to 
the claim or defense or whether the party could obtain discovery of evidence which was re-
levant to any issue in dispute.” Id. Moreover, “[t]he bill of discovery was a cumbersome 
proceeding. The courts were constantly burdened with applications to settle the form, scope, 
and propriety of interrogatories.” Id. (citing a Learned Hand opinion (Pressed Steel Car Co. 
v. Union Pac. R. Co., 241 F. 964, 967 (S.D.N.Y. 1917)) (stating that “Judge Learned Hand 
pointed out the wastefulness of this procedure”)). 
Id. at 698 n.41 (quoting 6 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26 App.100 (3d 
ed. 1997)). 
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either to look up another opinion, or more burdensomely try to obtain from the 
Clerk of Court’s Office a copy of an unpublished opinion, order, or report? 
Learned Hand opted for the latter approach in a factually interesting litigation, 
Page Machine Co. v. Dow Jones & Co.133  In that case, Hand did not orient his 
readers in his published opinion; he passed them off to the unpublished report of a 
special master, “I think there is no gain in repeating the general outline of the liti-
gation, which sufficiently appears in the [s]pecial master’s report.”134
And just where is this report?  What would it tell the reader?  The “gain” that 
Hand could not see is actually apparent—the gain to be had is by a broader au-
dience of readers beyond the attorneys for the respective parties, who would have 
more ready access to the Special Master’s report in their files.  Without it, other 
readers—lay, attorney, or judicial—are left with little context in which to order 
Hand’s discussion of the details at issue in that opinion.  To gain such context, a 
reader would have to be highly motivated—willing to spend the time, money, and 
frustration in trying to obtain a manuscript copy of the Special Master’s report 
from the clerk’s office—or if the file is checked out to chambers, from the issuing 
Judge’s chambers.135
In contrast to Hand’s attitude towards audience in Page Machine, Michael 
Mukasey (the last of President George W. Bush’s Attorneys General), as a United 
States District Judge in Hand’s former Southern District of New York, certainly 
saw the value of orienting a broader audience of readers.  A good example of this is 
found in his opinions in a litigation filed by a sports and entertainment promoter 
against American poet and author Maya Angelou.136  In issuing an opinion on con-
tract-claim issues remanded to him by a Second Circuit panel, Judge Mukasey 
made passing reference to the prior opinion (giving readers familiar with it an op-
portunity to opt out of the fact section and to go directly to the legal discussion), 
but also oriented all readers not involved with the case by providing a synthe-
sized—but not cursory—presentation of the facts pertinent to the issues addressed 
in the remand: 
 ________________________  
 133. 238 F. 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1916). 
 134. Id. at 369. 
 135. See, e.g., Comment, Discretionary reporting of Trial Court Decisions:  A Dialogue, 114 U. PA. L. REV.
249, 255 (1966).  Hand’s occasional predilection to dive into legal discussions without context, and sometimes 
even facts, vexed Professor Grant Gilmore, the reporter for Article 9 of the UCC.  In a seminal book of debtor-
creditor law, Gilmore quoted at length from a Hand opinion that decried the artificiality and incoherence of the 
common-law distinction between pledge and chattel mortgage. 1 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN 
PERSONAL PROPERTY 8-9 (1965) (citing In re German Publication Society, 289 F. 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1922), aff’d, 289 
F. 510 (2d Cir. 1923)).  However, when trying to bring Hand’s legal discussion to life by providing the factual 
context for that case, Gilmore lamented, “I find it impossible to make out from Judge Hand’s opinion what the 
facts of the case could have been.” Id. at 9 n. 12.  
 136. B. Lewis Productions, Inc. v. Angelou, No. 01 Civ. 0530 (MBM), 2003 WL 21709465 (S.D.N.Y. Jul 
23, 2003), rev’d Nos. 03-7864(L), 03-7922(XAP), 2004 WL 11470712d Cir. 2004) (unpublished summary order), 
remanded to No. 01Civ.0530MBM, 2005 WL 1138474 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2005) (on remand after the U.S. Court 
of Appeals reversed the above decision in part to have Judge Mukasey consider “whether the Letter Agreement 
formed a contract other than a formal joint venture or exclusive agency agreement”—such as a simple bilateral 
contract). 
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Although familiarity with the facts in this case can be assumed, as 
they were set forth in detail in the court’s previous opinion, B. 
Lewis Prods., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12655, at *2-*15, a brief re-
capitulation is necessary to provide context for this decision.137
Thus, by recognizing the simple teachings of the Audience Principle (not to 
mention the Context Principle), Judge Mukasey expanded the potential audience 
for this opinion from the immediate parties to others who might encounter it in 
researching the litigation, the law involved, or the operation of his court.  It is no 
surprise that lawyers from all sides of the equation have praised Judge Mukasey for 
the transparency of proceedings in his court.138
IV. THE OPPORTUNITY OF SONIA SOTOMAYOR
During the interim in which Part I of this article was in the publication process, 
President Barack Obama nominated Second Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals Judge 
Sonia Sotomayor to the first vacancy on the U.S. Supreme Court during his admin-
istration.  The media coverage and political discourse about her nomination seemed 
firmly fixed on her Latina heritage and her gender.139  What is, however, most re-
markable about the nominee is her experience on the District Court bench.  While a 
District Judge for only six years (1992-1998) before her nomination and confirma-
tion to the U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals,140 those six years on the District 
Court bench are far more than any Supreme Court nominee since the ill-fated nom-
ination of G. Harold Carswell141 in 1969, and the most substantial prior judicial 
 ________________________  
 137. B. Lewis Productions, Inc. v. Maya Angelou, Hallmark Cards, Inc., No. 01Civ.0530MBM, 2005 WL 
1138474 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2005).  Judge Mukasey made good on his promise to the reader, compressing 
lengthy findings and prior proceedings into three-and-a-half slip opinion pages.  See id. at *1-*4. 
 138. E.g., The New Man at the Justice Department, N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 2007, at A1, 25.   Some have 
attributed Mukasey’s crisp, concise, and clean judicial writing style to his admiration of George Orwell’s and to a 
stint at United Press International.  Adam Liptak, Nuance and Resolve in Rulings by Attorney General Nominee,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2007, at A1. 
 139. See, e.g., Nico Pitney, Sonia Sotomayor, Supreme Court Nominee:  All You Need To Know, THE 
HUFFINGTON POST (June 1, 2009)(“ President Barack Obama has tapped federal appeals judge Sonia Sotomayor 
for the Supreme Court, making her the first Hispanic in history picked to wear the robes of a justice.”), available 
at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/05/01/sonia-sotomayor-supreme-c_n_194470.html (last visited Aug. 28, 
2009); Peter Hamby, Ed Henry, Suzanne Malveaux and Bill Mear, Obama Nominates Sonia Sotomayor To The 
Supreme Court, CNN.com  (May 26, 2009) (“If confirmed, Sotomayor, 54, would be the first Hispanic U.S. Su-
preme Court justice and the third woman to serve on the high court.”), available at
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/05/26/supreme.court/index.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2009); Jeff Zeleny, 
Obama Chooses Sotomayor for Supreme Court Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2009 (“If confirmed by the Demo-
cratic-controlled Senate, Judge Sotomayor, 54, would replace Justice David H. Souter to become the second wom-
an on the court and only the third female justice in the history of the Supreme Court. She also would be the first 
Hispanic justice to serve on the Supreme Court.”), available at
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/26/obama-makes-decision-on-supreme-court-
nominee/?scp=3&sq=Sotomayor%20nominated&st=cse (last visited Aug. 28, 2009). 
 140. Charlie Savage, A Primer on the Sotomayor Hearings, N.Y. TIMES July 12, 2009, available at
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/12/a-primer-on-the-sotomayor-
hearings/?scp=7&sq=Sotomayor%20nominated&st=cse (last visited August 28, 2009). 
 141. Martin Waldron, Supreme Court Choice—George Harrold Carswell, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1970 (not-
ing that Carswell was nominated by President Eisenhower to the District Court in 1958, where he served until he 
was nominated and confirmed to the U.S. Appeals Court in 1969), available at
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experience of any nominee since Benjamin Cardozo in 1932.142  Confirmed by the 
Senate in August 2009, Justice Sotomayor presents the first opportunity in a very 
long time to forge the hard-earned lessons of trial court judging with the opportuni-
ty to bring those lessons to bear on appellate judging at both the Circuit and Su-
preme Court levels.   
As she embarks upon the work of the Court, Justice Sotomayor has an even 
greater opportunity to affect the practice of writing opinions than she does to im-
pact doctrine (which will be more difficult given established voting blocs awaiting 
her on the Court). From our examination of what laboring in the Southern District 
of New York taught Learned Hand about opinion writing, we can anticipate that 
Justice Sotomayor is likely to bring many of the same lessons to the Supreme 
Court.  But her spin on those lessons may be a bit different than Hand’s after the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, reflecting political polarization in the media, used her 
confirmation hearings to debate —– albeit on a terribly simplistic and poorly in-
formed level — the very notion of what it means to be a judge both in 21st century 
America as well as in the Anglo-American legal tradition as perceived 222 years 
after the judicial power was created in the Constitution of 1787. 
Detailed explorations of legal, judicial, or political philosophy are outside of 
this article’s stated purview.  However, Justice Sotomayor’s confirmation hearings 
raised three specific philosophical issues that bear directly on how the cognitive 
theories of communication will be applied to opinion writing.  A judge’s view of 
each of these issues defines the milieu within which the principles, particularly the 
audience principle, operate. These issues do not bear merely on a judge’s jurispru-
dence or legal philosophy; how they are viewed erects the critical intellectual scaf-
folding within which cognitive communication occurs.  These issues involve:  
[1] the dangerous – and fictional – “judges as baseball umpires” 
metaphor;  
http://select.nytimes.com/mem/archive/pdf?res=F10E17F83C5D137B93C2AB178AD85F448785F9 (last visited 
Aug. 28, 2009).  It must be noted, however, that Judge Carswell’s actions and words as a District Judge are what 
ultimately torpedoed his nomination.  See, e.g., Senators Are Told That Carswell Was Insulting To Negro Law-
yers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1970, at 15 (“Louis H. Pollock, Dean of the Yale Law School,” testified before the 
Senate Judiciary Committee in 1970 “that after a study of Judge Carswell’s opinions, ‘I am compelled to conclude 
that this nominee presents the most slender credentials of any man put forward in this century’ for the Supreme 
Court.”), available at
http://select.nytimes.com/mem/archive/pdf?res=FB0F15F9355D1B7493C1A91789D85F448785F9 (last visited 
Aug. 28, 2009).  After the Senate Judiciary Committee rejected his nomination, Judge Carswell resigned from the 
bench to campaign for a seat in the Senate “on a platform based largely on his ridicule of liberal senators who had 
turned down his nomination to the Supreme Court by President Nixon”; he lost by nearly 90,000 out of slightly 
over 317,000 votes cast in the election.  John Nordheimer, Cramer Beats Ex Judge, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1970, at 
36, available at
http://select.nytimes.com/mem/archive/pdf?res=F40612F8345E157B93CBA91782D85F448785F9 (last visited 
Aug. 28, 2009).  
 142. Cardozo was elected to the New York State Supreme Court in November 1913, sworn in on January 1, 
1914, but in little over a month was detailed as a judge of the Court of Appeals, the New York’s highest court, 
where he served until sworn in as a U.S. Supreme Court Justice in 1932.  See Hornblower Goes On Appeals 
Bench—Glynn Also Designates Cardozo For That Tribunal And Names Weeks For The Supreme Court, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 2, 1914, available at http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-
free/pdf?res=9B0DEED81F3BE633A25750C0A9649C946596D6CF (last visited Aug. 30, 2009). 
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[2] the ahistorical and erroneous notion that in deciding cases 
judges do not make “policy” or “law”; and 
[3] the bizarre denunciation of “empathy” as a quality of judges. 
These are important issues in the fabric that connects the District Court opi-
nions of Learned Hand at the turn of the last century to the opinions being written 
by the Supreme Court in the period of decline at the turn of the present century.  
We will examine each of these issues in turn.  Then we will coalesce the product of 
that examination into an attempt to read what the tea leaves, in the form of a repre-
sentative opinion from the many Justice Sotomayor wrote as a District Judge –
suggest is an opportunity for Justice Sotomayor to elevate the cognitive integrity of 
the Court’s opinions from the sophistic to the transformational.
A. Of Umpiring, Legislating, and Empathizing:  Three Confirmation 
Hearing Issues And Their Implications For Justice Sotomayor’s Judicial 
Opinion Writing    
1. The Dangerous – And Fictitious – “Judges As Baseball Umpires”   Meta-
phor 
Perhaps the most unfortunate metaphor yet invoked to describe the judicial 
function is the notion of the judge as an umpire calling balls and strikes.143  Such a 
simplistic metaphor would be anathema to any of the eminent judges in Anglo-
American legal history144, be they labeled “liberal,” or “moderate,” or “conserva-
 ________________________  
 143. See John G. Roberts, Chief Justice of the United States, Text of John Roberts Opening Statement 
before the Sentate Judiciary Committee, (Sept. 12, 2009) (available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2005-09-12-roberts-fulltext_x.htm.)  The relevant portion of then-
Judge Roberts statement about judging as umpiring follows: 
Judges and justices are servants of the law, not the other way around. Judges are like um-
pires. Umpires don’t make the rules; they apply them. The role of an umpire and a judge is 
critical. They make sure everybody plays by the rules. But it is a limited role. Nobody ever 
went to a ball game to see the umpire. 
*** 
I have no agenda, but I do have a commitment. If I am confirmed, I will confront every case 
with an open mind. I will fully and fairly analyze the legal arguments that are presented. I 
will be open to the considered views of my colleagues on the bench. And I will decide every 
case based on the record, according to the rule of law, without fear or favor, to the best of 
my ability. And I will remember that it’s my job to call balls and strikes and not to pitch or 
bat. 
Id.
 144. See, e.g., Wilfred Prest, Blackstone On Judges; Blackstone As Judge, 11 MURDOCH UNIVERSITY 
ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF LAW, NO. 4 (Dec. 2004), available at 
http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/indices/issue/v11n4.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2009); Edward Mason, Builders 
Of Our Law During The Reign Of Queen Victoria (1904)(each judicial biography within that volume is chock full 
of detail that makes it clear that the great English common-law judges hardly saw themselves as mere “umpires” ); 
Emily Kadens, Justice Blackstone’s Common-Law Orthodoxy, 103 NORTHWESTERN L. REV. (forthcoming  2009, 
Issue 4), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1359284. 
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tive,”145whatever those labels are supposed to mean.  Harlan Fiske Stone, a Dean of 
Columbia University Law School, a Republican, and an appointee of Republican 
President Calvin Coolidge,146 would have no truck with such boyish metaphors147
when he observed that: 
[O]ne of the evil features, a very evil one, about all this assumption 
that judges only find the law and don’t make it, often becomes the 
evil of a lack of candor. By covering up the lawmaking function of 
judges, we miseducate the people and fail to bring out into the 
open the real responsibility of judges for what they do.148
Yet, it is a contemporary, conservatively-identified judge, Richard Posner of 
the Seventh Circuit, who delivers the most devastating critique of the Roberts 
“umpire” metaphor.  In How Judges Think, Judge Posner takes us, the readers, 
 ________________________  
145. See Sir Michael Hardie Boys, The Right Honourable the Lord Cooke of Thorndon, 39 VICT. U.
WELLINGTON L. REV. 9,  13 (2007) (Eulogy given at Lord Cooke of Thorndon’s funeral) (“Some have called 
Robin an activist, but that is a foolish label, indicative of a failure to understand our legal history and the nature of 
the judicial process. He was in truth liberal, open minded, seeing the law as a living instrument, unafraid to ensure 
as far as he could that it met the needs of contemporary society; above all, that it achieved fairness.”); Archibald 
Cox, The Role of the Supreme Court: Judicial Activism or Self-Restraint?, 47 MD. L. REV. 118, 121-123 (1987) 
(demolishing the typical use of the “liberal”/”conversative” and “activist”/”restrained” judicial labels).  As a wise 
law-student writer has admonished: 
Much is expected from the judicial power of the United States. Expected to possess neither 
force nor will,  it must serve as a bulwark for discrete and insular minorities.   At the same 
time, it is expected to give effect to the will of the legislature.  The demands on the federal 
judiciary are far from homogenous, and at times, they are conflicting.  A court is expected to 
do justice yet receives public criticism for engaging in “activism.”  Yet, American law finds 
its roots in a tradition of adjudication that is evolving and flexible: the common law.  At the 
heart of its charge is the obligation*1458 to safeguard the will of the legislature,  to ensure 
the protection of the minority, and resolve particular disputes and redress particular injuries.  
It is difficult to imagine a philosophy of law that accommodates such a tension.  
Yavar Bathaee, Comment: Incompletely Theorized Agreements: An Unworkable Theory Of Judicial Modesty 34 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1457, 1457-1458 (2007) (footnotes omitted). 
 146. John W. Johnson, Harlan Fiske Stone, in THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A BIOGRAPHICAL 
DICTIONARY 425-426 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed. 1994). 
147. See Robert Bruce Weber, The Deciders:  Judges v. Umpires, N.Y. TIMES, . July 12, 2009, at WK1, 
available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/12/weekinreview/12weber.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=Judges%20v.%20Umpires&s
t=cse.  Weber makes the point nicely: 
The judge-umpire analogy, in the end, is unfair to both judges and umpires, and in the cur-
rent context it’s worth remembering the 1933 eulogy that F. Scott Fitzgerald delivered for 
his friend Ring Lardner, whose focus on baseball — “a boy’s game, with no more possibili-
ties in it than a boy could master,” Fitzgerald lamented — kept him from fulfilling his 
promise as a writer.  
Id.  The same might be said of the effect of the umpire metaphor on the fulfillment of promise a judge. 
 148. Edward Lazarus, Overall, The Miers Nomination Is Troubling-But It Does Have One Virtue, FindLaw, 
Oct. 13, 2005, http:// writ.news.findlaw.com/lazarus/20051013.html. (quoted in, Theodore A. McKee, Judges As 
Umpires, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1709, 1723 (2007).  See also, MANFRED LACHS, THE TEACHER IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 205-209 (2d 3d. 1987) (discussing the transition of international law publicists to international tribunal roles 
and disputing the notion that such academics leave behind the nuances acquired in their study and scholarship to 
assume some kind of antiseptic role as a judge). 
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aside and speaks plainly to us as persons of intelligence when he writes, “[n]either 
[John Roberts] nor any other knowledgeable person actually believed or believes 
that the rules that judges in our system apply, particularly appellate judges and 
most particularly the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, are given to them the way 
rules of baseball are given to umpires.”149  If judges are umpires, Posner writes, 
“[w]e must imagine that umpires, in addition to calling balls and strikes, made the 
rules of baseball and changed them at will.”150  As Judge Posner elaborates, Chief 
Justice Roberts: 
 ________________________  
 149. RICHARD A. POSNER, The Judge As Occasional Legislator in HOW JUDGES THINK 78 (2008). 
 150. Id. at 78-79.   Judge Posner also notes another flaw in the Roberts umpire metaphor: 
There is a less obvious mistake in Roberts’s baseball analogy.  Until recently, different um-
pires defined the strike zone differently, so that pitchers had to adjust their tactics to the par-
ticular umpire.  The analogy is to the way in which different judges interpet the Constitution 
differently. 
. . . As is usually true of “reasoning by analogy,” what is interesting about the comparison 
between umpires and judges in not the similarities but the differences.
Id. at 79 (emphasis supplied).  Judge Posner highlights those differences by offering “the story of the three um-
pires asked to explain the epistemology of balls and strikes”:
The first umpire explains that he calls them as they are, the second that he calls them as he 
sees them, and the third that there  are no balls and strikes until he calls them.  The first um-
pire is the legalist.  The second umpire is the pragmatic trial judge . . . .  The third is the ap-
pellate judge deciding cases in the open area.  His activity is creation rather than discovery. 
Id. at 81.  The popular press is largely in accord with Judge Posner’s critique.  See, e.g., Dahlia Lithwick, The 
Sotomayor Test:  Will She Limit Obama’s Next Pick?, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 3, 2009, available at 
http://www.newsweek.com/id/208123; Edward Lazarus, The Supreme Court as Umpire?: How the Global Warm-
ing Decision Illuminates the Role We Ask the Justices to Play, Findlaw, April 13, 2007 (“no matter the Chief 
Justice might say, judicial decision-making is often, inevitably, about policy judgments. Moreover, the decisions 
themselves are, inevitably, political in consequence”), available at 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/lazarus/20070412.html; Joshua Green, Chief Umpire Rove, THE ATLANTIC, July 13, 
2009 (attributing the origin of the phrase to Karl Rove from his consultancy on Alabama Supreme Court election 
races), available at http://politics.theatlantic.com/2009/07/chief_umpire_rove.php.  Another national commentator 
aptly observed that Justice Sotomayor may have gone too far in conceding deference to this unhistorical notion, 
“by staging what was, in effect, a three-day infomercial for judges as mechanical umpires who simply ‘apply the 
law’  by ‘calling balls and strikes,’” and in so doing “Sotomayor has proved conclusively that it’s John Roberts’s 
world now—we all just rent space there.”  Dahlia Lithwick, The Sotomayor Test:  Will She Limit Obama’s Next 
Pick?, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 3, 2009, available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/208123.  Another commentator has 
taken to task both John Roberts and Sonia Sotomayor for seeking confirmation refuge in creating philosophical 
constructs so bizarrely off-base that the importance of the very position they sought would be imperiled if reality 
mirrored their confirmation persona: 
An eavesdropper from Mars listening in on the confirmation hearings of John Roberts and 
Sonia Sotomayor might wonder why any attorney of lively intelligence would aspire to 
serve on the U.S. Supreme Court. Roberts’s umpire calling balls and strikes and Soto-
mayor’s dispassionate technician doggedly applying law to facts make the process of judi-
cial decision[-]making seem simple and dull.  Both know that cases where the law is clear, 
the facts are unambiguous, and reasonable minds agree on the right result seldom reach the 
Supreme Court, or, for that matter, any appellate court. 
Leslie Carothers, Closing Statement—Judging And The “Empire Of Unconscious Loyalties, THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL FORUM at 60 (Sept./Oct. 2009), available at http://www.eli.org/pdf/forum/26-5/26-
5closingstatement.pdf.  Ruth Marcus has provided an even more amusing way to describe the absurdity of the 
metaphor: 
Winnie the Pooh, or so he tells us, is a Bear of Very Little Brain. As he struggles to think 
his way out of a predicament, you can see him trying to knock the solution out of his fluff-
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[K]nows that when legalist methods of judicial decision-making 
fall short, judges draw on beliefs and intuitions that may have a 
political hue . . . [S/]he will draw on these intuitions and believes 
in the legalistically indeterminate cases because the judicial imper-
ative is to decide cases, with reasonable dispatch . . . .  The judge 
cannot throw up his [or her] hands, or stew indefinitely, just be-
cause [s/]he is confronted with a case in which the orthodox mate-
rials of judicial decision-making, honestly deployed, will not pro-
duce an acceptable result.  They may not produce any result, as in 
a case in which two canons of statutory construction are applicable 
and they point to different results.151
Adding to the concerns that Harlan Fiske Stone expressed about the harm to 
the public’s perception of the bench resulting from such caricatures of judging, 
Richard Posner finds that such false modesty is just as harmful to the judge who 
appears to wear it on his sleeve: 
Roberts may have made a tactical error.  His confirmation did not 
turn on convincing Senators that a Supreme Court Justice is like a 
baseball umpire.  In the spring of 2007, less than two years after 
his confirmation, he demonstrated by his judicial votes and opi-
nions that he aspires to re-make significant areas of constitutional 
law.  The tension between what he said at his confirmation hearing 
and what he is doing as a Justice is a blow to Roberts’s reputation 
for candor and a further debasement of the already debased curren-
cy of the testimony of nominees at judicial confirmation hear-
ings.152
filled head. By contrast, Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justice-in-Waiting Samuel Alito 
are, as Pooh might say, Very Clever Brains indeed. But, listening to their confirmation hear-
ings, they seem to have a Winnie the Pooh theory of judging: a conviction that if they just 
think, think, think, they will come up with the correct result. 
Ruth Marcus, Underneath Their Robes, WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 17, 2006, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/16/AR2006011600909_pf.html (original empha-
sis). 
 151. POSNER, supra note 149, at 79 (original emphasis). 
 152. Id. at 81.  Professor Timothy Terrell has undertaken a deeper, jurisprudential exploration of this territo-
ry, in which he finds an integral relationship between the metaphor chosen to express the judicial function and the 
very notion of an independent judiciary: 
[J]udges, properly understood in their most fundamental political sense, are not simply ob-
servers of “balls and strikes.”  They are instead essential to the existence of balls and strikes 
in the first place.  The key proposition is therefore this:  Judges do not exist as a part of 
modern political life to make the “easy” calls that make the sandlot game a bit more effi-
cient and (perhaps) fun and satisfying; they exist to make the frequent “hard” calls that our 
circumstances now demand for us to remain a viable civil community.  The “players” in this 
“game” of civil life expect nothing less, for the game itself has been redefined by all of us to 
include the presence, and authority, of these “official scorers.”
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Richard Posner is not the only sitting federal circuit judge to find cause for 
pause in the face of the Roberts umpire metaphor.  Judge McKee of the U.S. Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals cautioned two years before the Sotomayor confirmation 
hearings that he: 
[R]ealize[d], of course, that the confirmation hearings of both 
Chief Justice Roberts and Associate Justice Alito were largely 
theater and that the metaphor was offered in that context.  Howev-
er, the metaphor has become accepted as a kind of shorthand for 
judicial “best practices,” that obscures a complex dynamic that is 
far more amorphous, elusive and troublesome than its simplistic 
appeal suggests.153
Judge McKee helpfully observes that “[r]ather than indulging the pretense that 
judges are umpires and that umpires merely ‘call’um as they see’um,’ we should 
accept the fact that the law is flexible enough and strong enough to accommodate a 
far more honest approach to adjudication.”154
With respect to appellate judges, Richard Posner calls that approach the recog-
nition that “judges are occasional legislators.”155  He emphasizes that judges do not 
This observation, I think, gives additional perspective to the concept of “judicial indepen-
dence” about which we hear from time to time – quite often from the judiciary itself.   
Judges are indeed not “players” in the drama of real life the way the rest of us are; they are 
“scorers” who should be able to provide this vital function without being harassed by the 
players or the fans.  The ability of an umpire to end a dispute by throwing a player or man-
ager out of the game is therefore entirely appropriate and easily explained:  At some point, 
to preserve the game itself, interference with the umpire’s function must end, and the um-
pire is in fact in the best position at that moment to make that determination.  By the same 
token, judges must be able to operate from a vantage of perspective “outside” the fray that 
produced the dispute that is before them.  It is not as if they do not live in our ordinary non-
judicial communities – they most certainly do.  But those communities should not be able to 
dictate to a judge – once the issue of a “score” has been brought before him or her – what 
the judge’s assessment of the situation should be. 
Perhaps most daunting of all, however, is the further observation that because judges are es-
sential to the game, they are also essential to the values that constitute and justify the game.  
An important additional conclusion is therefore unavoidable:  Every judicial decision will 
be relevant in some way to the values that are inherent in civil life, and the only question 
becomes whether judges acknowledge that fact or attempt to hide from it. 
Timothy P. Terrell, Babe Pinelli’s Moment of Truth: An Essay on the Art of Legal Reasoning and the Angst of 
Judging, at 92-94(unpublished manuscript 2008, on file with author).  Professor Terrell’s essay is expected to 
become part of a forthcoming book that he is preparing for publication. 
 153. Theodore A. McKee, Judges As Umpires, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1709, 1710 (2007); see Neil Siegel, 
Umpires at Bat: On Integration and Legitimation, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 701 (2007) (stating that the Court sus-
tains its institutional legitimacy over the long run, not by pursuing the impossible task of simply applying ‘the 
rules,’ but by articulating a vision of social order that resonates with fundamental public values.).
 154. Id. at 1719. 
 155. POSNER, supra note 149, at 81.  Judge Posner notes that “[i]n their legislative capacity they labor under 
constraints that do not bind official legislators—rules of standing, for example, and limitations on whom the 
judges may consult and more generally on what methods of inquiry they may employ.”  Id.  On the other hand, 
Judge Posner observes, “judges also enjoy leeways that official legislators do not” — such as lower “[t]ransaction 
costs” (because, as he notes, “there are many fewer judges on a panel . . . than there are members of a legislative 
body”), that “constituent pressures are usually nonexistent,” and greater liberation than legislators because of “the 
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consciously divide their deliberative process along a divide of “judging” versus
“legislating.”  Rather, what occurs is, as Judge McKee’s observations suggest, a 
phenomenon in which “[m]ost judges blend the two inquiries, the legalist and the 
legislative, rather than addressing them in sequence.  Their response to a case is 
generated by legal doctrine, institutional constraints, policy preferences, strategic 
considerations, and the equities of the case, all mixed together and all mediated by 
temperament, experience, ambition, and other personal factors.”156
Of course, while both Judge Posner and Judge McKee provide valuable, con-
temporary discussions of the law-making functions of judges, their thinking owes a 
great debt to the candor and labors of Benjamin N. Cardozo, whose classic and 
most insightful statements on the nature of judging come from his Storrs Lectures 
at Yale in 1921, later published as a book that he called The Nature of the Judicial 
Process.157
In The Nature of the Judicial Process, Cardozo made critical points about judg-
ing with a clarity and intelligence that makes the current debate appear to be idle.  
Thus, Cardozo would have been contemptuous, to say the least, of the judges-as-
balls-and-strikes-umpires metaphor.158  As he pointedly observed in Lecture I, the 
“inherited instincts, traditional beliefs, acquired opinions” of those who become 
judges produce “an outlook on life, a conception of social needs . . . which, when 
reasons are nicely balanced, must determine where choice shall fall.”159  Betraying 
his own outlook of decisively artistic and of a literary temperament rather than a 
fact that they cannot sit in cases in which they have a financial or personal stake enlarges their decisional freedom, 
just as not being answerable to an electorate does.”  Id. at 81-82.  Judge Posner further elaborates these ideas in the 
balance of his chapter on “The Judge As Occasional Legislator.” See id. at 83-92. 
 156. Id. at 84-85. 
 157. If the members of the Senate Judiciary Committee have ever encountered this book, nothing said in 
Justice Sotomayor’s confirmation hearings showed either the temperance or wisdom to betray any familiarity with 
it whatsoever.  Every Senate Judiciary member ought to get a copy.  It should be required reading—whether as an 
inaugural encounter or a refresher—for every member on the Senate Judiciary Committee and their staff before 
every judicial confirmation hearing.  From appearances, they either haven’t read it; or have forgotten they read it; 
or, for purposes of political posturing, are simply ignoring that they have read it.  
 158. The only reference to baseball Cardozo made in a published judicial opinion was by way of explaining 
a precedent in a premises liability case: 
We may say more simply, and perhaps more wisely, rejecting the fiction of invitation, that 
the nature of the use itself creates the duty, and that an owner is just as much bound to repair 
a structure that endangers travelers on a walk in an amusement park as he is to repair a 
structure that endangers travelers on a highway. Whatever the underlying principle that ex-
plains the rule, the rule itself is settled. The owner of such a park must use all reasonable 
care to make its structures safe before he leases it for his profit. In Lusk v. Peck, (supra), the 
defendant had leased a grand stand and bleachers to be used for baseball games. The lease 
was for a term of years. The plan of the structure was proper. Some of the timbers, however, 
had decayed before the lease was made. Because inspection  would have disclosed the de-
fect, the landlord was held liable. 
Junkermann v. Tilyou Realty Co., 213 N.Y. 404, 408-409, 108 N.E. 190, 191-192 (N.Y. 1915)(emphasis supplied).  
In fact, on the few occasions when Cardozo mentioned “sport” in his opinions, it was used in a way to refer to 
juvenile amusement.  See . Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 250 N.Y. 479, 166 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1929); 
Hynes v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 231 N.Y. 229, 131 N.E. 898 (N.Y. 1921); Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills, 229 
N.Y. 470, 128 N.E. 711 (N.Y. 1920). 
 159. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, Lecture I:  Introduction—The 
Method of Philosophy 11 (1921). 
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follower of professional or collegiate sports – Cardozo invoked a painting meta-
phor to expose the same kind of mechanistic view of both judge and judge’s au-
dience that underlies the umpire metaphor:  “Their notion of their duty is to match 
the colors of the case at hand against the colors of the many sample cases spread 
out upon their desk. The sample nearest in shade supplies the applicable rule.”160
“But of course,” wrote Cardozo in dismissing such notions out of hand, “no system 
of living law can be evolved by such a process, and no judge of a high court, wor-
thy of his office, views the function of his place so narrowly. . . It is when the col-
ors do not match, . . . when there is no decisive precedent, that the serious business 
of the judge begins.”161
If the Senate Judiciary Committee’s complaints of “activist judges” are sincere, 
then Cardozo—who, along with Hand, considered among America’s greatest 
common-law judge, and who in 1932 was confirmed by a unanimous voice-vote in 
the Senate to the U.S. Supreme Court, and even though nominated by a Republican 
President—should have been rejected as a dangerous, activist, and radical nominee.  
What an odd fate that would have been for a founding member of the American 
Law Institute.162  In such a bizarre anti-intellectual climate whose logic would fos-
ter such an absurd result, the Sotomayor confirmation hearings became a spectacle 
of intellectual paucity on the part of her interlocutors – on both sides of the politi-
cal aisle.163
One must hope that Justice Sotomayor—unlike Nominee Sotomayor—will be 
willing to renounce the fallacy of the cramped and intellectually vacuous “balls-
and-strikes” perspective of the “umpire analogy,” and instead embrace that aspect 
of judging –– unquestionable integrity – that has characterized her seventeen years 
of federal judicial service.  It is the same unquestionable integrity that Justice Ro-
bert H. Jackson eloquently and accurately described in a 1951 tribute to Learned 
Hand and his cousin, Judge Augustus Hand: 
These men found their highest satisfaction in judicial work. It ful-
filled their every ambition. They put all they had into it—they have 
not shirked even its drudgery. They wrote their opinions with no 
appeal for applause and sought only to merit the ultimate approval 
of their profession. They have not been looking over their shoul-
 ________________________  
 160. Id. at 19. 
 161. Id. at 20. 
 162. See, e.g., The American Law Institute Archives, http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ali/ (describing 
the history of the American Law Institute). 
 163. See Sherilyn A. Ifill, Editorial,— A Failed Conversation GOP Assertions To The Contrary, The Soto-
mayor Hearings Shed Little Light On Either Race Or Justice, BALTIMORE SUN, July 23, 2009, at 17A, available at 
2009 WLNR 14255261.  As Professor Ifill aptly sums the hearings up:  
The atmospherics alone were astonishing. A panel of white, mostly Southern men (on the 
still all-white Judiciary Committee), using tones that were alternately scolding and condes-
cending, sought to school the first Latina Supreme Court nominee on the dangers of racism 
and the importance of equal opportunity. 
Id.  Sadly, too, the Sotomayor confirmation hearings suggest yet another audience for judicial opinion writing, 
another constituency in the mix:  the U.S. Senate’s Judiciary Committee.
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ders to see whom they please. They have represented an indepen-
dent and intellectually honest judiciary at its best. And the test of 
an independent judiciary is a simple one—the one you would apply 
in choosing an umpire for a baseball game. What do you ask of 
him? You do not ask that he shall never make a mistake or always 
agree with you, or always support the home team. You want an 
umpire who calls them as he sees them. And that is what the pro-
fession has admired in the Hands.164
2. The Heretical Notion That Judges Do Not Make Law In A Common-Law 
Legal System—Cardozo Redux 
During the Roberts confirmation hearings, Dean Chemerinsky felt compelled 
to write an editorial in the popular press responding to another distortion of the 
historic Anglo-American judicial role: 
Misleading and silly slogans about what judges do are dominating 
the debate about Supreme Court nominee John Roberts. 
[Supporters] repeat, as a mantra, that Roberts is a desirable choice 
because he won’t “legislate from the bench” and will merely “ap-
ply the law, not make it.”
But every lawyer knows that judges make law — it’s their job. In 
fact, law students learn in the first semester that almost all tort law 
(governing accidental injuries), contract law and property law are 
 ________________________  
 164. Robert H. Jackson, Why Learned And Augustus Hand Became Great (Address by Associate Justice 
Robert H. Jackson of the United States Supreme Court at the Association’s Annual Bar Dinner at the Hotel Wal-
dorf-Astoria on December 13, 1951), available at http://www.roberthjackson.org/documents/121351/.  Accord 
Marvin E. Frankel, The Adversary Judge, 54 TEXAS L. REV. 465, 467-469 (1976) (employing the “umpire” meta-
phor as a proxy for “impartiality and detachment”).  As Judge Frankel, who served on the U.S. District Court of 
Hand before him and Sotomayor after him, elaborated: 
What should go without saying is that the essence of the judicial role, active or passive, is 
impartiality and detachment, both felt and exhibited. In the quest for truth through the clash 
of contradictions, which is, of course, the only reason in theory for having trials, the judge 
does not care where the chips may fall. Concerned only that the right is done, the judge 
“should be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and oth-
ers”  as [s/] he presides over the contentious strivings toward that end. 
Id. Perhaps the real “umpire” metaphor here is that there is, as Benjamin Wittes has recently written, no one  
playing role of umpire in the sense of functioning as “a trusted source of information about [judicial] nominees 
and the controversies surrounding them.”  Benjamin Wittes, Judicial Nominations In An Umpireless Game: 
Trusted Sources, A Complaint, And A Proposal, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1487, 1488, 1490 (2009) (“My purpose in this 
Article is both to describe the consequences of our umpireless confirmation game and to suggest the establishment 
of an institutional umpire for it. That is, I mean to propose the deliberate construction of an intellectual counter-
weight to the ideological interest groups that now dominate the confirmation process, the creation of a trusted 
source of information about judicial confirmations.”).
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made by judges. Legislatures did not create these rules; judges did, 
and they continue to do so when they revise the rules over time.165
We find the seed from which such thoughts grew not in the era of David Baze-
lon and the D.C. Circuit of the 1960s166, nor from the days of the Warren Court.  “I
take judge-made law as one of the existing realities of life.”  So said Cardozo in 
The Nature of the Judicial Process.167  Indeed, he candidly titled the third of his 
seven Storrs Lectures at Yale Law School in 1921, “The Method of Sociology—
The Judge as Legislator.”168  Having discussed three examples of areas of the law 
that were, at the time, in the process of development by judicial appreciation of 
sociological perspectives and application of those perspectives in judicial rule-
making for example, the extent of legislative “power to control and regulate a busi-
ness affected with ‘a public use’”;  “modern decisions which have liberalized the 
common law rule condemning contracts in restraint of trade”; and “a like develop-
ment in the attitude of the courts toward the activities of labor unions,”169 ! Cardo-
zo expressed the operation of the common-law, judicial law-making process in 
terms of a horticultural metaphor: 
I have chosen these branches of the law merely as conspicuous il-
lustrations of the application by the courts of the method of sociol-
ogy. But the truth is that there is no branch where the method is 
not fruitful. Even when it does not seem to dominate, it is always 
in reserve. It is the arbiter between other methods, determining in 
the last analysis the choice of each, weighing their competing 
claims, setting bounds to their pretensions, balancing and moderat-
ing and harmonizing them all. Few rules in our time are so well es-
 ________________________  
 165. Erwin Chemerinsky and Catherine Fisk, Editorial/Opinion,  Judges Do Make Law — It’s Their Job,
USA Today, Aug. 23, 2005, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2005-08-23-forum-
judges_x.htm. 
 166. See, e.g., Marilyn Berger, David Bazelon Dies At 83; Jurist Had Wide Influence, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 
1993, at Section 1, p. 38 (“Rather than follow precedent set in a simpler time, he questioned the status quo and 
sought to apply new findings in the social sciences and psychiatry to issues the court faced. . . . Judge Bazelon . . .  
believed that the judiciary should reach beyond the bench and speak out on social issues” and “ was assailed by 
conservatives as being soft on crime and by some legal scholars for bringing the judiciary into the regulatory 
process.”)
 167. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, Lecture I:  Introduction—The 
Method of Philosophy, 10  (1921); see, e.g., Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 & n.12 (2002)    
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia echoed Cardozo in words that are not likely to be spoken by any nominee 
before the Senate Judiciary Committee anytime soon: 
Th[e]complete separation of the judiciary from the enterprise of “representative govern-
ment” might have some truth in those countries where judges neither make law themselves 
nor set aside the laws enacted by the legislature. It is not a true picture of the American sys-
tem. Not only do state-court judges possess the power to “make” common law, but they 
have the immense power to shape the States’ constitutions as well. 
Id.
 168. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, Lecture III:  The Method Of Sociol-
ogy The Judge As Legislator 97 (1921).  
 169. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, Lecture II:  The Methods of History, 
Tradition, & Sociology 85-86, 93-94 (1921). 
47
: Decline & Fall: Part II
Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2009
76 Barry Law Review Vol. 13 
tablished that they may not be called upon any day to justify their 
existence as means adapted to an end. If they do not function, they 
are diseased. If they are diseased, they must not propagate their 
kind. Sometimes they are cut out and extirpated altogether. Some-
times they are left with the shadow of continued life, but sterilized, 
truncated, impotent for harm.170
Thus, “[c]odes and statutes do not render the judge superfluous, nor his work 
perfunctory and mechanical. There are gaps to be filled.”171 Such language, howev-
er, should not be misread to import unrestrained judicial law-making.  Cardozo 
squarely speaks to the judge in law-making capacity as he admonishes that “[t]here 
should be greater readiness to abandon an untenable position when the rule to be 
discarded may not reasonably be supposed to have determined the conduct of the 
litigants.”172 The law-making judge must, as Cardozo wrote: 
remembe[r] that the scope of law-making power in the judiciary is 
circumscribed . . .  .   [E]ven when he is free, he is still not wholly 
free. He is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant 
roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of good-
ness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles. He 
is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated 
benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion informed by tradition, 
methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinated to 
“the primordial necessity of order in the social life.”173
Cardozo had no hesitancy in drawing a direct, and close, parallel between the 
law-making function of judges in their common-law sphere, and the law-making 
function of legislators in the age of statutes: 
We must keep within those interstitial limits which precedent and 
custom and the long and silent and almost indefinable practice of 
other judges through the centuries of the common law have set to 
judge-made innovations. But within the limits thus set, within the 
range over which choice moves, the final principle of selection for 
judges, as for legislators, is one of fitness to an end.
***
. . . [L]aw is also a conscious or purposed growth, for the expres-
sion of customary morality will be false unless the mind of the 
 ________________________  
 170. CARDOZO, supra note 168, at 97-98 (emphasis supplied).  
 171. CARDOZO, supra note 159, at 14. 
 172. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, Lecture IV: Adherence To 
Precedent—The Subconscious Element In The Judicial Process—Conclusion 151 (1921). 
 173. CARDOZO, supra note 168, at 139-40. 
48
Barry Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 2
https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol13/iss1/2
Fall 2009 Decline & Fall: Part II 77
judge is directed to the attainment of the moral end and its embo-
diment in legal forms.  Nothing less than conscious effort will be 
adequate if the end in view is to prevail. The standards or patterns 
of utility and morals will be found by the judge in the life of the 
community. They will be found in the same way by the legislator. 
That does not mean, however, that the work of the one any more 
than that of the other is a replica of nature’s forms.174
As Cardozo’s contemporary, Hand clearly exhibited the ability to take on ef-
fortlessly the role of restrained law-maker. Hand’s decision in Stohr v. Wallace,175
for example, a Trading-With-The-Enemy Act case in the wake of U.S. entry into 
World War I, exhibits this quality, as Hand had to chart a course between Con-
gress’s intentions, the language of the statute, international law, and sound policy:
It is quite true that the right of capture on land depends upon the 
action of Congress, and is not a part of our customary law arising 
from a state of war. Yet the incidents of sea capture might, in the 
absence of contrary legislative expression, be perhaps looked to as 
a fair analogy. The reason of the rule which makes the transitu a 
test of the validity of a transfer, imminente bello, was considered 
by the Privy Council in The Baltica, supra, and it was held to be 
the difficulty involved in detecting reserved enemy interests. 
Therefore a ship was restored when delivery was made to the 
transferee at an intermediate port. The theory was *841 repudiated 
that while at sea the belligerent’s rights are already inchoate, and 
that the ship has come, as it were, already into the jurisdiction of 
the captor. 
In spite of The Baltica, it might still be that sales of goods within 
enemy territory, imminente bello, and to avoid capture, ought to be 
regarded as in fraud of belligerent rights, if the statute said noth-
ing. A serious argument might be made in favor of such a result, 
once a policy of land capture be inaugurated; but under this act it 
appears to me that section 7b effectively closes any such discus-
sion. A part of the first paragraph of that section reads as follows: 
‘No person shall by virtue of any assignment * * * to him of 
any * * * chose in action by * * * an enemy * * * have any 
right or remedy against the * * * obligor * * * unless said as-
signment * * * was made prior to the beginning of the war.’
 ________________________  
 174. Id. at 103, 105 (emphasis supplied)(footnotes omitted).   
 175. 269 F. 827, 841 (S.D.N.Y. 1920) (suit by shareholders in multi-national corporation against the Alien 
Property Custodian seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to reclaim their interest in German-held stock shares 
that had been seized under color of authorization by the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917). 
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It might indeed be open to a good deal of question whether this in-
cluded an assignment of equitable interests in shares of stock, 
though shares are analogous to choses in action, and a fortiori 
equitable interests in shares. But I think that the purpose of the sta-
tute is pretty clearly indicated, even if its letter does not cover this 
precise case. It can scarcely be supposed that an exception would 
be made in favor of ante bellum transfers of choses in action which 
did not apply to property so nearly akin as this, or indeed to all 
property, and it is clear that absolute transfers of choses in action 
before April 6, 1917, would be valid. Apparently the United States 
meant not to inquire into such transfers as in fraud of its rights. 
There is no reason to extend the application of so penal a statute 
beyond its fair import; therefore the capture must stand upon the 
ground that the contract conveyed nothing to Stohr & Sons, Incor-
porated. Upon that ground it finds sufficient support.176
Hand wrote hundreds of district court decisions in which the court was called 
upon to establish the rule of law, from the relevant available sources, needed to 
decide the claims in the case.  As he once wrote to Justice Brandeis, “[i]t is of 
course true that any kind of judicial legislation is objectionable on the score of the 
limited interests which a Court can represent, yet there are wrongs which in fact 
legislatures cannot be brought to take an interest in, at least not until the Courts 
have acted.”177
3. Empathy As A Corollary Of The Audience Principle In Action 
It should chill good people to the bone when one hears judges criticized for 
having the quality of empathy.178  It should make us recoil to hear denunciation of a 
chief executive, or judicial commission, who considers the capacity for empathy as 
a judicial qualification.179 For those, however, who do embrace such harsh rhetoric, 
 ________________________  
 176. Stohr, 269 F. at 841. 
 177. Letter from Learned B. Hand to Louis D. Brandeis, Jan. 22, 1919, available at
http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Learned_Hand. 
 178. Charlie Savage, A Judge’s View Of Judging Is On The Record, N.Y. Times, May 15, 2009, at A21, 
available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/15/us/15judge.html?scp=6&sq=obama%20empathy%20judges&st=cse. 
179. See, e.g., Slate.com, Dahlia Lithwick, Once More, Without Feeling: The GOP’s Misguided And Con-
fused Campaign Against Judicial Empathy, http://www.slate.com/id/2218103/, (last visited SLATE. Nov. 6, 2009) 
(discussing criticism of President Barack Obama’s listing of empathy as one of the qualities he seeks in judicial 
nominees).  President Obama has described his view of empathy in the following terms:  “It is at the heart of my 
moral code, and it is how I understand the Golden Rule — not simply as a call to sympathy or charity, but as 
something more demanding, a call to stand in somebody else’s shoes and see through their eyes.”  Sheryl Gay 
Stolberg, Political Memo:  Buzzwords Shape The Debate Over Confirmation, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2009, at A15 
(quoting Barack Obama, The Audacity of Hope (2006)), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/29/us/politics/29memo.html.  For a psychological view of empathy and the law, 
see Richard Warner, Empathy and Compassion, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 813, 824 (2008) (“we often fail to 
empathize, which can lead to intolerance”); See also, Tibor Varady, Harold Berman--An Empathy For Difference 
That Made All The Difference, 57 EMORY L.J. 1455 (2008).  For a fascinating discussion of empathy, ritual, and 
50
Barry Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 2
https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol13/iss1/2
Fall 2009 Decline & Fall: Part II 79
a slipperiest of slopes is presented:  Where would we hope to end up with such a 
qualification standard?180
That the quality of empathy is a most desirable characteristic of a judge is a no-
tion at least as old as Solomon and Sheba.181  A judge who cannot empathize is a 
poor judge of character, motivation, and psychology; as Professor Linder has ob-
served, “[e]mpathy, unlike intuition, is an ‘act of great sophistication,’ necessitat-
ing imagination of the beginning, middle, and possible end of another human be-
ing.”182
In flushing out the true mother in a custody contest between two women, King 
Solomon demonstrated a capacity for empathy when he startlingly proposed that 
the child should be vivisected.183  At first, this assertion may seem preposterous 
given the obvious savage cruelty of the royal decree if it had actually been ex-
ecuted—but the statement was the sophisticated product of empathy, delivered in 
the form of what we commonly call “reverse psychology.”  As Solomon correctly 
understood, the birth mother would rather give up possession of the child than to 
see him slaughtered.  He also knew that the other woman, a maternal pretender, 
was simply trying to escape a state of semi-servitude for childless widows, and 
cared naught for sacrificing the child to gain the freedom of the maternal status.  
Thus, over two thousand years later, we marvel at the wisdom of Solomon.  But 
that wisdom came not from cleverness, or detachment, or logic, or playing the um-
pire; it came straight from the ability to empathize – King Solomon was able to 
the legal profession within the context of a celebrated law-based novel, see generally, Note, Being Atticus Finch: 
The Professional Role Of Empathy In To Kill A Mockingbird, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1682 (2004).
 180. We have seen that destination in the fulfillment of the “scientific” method of the law in Germany 1933-
1945. See generally INGO MULLER, HITLER’S JUSTICE: THE COURTS OF THE THIRD REICH (1991); Rabbi Yitz-
chok Breitowitz, Book Review of Hitler’s Justice, available at http://www.jlaw.com/Commentary/book.html.   
That period of German legal history is epitomized by Roland Freisler, the infamous judge who served as President 
of the Volksgerichtshof (“People’s Court”.  See the surreal portrait of Freisler on the bench at 
http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/images/highres_30016345%20copy.jpg.  No one would be able to detect even 
the scintilla of empathy in his visage.  http://decker.extra.hu/wpress/wp-content/2007/10/f3.);  Freisler, preserved 
forever on film by the Nazi’s obsessive documentation of their crimes see 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aNi5256dhvM ;   http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q1pMk73UCYY&NR=1.  
Freisler was  apotheosis of the unempathetic judge.  See The People’s Court (1934-1945), JEWISH VIRTUAL 
LIBRARY, available at http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/peoplesct.html.  Yet, it could be said 
for Freisler that he, indeed, applied “the law”—without once ever questioning whether “the law” he applied was in 
fact lawlessness institutionalized.  See Breitowitz, supra.   The phenomenon is not entirely unknown in America.  
See generally ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTI-SLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975); Jeff-
rey A. Van Detta, Requiem For A Heavyweight: Costa As Countermonument To McDonnell Douglas — A Coun-
termemory Reply To Instrumentalism, 67 ALB. L. REV. 965 (2004) (discussing choices confronting anti-slavery 
Justice Joseph Story in ruling on the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act).  
 181. See 1 Kings 3:16-27; see also, 1 Kings 10:1-13.   
 182. Douglas O. Linder, Juror Empathy and Race, 63 TENN. L. REV. 887, 891 (1996) (footnotes omitted). 
 183. An exegesis of Jewish law concerning the widowed and childless woman makes it clearer why King 
Solomon would have proposed a solution that to the modern ear sounds utterly absurd, and contrary to his reputa-
tion for wisdom.  In short, the childless woman was seeking to escape the childless widow’s obligation of Yibbum
-- having to marry her brother-in-law or having to persuade him to emancipate her.  Provided she had given birth 
to her late husband’s child, be the child now living or dead, she escaped that state of servitude to her brother -in-
law, who “may not be locatable, compliant or appealing.”   She was interested, in other words, in preserving her 
socio-economic status, rather than being dull-witted.  See Baruch C. Cohen, The Brilliant Wisdom of King Solo-
mon, JEWISH LAW (1998), available at http://www.jlaw.com/Commentary/solomon.html.  
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place himself in the shoes of both women, and found the correct solution to what at 
first seemed an intractable swearing contest.184
Solomons are sought today.  Despite the tenor of recent political debate, it is 
well-documented that the general public desires empathy as a quality of any law-
yer—practitioner or judge—in the legal system with whom they come into con-
tact.185  Thus, the Audience Principle cannot be effectively applied to judicial opi-
nion writing unless the quality of empathy is taken into account in determining 
what a very predominant segment of the audience expects and demands. 
Our subject, Learned Hand, struggled with finding the right balance of empa-
thy with other factors—but he nonetheless recognized the value of that struggle and 
strove to realize its beneficial potential for judicial decision-making.186  Indeed, 
Hand has not been alone in that search; as it has been said of another federal judge 
in one of the few examinations in the law-review literature of empathy as a judicial 
quality: 
Deciding any given case likely requires a judge to rely on a com-
bination of different abilities and knowledge including a firm un-
derstanding of rules of law, statutes, and precedent; an appreciation 
for legal theory and policy; and an incorporation of common sense 
and judgment informed by an empathic understanding of context.  . 
. . [E]mpathy [may therefore be understood] as an integrated com-
ponent of the decision making process that may enhance, but does 
not undermine, other vital judicial considerations.187
 ________________________  
 184. For a modern analog in the tradition of King Solomon, see the rare and hard-to-find IRVING YOUNGER,
IMAGINARY JUDICIAL OPINIONS: A CREATIVE VIEW FROM THE BENCH (1989).  Professor Younger wielded  the 
wisdom of Solomon in fictional cases such as In the Matter of the Application of Redan, id. at 67-70 (described as 
“ an application for an injunction to prevent the end of the world,” offering a Mathusian analysis circa 1822 pre-
dicting a dire future for New York City due to transportation pollution – from horses –and conditionally dismiss-
ing the petition that sought the court to enjoin “further enlargement of the population, human or equine” on the 
condition that “within three years hereof, there has  . . . been bred and made available to the public a ‘clean’ 
horse”); In the Matter of the Application of a Number of Fetuses, id. at 25 (a decision of Solomonic logic uphold-
ing a challenge to a “limited abortion law” on the grounds that it “unlawfully distinguishes between permissible 
and impermissible abortions”).
185. See, e.g., Kristin B. Gerdy, Clients, Empathy, and Compassion: Introducing First-Year Students to the 
“Heart” of Lawyering, 87 NEB. L. REV. 1, 12-15 (2008); see also Michael J. Zimmer, Systemic Empathy, 34 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 575 (2003). (proposing “that judges ought to adopt an approach to victims of discrim-
ination rooted in . . . ‘systemic empathy’” and “explor[ing] how the existence of discrimination can be used to 
educate judges in the hopes that they will develop this sort of empathy”). 
 186. See MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, THE SENSE OF JUSTICE: EMPATHY IN LAW AND PUNISHMENT 40-41 
(2006)(discussing Hand’s struggle with applying the concepts of “crime of moral turpitude,” a standard for order-
ing deportation of an alien, and “good moral character,” a requirement for naturalization of an alien).
 187. Catherine Gage O’Grady, Empathy and Perspective in Judging: The Honorable William C. Canby, Jr.,
33 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 4, 7 (2001).  Professor O’Grady’s observations about the difference between desirable judicial 
empathy as a quality of judging versus undesirable favoritism are worth recounting here: 
In the judicial process, the conscious attempt to employ empathy-to understand a case by 
imagining the perspectives and situations of others-requires a judge to consider thoughtfully 
the unique context that surrounds a dispute and to recognize the individual perspective, or 
“life story,” that each litigant brings to the court. The notion of empathy in judging is in-
tertwined with a widespread “call to context” in judicial decisionmaking.  Judges are urged 
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It is not unprecedented for Supreme Court Justices who are very open and can-
did about the work of the court, to reveal, at least in intimate circles, how a case 
made them feel and how they tried to understand the emotions of the parties, par-
ticularly those who had not prevailed in the high court.  In 1831, for example, the 
Supreme Court turned back the Cherokee Nation’s effort to use the federal courts 
to contest Georgia’s encroachment on their native sovereignty, an encroachment 
that ultimately led to their complete disenfranchisement and their expulsion from 
the State.188  In a divided court, Chief Justice Marshall ruled that the Court had 
jurisdiction only over disputes between a sovereign state (Georgia) and a sovereign 
nation, not a sovereign state and an association of people with cultural and familial 
ties within that nation, which is how he characterized the Indian Nations.  Justice 
Joseph Story, however, joined Justice Thompson’s comprehensive dissent from 
that ruling, and would have found federal subject matter jurisdiction.189  The case 
deeply affected Justice Story.  Story wrote to his wife, at the beginning of the 
second half of the term of court (January 1832), that: 
At Philadelphia I was introduced to two of the Chiefs of the Che-
rokee nation so sadly dealt with by the State of Georgia.  I never in 
my whole life was more affected by the consideration that they and 
all their race are destined to destruction.  And I feel, as an Ameri-
can, disgraced by our gross violation of the public faith towards 
to consider context, or individual life stories, as a fundamental part of deciding a case. It is 
suggested that a focused concentration on legal rules and legal theory, which are typically 
far removed from individual experience, takes a judge away from the human concerns that 
are actually at issue in the case. The “call to context” seeks to “bring law down to life, to the 
people, ‘to the ground.”‘
Although empathy is sometimes used interchangeably with compassion, sympathy, and pity, 
empathy as a component of judicial decisionmaking does not mean experiencing sympathy 
or pity for another and allowing that sympathy to shape an outcome. Empathy in judging is 
not predictive of outcome-it is part of a process, but it does not carry the day.  When a judge 
proceeds to apply the law and judicially assess a case that is empathically understood, the 
fact that the judge has achieved empathic understandings may or may not affect the eventual 
outcome of the case. With respect to judicial decisionmaking, empathy is an important part 
of the process, not because it may have an impact on the result, but because the incorpora-
tion of empathy in judicial decisionmaking will provide a judge with new understandings 
and enhanced knowledge of context with which to assess a case. Moreover, as illustrated in 
the Canby opinions analyzed below, empathic understandings can usefully integrate with 
legal analysis in ways that illuminate the intent of a statute or law. Indeed, some concepts 
imbedded in law can only be understood from an empathic perspective; thus, it follows that 
judges interpreting laws that incorporate such concepts ought to be employing empathy in 
the judicial decisionmaking process.  
Id. at 9-11 (footnotes omitted). 
 188. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). 
 189. Id. at 80 (Thomson, J., dissenting, and noting “I am authorised by my brother Story to say that he 
concurs with me in this opinion.”).
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them.  I fear, and greatly fear, that in the course of Providence 
there will be dealt to us a heavy retributive justice.190
Story, who died in 1845, did not live to see truth come of his fearsome prophe-
cy. 
Like Story, Justice Sotomayor was to encounter a previous litigant in the wake 
of a decision.  However, the retributive aspect of this encounter was immediate and 
political, not predictive and dispensational.  A litigant confronted Justice Soto-
mayor from a case in which, unlike Story, she did not dissent, but rather, added her 
vote to rule against the litigant.  And unlike the exiled Cherokee Nation, who left 
Story’s East-Coast antebellum world along a “trail of tears,” the litigant who re-
turned to haunt Justice Sotomayor was mustered by those most opposed to her ad-
vancement to argue that her empathy was selectively effectuated and that this liti-
gant, unlike the Cherokee Nation for Story, had not received the benefit of judicial 
empathy.  In an ironic twist, Justice Sotomayor’s confirmation opponents con-
structed a seemingly intractable conundrum as their assessment of the nominee—
criticizing her for being empathetic (and for being the nominee of a President who 
valued empathy) while at the same time decrying her supposed lack of empathy for 
this particular litigant.  Only “double-think” worthy of Orwell could reconcile the 
incongruity in these inconsistent positions.  
To complicate matters even more, the criticism of empathy drove Justice So-
tomayor to seek the same kind of deflecting shelter that John Roberts took refuge 
in during his confirmation hearings with the simplistic “umpire” metaphor.  Put on 
the defensive by a hostile press and hostile Judiciary Committee members, Justice 
Sotomayor appeared constrained to distance herself from empathy as a quality of 
judges.191  This is unfortunate. 
The role of empathy has been distorted so far beyond its meaning and its tradi-
tion that it is time for a voice that commands the attention of politicians and of the 
people to set its role aright.192 In bringing a clearer acknowledgement of the Au-
dience Principle to the Supreme Court’s opinions, Justice Sotomayor has an oppor-
tunity to rehabilitate and reinstall empathy in the pantheon of values on which the 
tradition of American judicial opinion-writing is based.   
Her bona fides for doing so were, in fact, enhanced as a result of her confirma-
tion process, and the odd roles that the topic of empathy played in it.  The only 
criticism that could be—and was—leveled at her actual judicial record involved the 
 ________________________  
 190. 2 LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 49 (WILLIAM WETMORE STORY, EDITOR 1851)(letter of Joseph 
Story to Mrs. Joseph Story, January 13, 1832); see JAMES MCCLELLAN, JOSEPH STORY AND THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 299 & n. 115 (1971). 
 191. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Political Memo: Buzzwords Shape the Debate Over Confirmation, N.Y. TIMES,
May 29, 2009, at A15, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/29/us/politics/29memo.html.  
 192. See, e.g., Editorial Advisory Board, Commentary: The Empathy Of Judges, THE DAILY REC. (Balt., 
Md.), July 16, 2009, available at  http://mddailyrecord.com/2009/07/16/editorial-advisory-board-the-empathy-of-
judges/(distinguishing among empathy, sympathy, and judicial activism; observing that “there is no necessary 
correlation between having empathy for a litigant and employing empathy to achieve a predetermined policy 
objective”; and concluding that “the judicial standard must be scrupulous impartiality, informed by empathy”).
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Second Circuit’s opinion in Ricci v. DeStefano,193 known to most as “the New Ha-
ven firefighters’ case.”  Ricci has become paradigmatic of the perils in short-
shrifting the Audience Principle, particularly by choosing a manner and means of 
communicating a ruling that is perceived by the Audience — rightly or wrongly, 
fairly or unfairly — to denigrate, rather than promote, empathy.  The Ricci case is 
now perhaps better known than any other contemporary federal court decision 
among the general public (except, of course, for Roe v. Wade) — and the aspect of 
the case that is most well-known is not so much the divisive legal issue it presented 
on whether promotions in a public fire department could be deferred for those who 
passed a qualifying examination when the examination results showed a statistical-
ly significant disparate impact on non-white examinees.  What is most well known 
is the way in which the Second Circuit chose to issue its affirmation of the U.S. 
District Court that had found the firefighter’s claims legally insufficient.194  The 
Second Circuit elected to dispose of the case by an unpublished summary order and 
considerations of the way such a disposition would be received by the parties, the 
public, the press, and the politicians apparently eluded or were downplayed in the 
panel’s deliberations.195 It was Justice Sotomayor’s lot to have been a member of 
that very appellate panel. 
The panel’s miscalculation of what the Audience Principle required of them in 
Ricci might have gone unnoticed outside of the parties’ circle, had it not been for 
the further levels of scrutiny to which the slender opinion was subjected. 
First, there was a petition for rehearing in banc, and a request by Circuit Judges 
for a poll of the Circuit to determine whether rehearing would be granted.196  At 
that point, the panel thought it better to convert the summary order into a published 
per curiam opinion without enhancing or adding anything to the text itself.197  The 
divisive issue ended up dividing the Circuit quite closely – seven  judges to six, in 
fact, voting by the slenderest of margins to allow the slender summary order (now 
dressed in per curiam raiments) to stand without a full-Circuit rehearing.  But even 
more than the merits of the case per se, it was the panel’s choice to employ sum-
mary disposition that provoked the strongest reaction from the judges who favored 
in banc rehearing. 
 ________________________  
 193. Ricci v. DeStefano 530 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam), reh’g in banc denied, 530 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 
2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 894 (2009), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009). 
 194. Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D. Conn. 2006). 
 195. Ricci, 530 F.3d at 87.  Here is the entirety of the summary order: 
We affirm, substantially for the reasons stated in the thorough, thoughtful, and well-
reasoned opinion of the court below. In this case, the Civil Service Board found itself in the 
unfortunate position of having no good alternatives. We are not unsympathetic to the plain-
tiffs’ expression of frustration. Mr. Ricci, for example, who is dyslexic, made intensive ef-
forts that appear to have resulted in his scoring highly on one of the exams, only to have it 
invalidated. But it simply does not follow that he has a viable Title VII claim. To the con-
trary, because the Board, in refusing to validate the exams, was simply trying to fulfill its 
obligations under Title VII when confronted with test results that had a disproportionate ra-
cial impact, its actions were protected. 
196. Id. at 88 (order and opinions on petition for rehearing in banc). 
197. Id. at 87.  
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The opinion, filed by Circuit Judge Jose Cabranes, dissenting from the seven to 
six denial of in banc rehearing, has garnered the most attention and it epitomizes 
how badly a miscalculation under the Audience Principle may redound to the de-
triment of the judicial authors. 
Judge Cabranes’ dissent started in strictly factual and measured tones, but one 
can sense the disquietude building as he wrote: 
The use of per curiam opinions of this sort, adopting in full the 
reasoning of a district court without further elaboration, is normal-
ly reserved for cases that present straight-forward questions that do 
not require explanation or elaboration by the Court of Appeals. 
The questions raised in this appeal cannot be classified as such, as 
they are indisputably complex and far from well-settled.198
Judge Cabranes’ tone and his pace were marked by both accelerando and cres-
cendo as he contrasted the weight of the filings and argument against the wisp of 
an opinion issued by the panel: 
On appeal, the parties submitted briefs of eighty-six pages each
and a six-volume joint appendix of over 1,800 pages; plaintiffs’ re-
ply brief was thirty-two pages long. Two amici briefs were filed 
and oral argument, on December 10, 2007, lasted over an hour (an 
unusually long argument in the practice of our Circuit). More than 
two months after oral argument, on February 15, 2008, the panel 
affirmed the District Court’s ruling in a summary order containing 
a single substantive paragraph.199
Judge Cabranes had harsher words for what, in effect, was the Audience Prin-
ciple impact of choosing the summary order format to communicate the panel’s 
decision to affirm: 
This per curiam opinion adopted in toto the reasoning of the Dis-
trict Court, without further elaboration or substantive comment, 
and thereby converted a lengthy, unpublished district court opi-
nion, grappling with significant constitutional and statutory claims 
of first impression, into the law of this Circuit.200 It did so, moreo-
ver, in an opinion that lacks a clear statement of either the claims 
raised by the plaintiffs or the issues on appeal. Indeed, the opinion 
contains no reference whatsoever to the constitutional claims at the 
core of this case, and a casual reader of the opinion could be ex-
 ________________________  
198. Id. at 94 (Cabranes, J., dissenting from order denying in banc rehearing). 
199. Id. at 95-96 (emphasis supplied). 
 200. Author’s note:  Apparently Judge Arterton’s opinion had not appeared in the official reports at the time 
Judge Cabranes wrote.  Ultimately, she submitted her opinion for publication in the Federal Reporter. See Ricci 
v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D. Conn. 2006). 
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cused for wondering whether a learning disability played at least as 
much a role in this case as the alleged racial discrimination. This 
perfunctory disposition rests uneasily with the weighty issues pre-
sented by this appeal.201
Judge Cabranes then proceeded to reel off, in substantial detail with specific 
legal authorities, all of the major issues raised by the appeal of the District Court’s 
opinion that had been summarily addressed, overlooked, or not addressed at all in 
the panel’s summary disposition.202  This extensive critique culminated in a terse 
conclusion how far off the mark the panel’s summary disposition was for some 
very important members of its audience  –  six of the seven Circuit Judges polled 
on the in banc rehearing petition: 
It is arguable that when an appeal raising novel questions of con-
stitutional and statutory law is resolved by an opinion that tersely 
adopts the reasoning of a lower court—and does so without further 
legal analysis or even a full statement of the questions raised on 
appeal—those questions are insulated from further judicial review. 
. . . [T]his Court has failed to grapple with the questions of excep-
tional importance raised in this appeal.203
Never in the author’s experience has a sitting Judge of a Circuit Court of Ap-
peals publicly taken others of his own court to the proverbial woodshed in quite 
this way. 
The sharp reaction to the panel’s opinion did not, however, end when Judge 
Cabranes’ set down his pen.  The Supreme Court took up the case (as Judge Ca-
branes urged them to do).  Again, the Audience Principle exacted its toll for those 
unfortunate enough to transgress it.  Not only was the panel reversed, but in a sepa-
rate concurring and widely quoted opinion, Justice Samuel Alito demonstrated a 
reaction similar to Judge Cabranes’ dissent in its exasperated tone, but with a more 
pointed assault.  Zeroing in on the panel’s half-hearted sounding statement (as it 
was echoed substantially in Justice Ginsburg’s dissent) that “[w]e are not unsympa-
thetic to the plaintiffs’ expression of frustration” (and citing, almost gratuitously, 
that, “Mr. Ricci, for example, who is dyslexic, made intensive efforts that appear to 
have resulted in his scoring highly on one of the exams, only to have it invali-
dated”204), Justice Alito rebuked the confusion of “sympathy” with “empathy”:
 ________________________  
201. Ricci, 530 F.3d at 96.  
202. Id. at 96-101.  
203. Id. at 101.  It should be noted that the Second Circuit’s order denying rehearing in banc was also  
accompanied by other Judges’ opinions, both for and against in banc rehearing.  See, e.g., the separate opinions of 
Chief Judge Jacobs, Judge Katzmann, Judge Calabresi, and Judge Barrington Parker; Id. at 92 (Chief Judge Jacobs 
dissenting from order denying in banc rehearing); Id. at 89 (Judge Katzmann concurring in order denying in banc 
rehearing); Id. at 88 (Judge Calabresi concurring in order denying in banc rehearing); Id. at 90 (Judge Barrington 
Parker concurring in order denying in banc rehearing). 
 204. Ricci v. DeStefano, 264 Fed. App’x 106, 107 (2d Cir. 2008) withdrawn, aff’d on other grounds, 530 
F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2008), reh’g denied, 530 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2008).  Judge Cabranes had not let the panel’s peculiar 
singling out of this one fact as a sop to the plaintiffs go unnoted:  “[T]he opinion contains no reference whatsoever 
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The dissent grants that petitioners’ situation is “unfortunate” and 
that they “understandably attract this Court’s sympathy.” But 
“sympathy” is not what petitioners have a right to demand. What 
they have a right to demand is evenhanded enforcement of the law-
of Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination based on race. 
And that is what, until today’s decision, has been denied them.205
Even this, however, was not the final word to be heard for the panel’s mis-
estimation of their audience.  Yet another audience member was yet to be heard 
from—lead plaintiff Ricci himself.  The potential for the most subjective, and thus 
the most passionate, rebuke—that from lead plaintiff Ricci himself—portended a 
scenario unseen206 since the Senate rejected President Hoover’s nomination of Cir-
cuit Judge John J. Parker for the Supreme Court in 1930.207
to the constitutional claims at the core of this case, and a casual reader of the opinion could be excused for won-
dering whether a learning disability played at least as much a role in this case as the alleged racial discrimination.” 
530 F.3d at 96 (Cabranes, J., dissenting from order denying in banc rehearing). 
 205. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2689 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasis supplied) (quoting 
Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. at 2710 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)). 
 206. See Randy Barnett, Ricci Testimony Is  Political Stunt, The Volokh Conspiracy, July 15, 2009 (quoting 
James Taranto),  http://www.volokh.com/posts/1247666706.shtml. 
 207. See, e.g., George W. C. McCarter, Confirmation Denied: The Senate Rejects John J. Parker (Unpub-
lished Thesis 1971), available at http://www.mccarterhiggins.com/Parkerthesis.pdf.  The author describes the case 
in which Judge Parker’s Ricci-like troubles arose: 
Three judges heard the case, International Organization United Mineworkers of America v. 
Red Jacket Consolidated Coal & Coke Co. (18 Fed. 2d. 839), and all concurred in the opi-
nion which Parker wrote. The court found precedent for the injunction, which it upheld, in 
previous Supreme Court decisions which forbade even peaceful union interference with 
workers’ contracts. The Supreme Court apparently agreed with Parker’s reasoning for it re-
fused to hear the union’s appeal. 
Id. at 14.  Walter Green, then American Federation of Labor President, appeared, not quite the representative of a 
party to this case, represented, at the very least, a party whose interests were directly affected by contacts prohibit-
ing workers from engaging in any union-related organizing activity.  His testimony was powerful: 
Supreme Court Justices, he observed, “should possess a trained mind sympathetic toward 
the hopes and aspirations of the masses of the people.” Judge Parker, according to Green, 
did not have such a judicial disposition, and for that reason the A.F. of L. protested his nom-
ination. Green then zeroed in on the Red Jacket case in which Parker’s sustaining of the dis-
trict court’s injunction had the effect of making “criminals out of law abiding, honest, loyal 
American citizens if they requested, in the exercise of peaceful, law abiding methods, wor-
kingmen to join with them in a labor organization.” Green reminded the Senators that their 
late colleague, Robert M. LaFollette of Wisconsin, had found the district judge in the Red 
Jacket case, George McClintic, “to be a petty tyrant and an arrogant despot.”  McClintic 
seems to have been a fairly notorious anti-union judge, and Green must have been trying to 
pass along some of McClintic’s bad reputation to Parker. 
A major obstacle to the success of Green’s argument was the prevailing impression that 
Parker had been bound by precedent to uphold McClintic’s injunction. In his Red Jacket 
opinion Parker cited several Supreme Court decisions which he felt supported the injunc-
tion. Primarily he relied upon Hitchman Coal and Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 
which was handed down by the Court in 1917. Green knew that his own case would be im-
measurably strengthened if he could show that the Hitchman and Red Jacket cases were in 
some respect different and that Parker was not in fact bound by precedent to decide as he 
did. Green began by emphasizing that the Hitchman decision was rendered thirteen years 
ago and that “[s]ince that time many economic, industrial, and social changes have taken 
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Ricci was called to testify in the Sotomayor confirmation hearings.  Having 
some personal experience with civil litigation, I attest that it is many a party’s 
dream to get to express their feelings about a judge’s decision (even when that par-
ty “won” the case) once they are finally beyond the power of the judge’s pen, espe-
cially in a setting, like testimony before a judiciary committee, where the judge is 
compelled to sit nearby, and listen silently.  Ricci might have described all of the 
emotions that he and his fellow plaintiffs endured when their hard-fought case 
seemingly came to its final act with a one-paragraph dismissal.  He might have 
galvanized the country with testimony about how poorly, from his perspective, the 
place.” Green then claimed that even the late, and conservative, Chief Justice Taft was of 
the opinion that “yellow dog” contracts were made under duress and thus unenforceable. 
Id. at 25-26.  The witness inflicted even greater blows by calling out what he’d divined was the nominee’s vision 
of the common working person while trying to hide behind Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 
(1917)—a intellectually compromised precedent if there ever was one: 
The Hitchman decision—I will try to make it plain— was the Dred Scott decision to labor. . 
. . What I stated in the preceding paragraph was not so much that Judge Parker followed the 
Hitchman decision as laid down by the Supreme Court, but that he shows himself as in en-
tire sympathy with that decision, and that is our objection to Judge Parker.” Therein Green 
was stating the kernel of truth in labor’s argument against the Judge. . . . Most of the pro-
labor and anti-Parker Senators were simply disturbed that Judge Parker, even if he were 
bound by precedent when he wrote the Red Jacket decision, failed to make clear that his 
opinion was dictated by the law and that “yellow dog” contracts violated his personal code 
of abstract justice. Though he would have ample opportunities to do so during the six weeks 
that his name was before the Senate, Parker never publicly declared his personal opinion of 
the hated contract, and indeed it is safe to presume that the “yellow dog” probably did not 
offend him terribly. 
Id. at 27-28 (footnotes omitted).  See also WILLIAM C. BURRIS, DUTY AND THE LAW: JUDGE JOHN J. PARKER AND 
THE CONSTITUTION, Colonial Press (1987). Interestingly, had Judge Parker been a bit more scholarly in his ap-
proach to the application of Hitchman, he might have found, digested, and applied the law-review article written 
by Professor Cook, which would have supplied a sound intellectual and legal basis for limiting Hitchman and 
denying enforcement of the “yellow-dog” contract in Red Jacket. See Walter Wheeler Cook, Privileges Of The 
Labor Unions In The Struggle For Life, 27 YALE L. J. 779 (1918).  That he did not do so would seem to suggest 
that he did not wish to limit Hitchman or to deny enforcement of contracts intended solely to interfere, restrain, 
and coerce employees in the exercise of personal autonomy to discuss unionization.  That apparent choice ended 
up being quite costly.  Current judges of ambition might consider how resort to the calmer reflection found in legal 
scholarship might assist their opinion writing, despite perennial judicial complaints that judges no longer find legal 
scholarship to be relevant or helpful.  See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Sidebar: When Rendering Decisions, Judges Are 
Finding Law Reviews Irrelevant, N.Y. TIMES, March 19, 2007, available at
http://select.nytimes.com/2007/03/19/us/19bar.html (quoting, among others, Second Circuit Chief Judge Dennis 
Jacobs as saying  “I haven’t opened up a law review in years. . . . No one speaks of them. No one relies on them.”);  
see also TRENDS IN FEDERAL JUDICIAL CITATIONS AND LAW REVIEW ARTICLES—COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 
SECOND CIRCUIT ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION, BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO SCHOOL OF LAW, MARCH 8, 2007, available 
at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/national/20070319_federal_citations.pdf.  Of course, the judges’ 
principle complaint is that so many of the “national” law reviews — such as the Yale Law Journal of 2009 rather 
than of 1917 — publish too much inter-disciplinary scholarship, and not enough doctrinal scholarship to assist 
courts.  See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Against The Law Reviews: Welcome To A World Where Inexperienced Edi-
tors Make Articles About The Wrong Topics Worse, LEGAL AFFAIRS (Nov./Dec. 2004), available at
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/November-December-2004/review_posner_novdec04.msp.  The solution to that 
problem, however, may be to recognize that scholarship useful to judges can be found in the pages of the excellent 
law reviews and journals published by law schools that do not happen to carry the “branding” of the U.S. News & 
World Report’s so-called “first tier.”  That such a realization has not seemed to have taken hold may be explained 
by the candid observation of Second Circuit Judge Robert Sack that “[j]udges use them like drunks use lamp-
posts—more for support than for illumination.”  See Adam Liptak, supra note 207 (quoting comments of Hon. 
Robert D. Sack at the Second Circuit Roundtable Discussion March 8, 2007). 
59
: Decline & Fall: Part II
Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2009
88 Barry Law Review Vol. 13 
court considered its audience, and how it patronized that audience with its “not 
unsympathetic” throw-away line.  What was portended, however, did not transpire.  
Ricci’s testimony was short, delivered with seemingly great effort, and did not dis-
cuss at any length how the form of the panel’s decision had made the plaintiffs feel
about the court system, its transparency, its integrity, its empathy, and its compe-
tency.208  He stuck to a script on the merits, denouncing activist judges, and thus 
this potential blow was greatly softened.209
Yet the mere fact that a litigant from an appeals case seemingly treated by the 
panel as hum-drum could become a public player in a confirmation hearing is tes-
timony to the power of the Audience Principle—and the 21st century media’s ca-
pacity to expose and exploit when a judicial opinion has served it poorly. 
It is not fair, however, as many in the press have done, to lay this mishandling 
of the Audience Principle generally, and of judicial empathy in particular, at the 
feet of Justice Sotomayor.  It is most unlikely, in fact, that she would have written 
the summary or per curiam opinions.210  Nor is it likely that she directed the form 
 ________________________  
 208. See, e.g., Frank Ricci Testifies At Sonia Sotomayor’s Confirmation Hearings, WASHINGTON POST, July 
16, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/07/16/AR2009071603090.html; Maureen Dowd, Op-Ed:  Pharisees On The  Potomac,
N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2009, at WK11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/19/opinion/19dowd.html; 
Naftali Bendavid, Washington Wire:  Firefighter Ricci Takes Witness Seat At Sotomayor Hearing, WALL ST. J., 
July 17, 2009, available at http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2009/07/16/firefighter-ricci-takes-witness-seat-at-
sotomayor-hearing/; Skyagunsta Pickens, Weasel Or Injured Party?, Kellia’s World, July 21, 2009,  
http://kelliasworld.wordpress.com/2009/07/21/weasel-or-injured-party/#comment-341 (blog ending Oct. 1, 2009); 
Randy Barnett,  Ricci’s Testimony Is  Political Stunt, The Volokh Conspiracy, July 15, 
2009,http://www.volokh.com/posts/1247666706.shtml. The testimony even inspired parody of the hearings; See, 
e.g., Sotomayor Spontaneously Combusts, Firefighter Frank Ricci Suggests Letting Fire Burn Itself Out ,
CARBOLIC SMOKEBALL, July 2009, http://carbolicsmoke.com/2009/07/17/sotomayor-spontaneously-combusts-
firefighter-frank-ricci-lets-her-burn/. 
209. See, e.g., Dana Millbank, Fireman Ricci Fails To Extinguish Sotomayor’s Hope, WASHINGTON POST,
July 17, 2009, Bus. Section, 2009 WLNR 13624929 (noting that although “Frank Ricci was to be Sonia Soto-
mayor’s Anita Hill,” he left the witness chair having “reduce[d] to embers the case against Sotomayor.  Id. (em-
phasis supplied); see CEO Wire, July 13, 2009, 2009 WLNR 13318848 (transcript of panel discussion)(comments 
of James Taranto, of the Wall Street Journal Editorial Board, describing as a “very bad idea having a litigant 
testify against a judge who ruled against him.”).  Of course, if the decision to include litigant testimony in a con-
firmation hearing is to be perceived as anything other than cheap political grandstanding, the summoning commit-
tee needs to have testimony from defendants and other interested parties and amici, not just from plaintiffs.  
 210. Nor, as Professor Ifill has, among other, pointed out, is it tenable to attack Justice Sotomayor, or her 
panel of colleagues, for not reaching the same ruling as did the Supreme Court, even if they disagreed with the 
precedents that lay before them at the time they reviewed the District Court’s decision in Ricci:
Her now-infamous “wise Latina” statement raised legitimate questions about Judge Soto-
mayor’s approach to judging. But in the context of the full speeches she gave, Judge Soto-
mayor’s remarks were an honest attempt to talk about how all judges are shaped by their 
backgrounds and must be conscious enough of this reality to guard against how these influ-
ences might skew their judicial view. 
The firefighter case was problematic for the Republicans as well, because although the Su-
preme Court overturned the decision of the court on which Judge Sotomayor was a part, it 
had done so by announcing a new legal standard - one that Judge Sotomayor could not fairly 
have been expected to divine or impose as an appellate court judge when she heard the case. 
But no matter. The case involved the inflammatory issue of race, and combined with her 
“wise Latina” remark, the Republican committee members settled on a strategy that could at 
least arouse their base. And so, ignoring thousands of decisions in which Judge Sotomayor 
has participated, they undertook to paint the nominee as a dangerous racial partisan. 
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of the disposition.  She sat as the junior member of a three-judge Appeals Court 
panel.  Judge Rosemary Pooler was the Presiding Judge of the panel during that 
week of oral arguments; and under Circuit tradition, it was Judge Pooler’s cham-
bers that would take the responsibility for proposing cases to be disposed on sum-
mary orders and for her law clerks to draft the summary orders in the cases decided 
that week.211 Then, Judge Sotomayor and Judge Sack agreed with the Presiding 
Judge that summary disposition was appropriate. 
Ricci cannot be, and should not have been, held up as an example of Judge So-
tomayor’s judicial opinion writing, or even as one of “Judge Sotomayor’s opi-
nions.”  However, she apparently did not reckon that the risks created by commu-
nicating the court’s decision in summary order fashion was worth digging in her 
heels to bring her colleagues back to political reality.  Nor did her empathy appear 
sufficiently attuned for how important audiences of this opinion would receive its 
form, apart from its substance.  A significant opportunity to save the panel from 
itself appears to have been missed as a result.212
Of significance now is what Justice Sotomayor may have gleaned from the 
Ricci experience. The opportunity, and the hope, is that now given the indepen-
dence that comes with life tenure, she can put that experience to positive use in re-
Ifill, supra note 163, 2009 WLNR 14255261.  That some Senators themselves had not come to terms with their 
own racial stereotypes was evident, Professor Ifill notes, in two telling statements: 
There were moments that were almost too painful to watch . . . [such as] Sen. Tom Coburn’s
tortured, historical reading of the history of the passage of the 14th Amendment as a debate 
about gun rights, and the Oklahoma Republican’s channeling of Ricky Ricardo in another 
sequence, joking that the Latina judge might have some “‘splainin’ to do.” And Mr. Ses-
sions chided the judge that if she had just voted in the firefighters’ case along with her col-
league on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals who “is also of Puerto Rican ancestry,” there 
wouldn’t be all this trouble.  
Id.
 211. With her home chambers in Vermont, Judge Pooler would quite likely be pushing to wrap up the pre-
siding judge’s post-argument responsibilities to catch the Amtrak at Penn Station on her way home to Vermont for 
the weekend.  The end of a week of oral arguments for the chambers of the federal appeals judge presiding that 
week is one of the most hectic periods in the life of the law clerks (who must complete the work) and the judge 
(who must manage it).  This is particularly so when the Judge’s chambers are upstate or out-of-state, as are Judge 
Pooler’s.  In the chambers where I clerked twenty-two years ago, the rule was that all work from the sitting, other 
than the writing of the more extensive opinions expected to be published, would be completed before judges and 
clerks departed on Friday evening.  This made for many an interesting dash from Foley Square to the immensely 
crowded rush-hour subway and (in the 1980s) struggle through the throngs of commuters at Grand Central Ter-
minal looking for some distant departure track.  By the time one found and awkwardly settled into a seat on the 
sleek aluminum cars of Amtrak’s The Henry Hudson, utter exhaustion was the only emotion left, thirst the only 
desire to be quenched, and three hours of restless sleep the only scheduled activity (except for the judge, who, 
always vigilant and diligent, used this quiet time to read recently issued advance sheets of opinions from our 
Circuit (and nobody knew them better than did our judge)). 
 212. Christopher Caldwell, The Limits Of Empathy For Sonia Sotomayor, TIME, June 8, 2009, available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1901478,00.html.  Mr. Caldwell observes that the Ricci case 
puts the quality of Justice Sotomayor’s empathy into a different light: 
Whether or not you like racial preferences, they involve a way of looking at the law that is 
sophisticated rather than commonsensical. If the New Haven opinion is fair, it is the kind of 
fairness you learn at Yale Law School, not the kind you learn in the South Bronx. Soto-
mayor may be a child of the barrio, culturally speaking, but the judicial philosophy she 
represents comes from the mandarin, not the proletarian, wing of the Democratic Party. 
Id.
61
: Decline & Fall: Part II
Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2009
90 Barry Law Review Vol. 13 
engaging the Supreme Court with the Audience Principle and its empathetic basis.  
She will have on her side the persuasiveness that comes from being the bearer of 
such a stigmata, the memorable scar inflicted from failing to give the Audience 
Principle its full due. 
B. Justice Sotomayor’s District Court Opinions As Augurs Of Her Oppor-
tunity 
Justice Sotomayor comes to the U.S. Supreme Court with a portfolio of judicial 
opinions larger than that any other sitting Justice brought with them.  She is cre-
dited with over 600 federal court opinions in the Federal Cases database on Wes-
tlaw, most of those written in the District Court.  As might be expected of a ta-
lented writer and thinker, her opinions realize a baseline of quality in applying the 
four critical principles of effective cognitive communication that we have ex-
amined in our Part I and Part II articles.  Adam Liptak speaks knowingly and well 
for her canon when he writes: 
Judge Sonia Sotomayor’s judicial opinions are marked by dili-
gence, depth and unflashy competence. If they are not always a 
pleasure to read, they are usually models of modern judicial 
craftsmanship, which prizes careful attention to the facts in the 
record and a methodical application of layers of legal principles.213
This achievement, however, may leave room for further progress.  As Liptak 
observes, her opinions written on the District and Circuit courts: 
[R]eveal no larger vision, seldom appeal to history and consistent-
ly avoid quotable language. Judge Sotomayor’s decisions are, in-
stead, almost always technical, incremental and exhaustive, consi-
dering all of the relevant precedents and supporting even complete-
ly uncontroversial propositions with elaborate footnotes.214
Some might argue that the Supreme Court thrusts a judge on a stage with many 
diverse audiences.  The stakes are even higher there than they were on the federal 
trial and appellate benches on which she has served for seventeen years.  To use a 
theater metaphor, what “plays in the Catskills” may need to be turned up a notch or 
two “for Broadway.”  Here is an opportunity for Judge Sotomayor to glance back 
from her future to the example of Learned Hand.  While her opinions reflect a more 
consistent application of the context and congruence principles than Hand’s trial-
court opinions, Justice Sotomayor may find inspiration in Hand’s impactful use of 
the sentence in realizing both the segmentation and audience principles, while 
creating a style of memorable and quotable syntax that marked his writings with 
 ________________________  
 213. Adam Liptak, Nominee’s Rulings Are Exhaustive But Often Narrow, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2009, at A1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/27/us/politics/27judge.html. 
 214. Id.
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uniqueness.  Hand hewed this achievement out of the bricks he laid at the sentence 
level.  From that vantage point, he created – in his best opinions –a truly literary 
style of writing that not merely made his points, but made them memorably.  Hand 
never sounded like a bureaucrat; nor should any Supreme Court Justice. 
Yet, there is much virtue in judicial writing that eschews using opinions to 
state “larger vision[s]”; that appeals “not to history” – in the sense of discursive 
displays of erudition or the evasion of rigorous analysis in favor of questionable 
reasoning cloaked in the fog of history215—but rather deals predominantly with the 
Constitutional provision, treaty, statute or case that frame the context of the legal 
analysis; and to emphasize substance over “quotable language,” which, as some of 
the examples by a variety of judges discussed earlier in this article show, often 
come at the expense of empathy to the parties and clarity of the ruling.  Perhaps 
Justice Sotomayor best articulated why we may expect that she will consciously 
seek to avoid such artifices in her judicial opinions.  Echoing Learned Hand’s as-
sessment of his own judicial career many years ago216, Justice Sotomayor has ob-
served of her own that she was “not going to be able to spend much time on lofty 
ideals,” “since[t]he cases that shake the world don’t come along every day. But the 
world of the litigants is shaken by the existence of their case, and I don’t lose sight 
of that, either.”217
Of the more than 400 District Court opinions credited to Justice Sotomayor, 
her opinion-writing strengths and opportunities are well illustrated by the last dis-
trict court opinion she appears to have authored – Barlett v. New York Bd. Of State 
Law Examiners.218 This was the third of three opinions written by Justice Soto-
mayor in a case brought by a bar examinee who challenged the New York State 
Board of Bar Examiners’ denial of requests for accommodation of an alleged dys-
 ________________________  
 215. See, e.g., FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE USE AND ABUSE OF HISTORY 3 (1873) (“[W]e need [for] life 
and action, not as a convenient way to avoid life and action, or to excuse a selfish life or a cowardly or base ac-
tion.”).  A classic example of the  use and abuse “of appeals to history”  is Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 
(1938), in which Justice Brandeis resorted to the flawed pseudo-historical research of Charles Warren (which he 
described as the “recent research of a competent scholar”) on the legislative history of  Section 34 of the Judiciary 
Act of 1789 (the so-called “Rules of Decision Act”) to severely limit the authority of federal courts to develop the 
common-law in diversity cases coordinately with, rather than subordinately to, the state courts.  See, e.g., LARRY 
L. TEPLY & RALPH U. WHITTEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 399-400, 403-404 & authorities cited in nn. 109, 111, & 112 
(2d ed. 2000).  Erie is the classic example of the Supreme Court’s “appeal to history,” and the kind of reasoning 
designed to insulate instrumentalism against its own faulty logic; as Professors Teply and Whitten aptly describe 
it, “[a]s a criticism of Swift [v. Tyson] and as a justification for a change of course, however, the Erie opinion was 
an intellectual disaster.”  Id. at 402; see generally id. at 402-406.  History as buffoonery, rather than the pseudo-
scholarship of Erie, afflicted Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972), about which it has been said: 
The opinion — for which Blackmun would long be ridiculed — included a juvenile, rhap-
sodic ode to the glories of the national pastime, sprinkled with comments about legendary 
ballplayers and references to the doggerel poem “Casey at the Bat.”
David Greenberg, Baseball’s Con Game: How Did America’s Pastime Get An Antitrust Exception?, SLATE,
July 19, 2002, available at http://www.slate.com/id/2068290.  Justice Sotomayor is to be praised for avoiding such 
uses and abuses of history. 
 216. Supra text & note 73, Fifty Years of Federal Judicial Service, 264 F.2d 5, 27 (2d Cir. 1959)(special 
session to commemorate Hand’s half-century on the federal bench) (separately paginated section). 
 217. Liptak, supra note 213. 
 218. No. 93-CV-4986, 2001 WL 930792 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2001) (Sotomayor, C.J., sitting by designa-
tion). 
63
: Decline & Fall: Part II
Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2009
92 Barry Law Review Vol. 13 
lexia-based cognitive impairment under both the Americans with Disabilities Act 
and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.219  The case garnered national attention.220
When it started in 1993, Justice Sotomayor was a relatively new District Judge; by 
the time of its last iteration in 2001, Justice Sotomayor had been promoted to the 
Circuit for three years, but returned to the trial court to continue hearing a case 
about which she likely knew more than any other single living person.  During her 
confirmation process, Judge Sotomayor’s handling of this case was recalled with 
praise for her attention to detail and ability to navigate uncertainties, in both the 
legal standards under the relatively new Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 
as well as in the starkly conflicting expert testimony about both the meaning of 
standardized reading tests and the significance of the plaintiff’s impairment.221
In her original 1997 opinion, Judge Sotomayor gave an excellent introduction 
to, and synthesis of, the Bartlett case that would serve to guide readers throughout 
the years of proceedings to come: 
This case, tried to the bench in 21 days of testimony accompanied 
by exhibits and briefs aggregating to more than 5000 pages, prin-
cipally devolves to the meaning of a single word- substantially-as 
used in the Americans with Disabilities Act . . . and the Rehabilita-
tion Act . . . . Both Acts define a disability as “a physical or mental 
 ________________________  
 219. The extensive procedural history of this case, as presented in Westlaw’s Insta-Cite is:  Bartlett v. New 
York State Bd. of Law Examiners, 970 F. Supp. 1094 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), reconsideration denied Bartlett v. New 
York State Bd. of Law Examiners, 2 F.Supp.2d 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d in part and vacated in part, Bartlett v. 
New York State Bd. of Law Examiners, 156 F.3d 321 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. granted, judgment vacated, New York 
State Bd. of Law Examiners v. Bartlett, 527 U.S. 1031 (1999), remanded, Bartlett v. New York State Bd. of Law 
Examiners, 226 F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 2000), remanded Bartlett v. New York State Bd. of Law Examiners, 2001 WL 
930792 (S.D.N.Y. Aug 15, 2001). 
 220. Frances McMorris, One Aspiring Lawyer Wins Accommodations for Bar Exam, WALL ST. J., July 
18,1997, at B1; Tamar Lewin, Dyslexic Law Graduate Sues On Exam’s Time Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1997, at 
A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1997/10/23/us/dyslexic-law-graduate-sues-on-exam-s-time-limit.html;  
Tamar Lewin, U.S. Court Upholds Aid for the Disabled On State Bar Exams, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1998, at A1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/1998/09/16/nyregion/us-court-upholds-aid-for-the-disabled-on-state-bar-
exams.html (calling ruling “first … of its kind”); Tamar Lewin, Ideas & Trends; Shaky Crutch for the Learning-
Disabled, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1998, at Section 4, page 1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/09/20/weekinreview/ideas-trends-shaky-crutch-for-the-learning-disabled.html; 
Robert D. McFadden, High Court Sends Claim Of Disability To Rehearing, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1999, at B5, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/1999/06/25/nyregion/high-court-sends-claim-of-disability-to-rehearing.html; 
Judge Rules That Dyslexic Can Get Exam Help, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2001, at B4, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/17/nyregion/judge-rules-dyslexic-can-get-exam-help.html.  Not all the media 
coverage has been favorable to bar-examinee accommodations or Justice Sotomayor’s rulings.  See, e.g., Walter 
Olsen, Standard Accommodations:  The Road To Universal Disability, REASON, Feb. 1999, available at 
http://www.reason.com/news/show/30908.html; Walter Olsen, Sotomayor and the ADA/bar-exam case,
OVERLAWYERED BLOG, June 4, 2009, available at http://overlawyered.com/2009/06/sotomayor-and-the-adabar-
exam-case/; Dr. Tana Dineen, The School Of Soft Knocks:  Does Anyone Really Benefit When Universities Cut 
Academic Corners To Accommodate The Disabled?, THE OTTAWA CITIZEN, Aug. 17, 2001, available at
http://tanadineen.com/COLUMNIST/Columns/SoftKnocksDisability.htm. (“Here’s a hint of just how much sillier 
it can get . . . [t]he fact that Bartlett would have a very hard time meeting the job requirements of a practising 
lawyer was, in the judge’s opinion, precisely the reason why Bartlett had a protected right to become a practising 
lawyer. . . . Only in America, you say.”).
 221. Jim Dwyer, On the Bench, With Fairness And Empathy, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2009, at A21, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/27/nyregion/27about.html. 
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impairment that substantially limits one or more of” an individu-
al’s “major life activities.”
. . . 
The evidence at trial has convinced me that Marilyn Bartlett suf-
fers from a learning deficit that evinces itself as a difficulty in 
reading with the speed, fluency and automaticity of an individual 
with her background and level of intellectual ability. Despite this 
impairment, plaintiff obtained a Ph.D. in Educational Administra-
tion and a law degree. By virtue of superior effort and not a small 
amount of courage, Marilyn Bartlett has been able to succeed aca-
demically and professionally despite the limitations her impair-
ment has placed upon her. 
But this case asks whether, in light of the confined language of the 
law, plaintiff is not merely impaired, but disabled.222
Years later, after appeals to the Circuit and the Supreme Court and remands 
from both courts, Justice Sotomayor was required to hold yet another trial, this one 
lasting four days and focusing on highly contentious testimony of expert witnesses 
– and this time focusing on standards of disability in the major life activity of both 
reading and working, under legal standards that the Supreme Court itself had only 
just started to evolve during the pendency of the Bartlett case.223  Despite the dis-
ruption of being taken away from her Circuit Court duties, Justice Sotomayor 
treated the remand with the same care and attention to detail as the original trial.  
Her opinion is 48 pages long224, which in and of itself does not necessarily equate 
with quality — yet the quality is there.  The opinion is efficiently written, with 
focus on the new issues at hand rather than repeating discussions in previous opi-
nions. 
After a thorough, yet concise, reprise of the procedural history of the case, Jus-
tice Sotomayor specified the questions that were now on remand to her from the 
Second Circuit, and — unlike Hand in so many of his District Court opinions —
proceeded to set forth the result up front, providing critical context for the detailed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law that followed: 
Having witnessed all of this additional testimony and having stu-
died the exhibits and affidavits submitted by the parties on the is-
sues before me on this remand and in the original trial record, I 
conclude that, when considering both the positive and negative ef-
 ________________________  
 222. Bartlett v. New York State Bd. of Law Examiners, 970 F. Supp. 1094, 1098-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).  
 223. Bartlett v. New York State Bd. of Law Examiners, 2001 WL 930792 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug 15, 2001). 
 224. In the Westlaw formatting; the slip opinion as filed in the Clerk’s office is apparently 99 pages.  See
Judge Rules That Dyslexic Can Get Exam Help, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2001, at B4, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/17/nyregion/judge-rules-dyslexic-can-get-exam-help.html.   
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fects of plaintiff’s self-accommodations, plaintiff is substantially 
limited in the major life activity of reading when compared to the 
average reader by her slow reading rate and by the fatigue caused 
by her inability to read with automaticity. I also conclude, in the 
alternative, that plaintiff is substantially limited in the major life 
activity of working because the Board’s failure to accommodate 
her reading impairment is a substantial factor in her failure to pass 
the bar. For these reasons, I find that plaintiff is entitled to receive 
reasonable accommodations in taking the New York State Bar Ex-
amination.225
Had the opinion also included a roadmap through the detailed factual findings 
in Sections III and IV of the opinion, the context principle might have been even 
better served, and the foundation upon which the congruence principle builds laid 
down.  As it is, the opinion’s findings appear to be organized around categories of 
testimonial evidence, with each category further sub-organized around a summary 
of each witness’s testimony (although the principle on which that sub-organization 
is based — e.g., chronological order of presentation at trial, the order of signific-
ance to the judge’s ultimate conclusions, the order of ascending or descending cre-
dibility, etc.. — is not revealed in the opinion).  Thus, there are no evident “road 
signs” beyond the witness’s name, as well as no overall road map, to guide the 
reader through the lengthy opinion; nor is there a table of contents to help the read-
er locate specific information quickly. 
Rather, the opinion moves immediately from the final paragraph of the intro-
duction, quoted above (and a brief summary of previous findings on plaintiff’s 
psychometric evaluations and previous bar examination attempts) to a new section 
headed “Plaintiff’s Expert Witnesses,” in which the testimony of each witness is 
summarized and separated by subheadings listing only the witness’s name.226  That 
section is followed by one that does the same thing for the defendant Board of Bar 
Examiners’ expert witnesses,227 and for the “lay testimony” presented by both par-
ties, including the plaintiff herself.228   
The organizational pattern of the factual findings shifts abruptly, and without 
warning, to “observations about the limitations of using psychometric measures to 
diagnose learning disabilities generally, particularly with adults.”229  This portion 
of the findings is sub-organized around the specific kinds of tests upon which the 
dueling expert testimony was based.  The same kind of structure is repeated for a 
short section on “clinical observations” of the plaintiff, which concludes the factual 
findings.230  While the macro-organization of this opinion remains obtuse, Justice 
 ________________________  
 225. Bartlett, 2001 WL 930792, at *3. 
 226. Id. at *3-4, 4-13. 
 227. Id. at *13-20. 
 228. Id. at *20-22. 
 229. Id. at *22, 23-28. 
 230. Id. at *29. 
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Sotomayor’s picks up energy in her discussion of the evidence and her findings 
therefrom  , and shines from the elegance of a rhetorically sophisticated simplicity: 
While defendants now try to couch their argument in terms of the 
entire gestalt of tests administered to plaintiff, this is a distinction 
without a difference. Dr. Flanagan [defendant’s testing expert] 
concluded that plaintiff’s performance on “multiple, individually 
administered” psychometric measures “indicates that she performs 
within normal limits or better on all indicators of reading perfor-
mance.” Of the 35 scores from psychometric measures on which 
Dr. Flanagan relied, however, thirty are from the Woodcock. For 
the reasons I discussed in my first opinion and order, I am con-
vinced that the Woodcock cannot be used as the principal instru-
ment to diagnose a reading disability.231
This kind of writing that at the micro-organizational level shows an expertise 
in applying both the segmentation and audience principles. 
Like the factual findings, the Conclusions of Law open with no roadmap to ex-
plain where the opinion has been, nor where it is going.232  While each sub-section 
is introduced effectively and concisely233, and tied together at subsection’s end with 
a concise conclusion234, the progress of the section as a whole is not explicit – as 
 ________________________  
231. Id. at *24. 
 232. Id. at *29. 
 233. For example, in the introduction to Section II of the Conclusions of Law, entitled, “Substantial Limita-
tion Under the Law for the Major Life Activity of Working,” Justice Sotomayor orients the reader well as to where 
that Section is going and why: 
The Second Circuit remanded for me “to determine, if necessary, whether plaintiff has 
shown that it is her impairment, rather than factors such as her education, experience or in-
nate ability, that ‘substantially limits’ her ability to work.”  I interpret the Circuit’s use of 
the phrase “if necessary” to refer to the fact that (at least in the context of Title I of the 
ADA), a court should only examine whether an individual is substantially limited in the ma-
jor life activity of working if it finds that the individual is not substantially limited in any 
another major life activity. ( . . . If an individual is substantially limited in any other major 
life activity, no determination should be made as to whether the individual is substantially 
limited in working.”). While ordinarily I would not reach the issue of whether plaintiff has a 
working disability because I find that she has a reading disability, given the long procedural 
history of this case, I will exercise an abundance of caution and discuss this issue in the 
event that the Circuit disagrees with my conclusion that plaintiff is substantially limited in 
the major life activity of reading. 
Bartlett v. New York State Bd. of Law Examiners, 2001 WL 930792 at *44 (S.D.N.Y. Aug 15, 2001) (citations 
omitted). 
 234. Looking again to the Section whose introduction we examined in the previous footnote, supra, we find 
a representative example of Justice Sotomayor’s ability to wrap up a discrete sub-section of the opinion with an 
effective concluding synthesis.   Having previously concluded that non-accommodation in the bar examination 
may exclude plaintiff from a discrete “class of jobs” in the ADA’s sense of that phrase, that she “still must answer 
the limited question posed to me by the Circuit on remand—whether ‘the denial of accommodations was a sub-
stantial factor preventing her from passing the [bar] exam,’” id. at *45, Justice Sotomayor summarized her conclu-
sions on that question, and Section II overall, as follows: 
When I view the evidence as a whole, I find that plaintiff has shown that the Board’s denial 
of accommodations was a significant factor in her failure to pass the bar exam. While on 
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Terrell and Armstrong’s command would have it, “make the structure explicit on 
the surface of the prose.”235  Thus, while each sub-section works well on a self-
contained level, they are as a whole episodic; there is little to no explanation of 
how one subsection transitions into another, which on the macro-organizational 
level, misses a chance to produce vertical and horizontal coherence across the opi-
nion as a whole.236  Outlined in a schematic form, the structure of the Conclusions 
of Law should appear as thus: 
I. Substantial Limitation Under the Law for the Major Life Ac-
tivity of Reading 
A. Corrective Devices or Mitigating Measures 
B. Measure of Substantial Limitation By Outcomes Alone 
C. The Comparison Group of “Most People”
II. Substantial Limitation Under the Law for the Major Life Ac-
tivity of Working 
III. Injunctive and Declaratory Relief 
IV. Compensatory Damages237
If one looks back at the opinion’s opening very carefully, we find, on second 
glance, that the opinion contains a buried roadmap (or perhaps a buried treasure 
map, since we had to search to find it), in which Justice Sotomayor explains the 
remand issues in the Second Circuit’s opinion in discussing what she is going to 
address in her remand opinion.  First, she writes, “in this opinion and order, I will 
first address ‘whether Bartlett is substantially limited in the major life activity of 
reading’ by her slow reading rate, or by any other ‘conditions, manner, or duration’ 
that limits her reading ‘in comparison to most people.’”238  She then discusses two 
other aspects of the Second Circuit’s opinion: 
any single exam there may have been other factors that affected plaintiff’s ability to pass the 
bar (as I have found to be the case with the July 1993 and 1999 exams), I  believe that the 
Board’s failure to provide her with accommodations on those exams deprived her of a fair 
opportunity to be tested on her knowledge. Therefore, I find that plaintiff has proven that 
her impairment of dyslexia “substantially limits” her major life activity of working and, 
therefore, that she is an individual with a disability under the ADA and Section 504. 
Id. at *46. 
 235. See ARMSTRONG & TERRELL 1st, supra note 3, at 3-22, 2-24; ARMSTRONG & TERRELL 2d, supra note 
3, at 23-25, 62-62. 
236. Bartlett, 2001 WL 930792  at *29-51; ARMSTRONG & TERRELL 1st, supra note 3, at 3-18 – 3-21. 
 237. Bartlett, 2001 WL 930792 at *46. 
 238. Id. at *2. 
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The Circuit further held that if I find that plaintiff is not substan-
tially limited in reading, I should make further findings with re-
spect to whether plaintiff is substantially limited in the major life 
activity of working. Specifically, the Court directed me to deter-
mine, if necessary, “whether plaintiff has shown that it is her im-
pairment, rather than factors such as her education, experience, or 
innate ability, that ‘substantially limits’ her ability to work.” 
Finally, the Second Circuit stated that it adhered to its original re-
mand with respect to compensatory damages.  It added, however, 
that if I were to find that plaintiff is disabled, and therefore entitled 
to compensatory damages, I should limit my damage award to the 
bar exams, if any, where the Board had before it sufficient infor-
mation to determine that plaintiff was disabled.239
While this matches up with the earlier quoted context providing conclusions240,
it does not sufficiently explain the sub-organization of the Conclusions of Law, nor 
does it even shed any light on the macro- or sub-organization of the factual find-
ings.  That is not to say that along the way anything that Justice Sotomayor wrote 
in the opinion is unclear; the opinion, in fact, is quite amazing in just how cohe-
rently and seamlessly it unfolds within each section and subsection, and how 
strongly organized her writing is at both sentence and paragraph level.  One of 
many fine examples: 
In my first opinion and order, I found that the bar examination 
functions like an employment examination that prevents plaintiff 
from working in her chosen profession: 
If plaintiff’s disability prevents her from competing on a level 
playing field with other bar examination applicants, then her 
disability has implicated the major life activity of working be-
cause if she is not given a chance to compete fairly on what is 
essentially an employment test, she is necessarily precluded 
from potential employment in that field. In this sense, the bar 
examination clearly implicates the major life activity of work-
ing. 
While I might have chosen a different word than “implicates” to 
describe how the bar exam functions like an employment test had I 
known the confusion its use would cause, I was merely addressing 
defendants’ argument that the Title I definition with regard to 
working was not proper in a Title II case because the bar exam is 
 ________________________  
 239. Id. at *2-3 (citations omitted). 
 240. Bartlett, 2001 WL 930792, at *3. 
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not an employment test. I in no way intended to imply that plaintiff 
had shown only that her reading impairment “implicates” the ma-
jor life activity of working rather than substantially limits it.241
What is most striking about this opinion is the incredible command of structure 
and logic Justice Sotomayor maintains at all levels of the opinion.  Her writing is 
cognitively effective, particularly at the sentence and paragraph level.  As we have 
seen, that was Learned Hand’s forte as well.  The writing is also well organized, 
but viewed from the perspective of logic; it would be even more powerful if it 
made  that organizational structure more explicit, and reassured the reader under-
taking the long trek through this opinion about where she is, where she has been, 
and where she is going.  
That rather small criticism, however, pales before the earnest struggle Justice 
Sotomayor undertook — and largely won — in managing the structure of a lengthy 
opinion while at the same time marshalling the key portions of the voluminous trial 
record and prior rulings in the case.  Her accomplishment reveals itself clearly as 
the product of a sincere and earnest struggle to attain a reasonable outcome for the 
parties within a statutory framework whose parameters had not yet been fully 
limned.  All of this goes to show why it has been observed of her handling of the 
remanded case in 2001:  “Her detailed and respectful treatment of the parties and 
witnesses in a decision on a matter involving less than ten thousand dollars in dam-
ages is testament to her commitment to the fair and equal administration of justice 
to all who come before her.”242
And all of this augurs well for Justice Sotomayor to seize the opportunity af-
forded by her demonstrated judicial writing talents to take her own—and the 
court’s, opinion writing to a new level of cognitive effectiveness, responsive to a 
highly diverse domestic and international audience.  To borrow a phrase from no-
velist Tom Wolfe, Justice Sotomayor has “the right stuff” to elevate her skillful 
opinion writing to mastery, and in so doing become the apotheosis of the seasoned 
 ________________________  
241. Id. at *44.  
 242. Women’s Bar Association of the State of New York, Statement In Support of Judge Sonia Sotomayor,
at 5 (June 30, 2009), available at http://www.grawa.org/documents/SotomayorStatement_July2009.pdf.  Some 
have speculated that the evident empathy Justice Sotomayor displayed for the disabled is a result of her long-term 
diabetic condition.  See, e.g., Deborah Kendrick, Commentary:  Sotomayor’s Diabetes Surely Helped Shape Her 
Judicial Career, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, June 28, 2009, available at 
http://www.dispatch.com/live/content/editorials/stories/2009/06/28/Kendrick28.ART_ART_06-28-
09_G5_JKEA8EJ.html.  However, a force just as – if not even more – significant may be the struggle that Justice 
Sotomayor undertook during her Princeton undergraduate days to elevate the level of her writing in English to the 
excellence expected there, and invaluable to judicial opinion writing.  See, e.g., Stewart Taylor, Jr., Grading Soto-
mayor’s Senior Thesis, The National Law Journal, June 2, 2009, available at
http://ninthjustice.nationaljournal.com/2009/06/grading-sotomayors-senior-thes.php.  The fruits of these labors—
including graduating with the highest Latin honors and election to Phi Beta Kappa—are described in Gabriel 
Debenedetti , At Princeton, Sotomayor ‘76 Excelled At Academics, Extracurriculars, DAILY PRINCETONIAN, May 
13, 2009, available at http://www.dailyprincetonian.com/2009/05/13/23695/.  In this sense, she may well have had 
genuine sympathy – indeed, empathy – for Mr. Ricci in Ricci v. DeStefano, supra note 204, whose own Herculean 
efforts to overcome the effects of dyslexia so that he could pass the promotion test in New Haven were central to 
the emotional merits of the case.  See, e.g., Susan Crile, Frank Ricci:  All You Need To Know, THE HUFFINGTON
POST, July 9, 2009, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/07/09/frank-ricci-all-you-
need_n_228898.html. 
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opinion writer, looking equally at the trial and appellate courts, the parties, and the 
broader audience to be embraced. 
V. SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON PARTS I AND II 
Frank Easterbrook has observed that “[m]uch of judge-centered scholarship in 
contemporary law schools assumes judges have the leisure to examine subjects 
deeply and resolve debates wisely.  Professors believe that they have this capacity 
and attribute it to judges.  Pfah!”243
Chief Judge Easterbrook’s realism may temper somewhat our assessment of 
Hand’s District Court work, but it does not change its lessons for whether appellate 
court writing skill should be a model for trial judges, or for whether skill as an ap-
pellate writer implies skill as a writer of trial-court opinions and judgments.   
Considering Learned Hand’s work as a District Judge, it is a spotty record from 
the perspective of the cognitive impact of his opinions.  Some, like The Masses244,
show strokes of brilliance in producing a well-organized, cognitively effective 
work, calculated to be quite reader-friendly; many show a very workman-like ap-
proach that while coherent, leaves the readers to fend for themselves; but a surpris-
ing number of others—including significant cases involving Congressional at-
tempts to intimidate the United States Attorney245 and landmark anti-trust lawsuits 
seeking to dissolve large corporations,246 show little care or concern for reaching 
readers beyond the parties—or slim appreciation for the lessons taught by cognitive 
psychology.  Certainly, the sampling of Hand’s record made here, demonstrates 
that reputation and skill as an appellate writer may be the product of considerable 
struggle and hard-won increments of improvement as a trial court writer.   
But Hand’s uneven oeuvre on the Southern District of New York calls even 
more fundamental questions into play.  What exactly is the role of a judicial opi-
nion?  Some might quarrel with my assumption that to be of the highest quality, 
judicial writing need speak beyond the parochial concerns of the lawyers for the 
parties to the case—that it must speak to a broad audience both within and without 
the legal profession.  Yet this notion has a more venerable pedigree than my prefe-
rences, or the points of Terrell and Armstrong.  In fact, this expectation goes to the 
very formational period in American history when publishing any judicial opinion 
 ________________________  
 243. Frank H. Easterbrook, What’s So Special about Judges, 61 COLO. L. REV. 773, 778 (1990) (quoted in 
BAUM, supra note 98, at 7 n.14). 
 244. Masses Pub Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y.1917).   I discussed this opinion in Jeffrey A. Van 
Detta, The Decline And Fall Of The American Judicial Opinion, Part I:  Back To The Future From The Roberts 
Court To Learned Hand--Context And Congruence, 12 BARRY L. REV. 53 (2009), at  Section II.A.1.b, text & 
accompanying notes 114-125. 
 245. U.S. ex rel. Marshall v. Gordon, 235 F. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 1916), rev’d, 243 U.S. 521 (1917).  I discussed 
this opinion in Jeffrey A. Van Detta, The Decline And Fall Of The American Judicial Opinion, Part I:  Back To 
The Future From The Roberts Court To Learned Hand--Context And Congruence, 12 BARRY L. REV. 53 (2009), 
at  Section II.A.2.b, text & accompanying notes 284-292. 
 246. United States v. Corn Prod. Ref. Co., 234 F. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1916). I discussed this opinion in Jeffrey A. 
Van Detta, The Decline And Fall Of The American Judicial Opinion, Part I:  Back To The Future From The Ro-
berts Court To Learned Hand--Context And Congruence, 12 BARRY L. REV. 53 (2009), at  Section II.A.1.c, text & 
accompanying notes 126-174. 
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was the exception, not the norm—a time that few of us, educated in the firmly-
rooted case-method of the latter 20th century law school, realize were not dominat-
ed by the minds of judges, but rather, by the arguments of advocates.  We were not 
let in on the secret that opinion writing and publication were 19th century develop-
ments, hard-fought and slowly adopted.  And the battle and reception of these prac-
tices came based on an early and intuitive appreciation for the truly American idea 
that the writing and reporting of court decisions served multiple audiences, not 
specialists residing at an Inn of Court.  “[C]ase reporting,” Denis Duffey has writ-
ten, “was understood to be directed not only at improving judicial administration 
and aiding litigants by making the law known, but also at controlling courts by 
making their decisions subject to public scrutiny.”247  As an early reviewer of Hen-
ry Wheaton’s pioneering efforts in case reporting observed, the writing and report-
ing of decisions and judgments makes their authors “[a]nswerable, not only to par-
ties and the power of the state, but to the tribunals of judicial and professional opi-
nion.  They cannot sin in defiance of the opinion or other judges and the profession 
of the law . . . .”248
Writing and publishing judicial decisions, in the American experience, is there-
fore transformational.  “By making the actions of the court visible and subject to 
constant analysis and criticism, reports domesticated adjudication.”249  In doing so, 
the judicial process is transformed from “a matter of lawyers and judges applying 
alien, abstract, rigid doctrines in courtrooms,” into “part of an ongoing, communal 
discussion conducted in the light of day.”250   
Hand’s struggles to master the facts and to apply the law are evident in our 
cross-sectional view of a typical year of his trial work.  While much of his writing 
appears to be a continuation of his oral rulings in court, there is a substantial por-
tion of his work that shows real effort of written authorship, to reach audiences 
beyond the parties in a particular controversy.  These efforts vary in effectiveness, 
and are not consistently made; but Hand struggled to make them, and against rather 
daunting odds in the low-tech, high-volume District Court of the 1910s.  That he 
struggled at all to do so opened a new vista in American judicial writing that allows 
us to have the conversation undertaken in this article. 
It is now Sonia Sotomayor’s hour to struggle with these questions anew.  For 
the first time in our lifetimes, we have a Supreme Court justice with considerable 
District Court, not to mention Court of Appeals, experience.  This juncture in histo-
ry, this hour of her dogged professional rise, presents an opportunity for Justice 
Sotomayor to influence the Roberts Court immediately and the Supreme Court 
institutionally.  The influence of which I speak is not as avatar for so-called (and 
grossly oversimplified and infelicitously stereotyped) “liberal” or “conservative” 
political-legal agendas.  Far more important than the ephemeral legal squabbles of 
 ________________________  
 247. Denis P. Duffey, Jr., Genre And Authority:  The Rise Of Case Reporting In The Early United States, 74 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 263, 266 (1998-2000). 
 248. Id. at 266 n.13 (citing Wheaton’s Reports, Vol. iii, 8 N. Am. Rev. 62, 67 (1818) (reviewing 3 Henry 
Wheaton, Reports of Cases Argued and Adjudged in the Supreme Court of the United States (1818)). 
 249. Duffey, supra note 247, at 267. 
 250. Id.
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the day is the influence Justice Sotomayor has the opportunity to wield in pursuit of 
a goal more enduring. to make the Supreme Court a leader, once again, as a judicial 
communicator, so that its opinions enjoy influence not merely because they are 
“final,” but rather, because they embody higher principles of cognitive excellence.  
By focusing on the context, congruence, segmentation, and audience principles in 
the judicial writing that will emanate from within her chambers, Justice Sotomayor 
may seize a unique opportunity to steer the Supreme Court out of the backwaters 
into which observers argue that it has slowly drifted since the death of its last great 
opinion writer, Justice Robert Jackson.  Should Justice Sotomayor decide to focus 
less on adding yet another paddle to steering the substantive outcomes, and more 
on how the court can persuasively and clearly speak to a wide circle of readers and 
explain its rulings, the reputation of the Supreme Court and of courts everywhere in 
America will be substantially enhanced as those courts follow her lead. Justice 
Sotomayor would therefore make an indelible contribution to American jurispru-
dence that, while not easily distilled into a sound bite or highlighted text-box for 
the practicing bar or for law students, can have an effect on pushing judges at all 
levels to confront the issues we have confronted in Parts I and II, which are the 
requisites to writing opinions to persuade, not merely to pronounce. 
In this endeavor, it is Learned Hand – rather than her preferred ideal of Benja-
min Cardozo251 – that should play Virgil to her Dante.  Learned Hand’s history 
provides a pole star by which Judge Sotomayor may steer her efforts in pursuit of 
this most worthy of goals.   
It was Hand’s very iconic status as an appellate judge that has made our critical 
—and mixed—review of his District Court opinions so much more useful and edu-
cational for the federal courts generally, and for Justice Sotomayor and her Roberts 
Court colleagues in particular, than any collection of gossamer phrases plucked 
from Second Circuit opinions with a meaningless exhortation to “write like B” so 
one might be “quote[d]” like B.252  The exhortation must be to struggle earnestly 
like B—and to recognize that the struggle is not with the law, nor with the facts, but 
rather with our own ability to write for a broad range of “others,” rather than for 
ourselves. 
It is a lesson well learned by those who pass through the refiner’s fire of trial-
court judging.  It is this lesson; above all others; our Supreme Court and its Chief 
Justice must consciously embrace and model for all judges to emulate if America’s
judicial opinions are to begin a reformative path to their former prominence among 
the nations of the world.  And it is Sonia Sotomayor’s opportunity—and perhaps, 
destiny—to catalyze this reformation as she takes up her work on the same Su-
 ________________________  
 251. See Transcript, Sotomayor Confirmation Hearings, Day 2, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2009, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/14/us/politics/14confirm-text.html. 
 252. CHARLES E. WYZANSKI, WHEREAS—A JUDGE’S PREMISES: ESSAYS IN JUDGMENT, ETHICS, AND THE 
LAW 82 (1965)(“it was oft repeated that Gus had better judgment than B—a view shared by Justice Robert H. 
Jackson, who wittily advised the bench and the bar:  ‘Quote B; but follow Gus’” ); see also Telford Taylor, Letter 
to the Editor:  The Judge’s Legacy, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1994, Section 7, page 51 (explaining that in the Second 
Circuit, Learned Hand was known by the initial for his given first name—”B” for “Billings”—while his cousin 
Judge Augustus Hand was known as “Gus”).
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preme Court to which Learned Hand’s ambitions turned, but outran his political 
luck. 
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